In the debating of a question of faith, kings have not, by virtue of their princely vocation, any precedency or chief place, the action being merely ecclesiastical. For howbeit kings may convocate a council, preside also and govern the same as concerning the human and political order, yet, saith Junius,[1062] Actiones, deliberationes, et definitiones, ad substantiam rei ecclesiasticae pertinentes, a sacerdotio sunt, a caetu servoram Dei, quibus rei suoe administrationem mandavit Deus. And, with him, the Archbishop of Spalato saith, in like manner,[1063] that howbeit Christian princes have convocated councils, and civilly governed the same, yet they had no power nor authority in the very discussing, handling and deciding of matters of faith.
What then? In the handling of controversies of faith, have princes no place nor power at all beside that of political government only? Surely, by virtue of their princely authority, they have no other place in the handling of these matters. Yet, what if they be men of singular learning and understanding in the Scriptures? Then [pg 1-346] let them propound their own suffrage, with the grounds and reasons of it, even as other learned men in the council do. But neither as princes, nor as men singularly learned, may they require that others in the council shall dispute and debate matters, and that they themselves shall sit as judges having judicial power of a negative voice; for in a council no man's voice hath any greater strength than his reasons and probation have. Non enim admitto, &c: “For I admit not in a council (saith the same prelate[1064]) some as judges, others as disputators, for I have showed that a conciliary judgment consisteth in the approbation of that sentence which, above others, hath been showed to have most weight, and to which no man could enough oppose. Wherefore no man in the council ought to have a judiciary voice, unless he be withal a disputator, and assigns a reason wherefore he assigns to that judgment and repels another, and that reason such a one as is drawn from the Scripture only, and from antiquity.”
Lastly, I hold, that, after the definition and decision of a council, princes may not take upon them, by any judicial power or public vocation, to examine the same, as if they had authority to pronounce yet another decisive sentence, either ratifying or reversing what the council hath decreed. Most certain it is, that, before princes give their royal assent unto the decrees of any council whatsoever, and compel men to receive and acknowledge the same, they ought, first of all, carefully to try and examine them whether they agree with the Scriptures or not; and, if they find them not to agree with the Scriptures, then to deny their assent and authority thereto. But all the princes do not by any judicial power or public authority, but only by the judgment of private discretion, which they have as Christians, and which, together with them, is common also to their subjects; for neither may a master of a family commend to his children and servants the profession of that faith which is published by the decrees of a council, except, in like manner, he examine the same by the Scriptures.
DIGRESSION IV.
OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS, AND ECCLESIASTICAL CENSURES.
Ecclesiastical censures and punishments, wherewith delinquents are bound, and from which, when they turn penitents, they are loosed, are of two sorts: either such as are common, and agree unto all, as excommunication and absolution; or such as are peculiar, and agree only to men of ecclesiastical order, as suspension, deprivation, &c.
As touching the power of the keys, to bind and loose, excommunicate and absolve; first of all, princes are to remember, that neither they may, by themselves, exercise this power (for regum est corporalem irrogare paenam; sacerdotum spiritualem inferre vindictam[1065]), nor yet by their deputies or commissioners in their name, and with authority from them; because, as they have not themselves the power of the keys, so neither can they communicate the same unto others. Secondly, Forasmuch as princes are the wardens, defenders, and revengers of both the Tables, they ought, therefore, to provide and take course that neither laymen be permitted to have and exercise, the power of excommunication, nor yet that the prelates themselves be suffered, in their particular dioceses, to appropriate this power and external jurisdiction, as peculiar to themselves; but that it remain in their hands to whom it pertaineth by divine institution. What a woeful abuse is it, that, in our neighbour churches of England and Ireland, the bishop's vicar-general, or official, or commissary, being oftentimes such a one as hath never entered into any holy orders, shall sit in his courts to use (I should have said abuse) the power of excommunication and absolution? And what though some silly presbyter be present in the court? Doth not the bishop's substitute, being a layman, examine and judge the whole matter, decree, and give sentence what is to be done? Hath he not the presbyter's tongue tied to his belt? And what doth the presbyter more but only pronounce the sentence according to that which he who sitteth judge in the court hath decreed and decerned? As touching the prelates themselves, I pray, by what warrant have they appropriated [pg 1-348] to themselves the whole external jurisdiction of binding and loosing, excommunicating and absolving? But that we may a little scan this their usurpation, and discover the iniquity thereof to the view of the princes, whose part it is to cause the same to be reformed, let us consider to whom Christ himself, who hath the key of David (Rev. iii. 7), who openeth and no man shutteth, and shutteth and no man openeth, hath committed this power of the keys to be used on earth. And, first, Let us distinguish betwixt the power itself, and the execution of it.
The power and authority of binding and loosing Christ hath delivered to the whole church, that is, to every particular church collectively taken. “The authority of excommunication pertaineth to the whole church,” saith Dr Fulk.[1066] Jus excommunicandi, saith Balduine,[1067] non est penes quamvis privatum, sive ex ordine sit ecclesiastico, sive politico, &c. Sed hoc jus pertiner ad totam ecclesiam. So say Zanchius (in 4 Praec., col. 756), Polanus (Synt., lib. 7, cap. 18), Pareus (in 1 Cor. v., De Excom.), Cartwright (on 1 Cor. v. 4), Perkins (on Jude 3): and, generally, all our sound writers. The Magdeburgians[1068] cite, for the same judgment, Augustine and Primatius. Gerhard[1069] citeth also some popish writers assenting hereunto. The reasons which we give for confirmation hereof are these:—
1. It pertaineth to the whole church, collectively taken, to deny her Christian communion to such wicked persons as add contumacy to their disobedience: therefore, it pertaineth to the whole church to excommunicate them. Again, it pertaineth to the whole church to admit and receive one into her communion and familiar fellowship: therefore, to the whole church it likewise pertaineth to cast one out of her communion. Sure, the sentence of excommunication is pronounced in vain, except the whole church cut off the person thus judged from all communion with her: and the sentence of absolution is to as little purpose pronounced, except the whole church admit one again to have communion with her. Shortly, the whole church hath the power of punishing a man, by denying her communion unto him: therefore, the whole church hath the power of judging that he [pg 1-349] ought to be so punished. The whole church hath the power of remitting this punishment again: therefore, the whole church hath the power of judging that it ought to be remitted.