DIGRESSION II.
OF THE CONVOCATION AND MODERATION OF SYNODS.
Touching the convocation of synods, we resolve with the Professors of Leyden,[1046] that if a prince do so much as tolerate the order and regiment of the church to be public, his consent and authority should be craved, and he may also design the time, place, and other circumstances; but much more,[1047] if he be a Christian and orthodox prince, should his consent, authority, help, protection, and safeguard be sought and granted. And that according to the example, both of godly kings in the Old Testament, and of Christian emperors and kings in the New.[1048] Chiefly, then, and justly[1049] the magistrate may and ought to urge and require synods, when they of the ecclesiastical order cease from [pg 1-339] doing their duty. Veruntamen si contra,[1050] &c. “Nevertheless (say they), if, contrariwise, the magistrate be an enemy and persecutor of the church and of true religion, or cease to do his duty; that is, to wit, in a manifest danger of the church, the church notwithstanding ought not to be wanting to herself, but ought to use the right and authority of convocation, which first and foremost remaineth with the rulers of the church, as may be seen, Acts xv.”
But that this be not thought a tenet of anti-episcopal writers alone, let us hear what is said by one of our greatest opposites:[1051] Neque defendimus ita, &c.: “Neither do we so defend that the right of convocating councils pertaineth to princes, as that the ecclesiastical prelates may no way either assemble themselves together by mutual consent, or be convocated by the authority of the metropolitan, primate, or patriarch. For the apostles did celebrate councils without any convocation of princes. So many councils that were celebrate before the first Nicea, were, without all doubt, gathered together by the means alone of ecclesiastical persons; for to whom directly the church is fully committed, they ought to bear the care of the church. Yet princes in some respect indirectly, for help and aid, chiefly then when the prelates neglect to convocate councils, or are destitute of power for doing of the same, of duty may, and use to convocate them.” Where we see his judgment to be, that the power of convocating councils pertaineth directly to ecclesiastical persons, and to princes only indirectly, for that they ought to give help and aid to the convocation of the same, especially when churchmen either will not or cannot assemble themselves together. His reasons whereupon he groundeth his judgment are two, and those strong ones.
1. The apostolical councils, Acts vi. 2; iv. 16, and so many as were assembled before the first council of Nice, were not convocated by princes, but by ecclesiastical persons without the leave of princes; therefore, in the like cases, the church ought to use the like liberty, that is, when there is need of synods, either for preventing or reforming some corruptions in the doctrine or policy of the church; and for avoiding such inconveniences as may impede the course of [pg 1-340] the gospel (princes in the meantime being hostile opposites to the truth of God and to the purity of religion), then to convocate the same without their authority and leave.
2. The church is fully committed (and that directly) to the ministers whom Christ hath set to rule over the same; therefore they ought to take care and to provide for all her necessities as those who must give account, and be answerable to God for any hurt which she receiveth in things spiritual or ecclesiastical, for which (when they might) they did not provide a remedy, which being so, it followeth, that when princes will neither convocate synods, nor consent to the convocating of them, yet if the convocating of a synod be a necessary mean for healing of the church's hurt, and ecclesiastical persons be able (through the happy occasion of a fit opportunity) synodically to assemble themselves, in that case they ought by themselves to come together, unless one would say that princes alone, and not pastors, must give account to God how it hath gone with the church in matters spiritual and ecclesiastical.
If it be objected that our divines maintain against Papists, that the right and power of convocating synods pertaineth to princes: Ans., And so say I; but for making the purpose more plain I add three directions: 1. In ordinary cases, and when princes are not enemies to the truth and purity of the gospel, ecclesiastical persons should not do well to assemble themselves together in a synod, except they be convocate with the authority or consent of princes. Yet, as Junius showeth,[1052] in extraordinary cases, and when the magistrate will not concur nor join with the church, the church may well assemble and come together beside his knowledge, and without his consent, for that extraordinary evils must have extraordinary remedies. 2. Ecclesiastical persons may convocate councils simply, and by a spiritual power and jurisdiction; but to convocate them by a temporal and coactive power, pertaineth to princes only. “Ecclesiastical power (saith the Archbishop of Spalato[1053]) may appoint and convocate councils; but yet the ecclesiastical power itself cannot, with any effect or working, compel bishops, especially if the bishops of another province, or kingdom, or patriarchship, be to be convocated. [pg 1-341] For because the church can work by her censures, and deprive them who refuse of her communion, if they come not, yet they shall not therefore come to the council if they contemn the censure; therefore that no man may be able to resist, it is necessary that they be called by a coactive authority, which can constrain them who gainstand, both with banishments and bodily punishments, and compel the bishops, not only of one province, but also of the whole kingdom or empire, to convene.” 3. In the main and substantial respects, the convocations of councils pertaineth to the ministers of the church, that is, as councils are ecclesiastical meetings, for putting order to ecclesiastical matters, they ought to be assembled by the spiritual power of the ministers, whose part it is to espy and note all the misorders and abuses in the church, which must be righted; but because councils are such meetings as must have a certain place designed for them in the dominions and territories of princes, needing further, for their safe assembling, a certification of their princely protection; and, finally, it being expedient for the better success of councils, that Christian princes be present therein, either personal or by their commissioners, that they may understand the councils, conclusions, and decrees, and assenting unto the same, ratify and establish them by their regal and royal authority, because of these circumstances it is, that the consent and authority of Christian princes is, and ought to be, sought and expected for the assembling of synods.
As for the right of presidency and moderation, we distinguish, with Junius,[1054] two sorts of it, both which have place in councils, viz., the moderation of the ecclesiastical action, and the moderation of the human order; and with him we say, that in councils, the whole ecclesiastical action ought to be moderated by such a president as is elected for the purpose; even as Hosius, bishop of Corduba, was chosen to preside in the first council of Nice: which office agreeth not with princes; for in the point of propounding rightly the state of questions and things to be handled, and of containing the disputation in good order, certe præsidere debet persona ecclesiastica, in sacris literis erudita, saith the Archbishop of Spalato.[1055] The [pg 1-342] presiding and moderating in the human order, that is, by a coactive power to compass the turbulent, to avoid all confusion and contention, and to cause a peaceable proceeding and free deliberation, pertaineth indeed to princes, and so did Constantine preside in the same council of Nice.