To us the particulars of sense stand first, and are the earliest objects of knowledge. To us, means to the large variety of individual minds, which grow up imperceptibly from the simple capacities of infancy to the mature accomplishments of adult years; each acquiring its own stock of sensible impressions, remembered, compared, associated; and each learning a language, which both embodies in general terms and propositions the received classification of objects, and communicates the current emotional beliefs. We all begin by being learners; and we ascend by different paths to those universal notions and beliefs which constitute the common fund of the advanced intellect; developed in some minds into principia of philosophy with their consequences. By nature, or absolutely, these principia are considered as prior, and as forming the point of departure: the advanced position is regarded as gained, and the march taken is not that of the novice, but that of the trained adult, who having already learnt much, is doubly equipped either for learning more or for teaching others; who thus stands on a summit from whence he surveys nature as a classified and coherent whole, manifesting herself in details which he can interpret and sometimes predict. The path of knowledge, seen relatively to us, is one through particulars, by way of example to fresh particulars, or by way of induction to universals. The path of knowledge, by nature or absolutely, is from universals by way of deduction either to new universals or to new particulars. By the cognitive nature of man, Aristotle means the full equipment, of and for cognition, which our mature age exhibits; notiora naturâ are the acquisitions, points of view, and processes, familiar in greater or less perfection to such mature individuals and societies. Notiora nobis are the facts and processes with which all of us begin, and which belong to the intellect in its highest as well as its lowest stage; though, in the higher stages, they are employed, directed, and modified, by an acquired intellectual capital, and by the permanent machinery of universal significant terms in which that capital is invested.
Such is the antithesis between notiora naturâ (or simpliciter) and notiora nobis (or quoad nos), which Aristotle recognizes as a capital point in his philosophy, and insists upon in many of his writings. The antithesis is represented by Example and Induction, in the point of view — quoad nos — last mentioned; by Syllogism or Deduction, in the other point of view — naturâ. Induction (he says),[68] or the rising from particulars to universals, is plainer, more persuasive, more within the cognizance of sensible perception, more within the apprehension of mankind generally, than Syllogism; but Syllogism is more cogent and of greater efficacy against controversial opponents. What he affirms here about Induction is equally true about the inference from Example, that is, the inference from one or some particulars, to other analogous particulars; the rudimentary intellectual process, common to all human and to many animal minds, of which Induction is an improvement and an exaltation. While Induction will be more impressive, and will carry assent more easily with an ordinary uncultivated mind, an acute disputant may always deny the ultimate inference, for the denial involves no contradiction. But the rightly constructed Syllogism constrains assent;[69] the disputant cannot grant the premisses and deny the conclusion without contradicting himself. The constraining force, however, does not come into accurate and regulated working until the principles and conditions of deductive reasoning have been set forth — until the Syllogism has been analysed, and the characteristics of its validity, as distinguished from its invalidity, have been marked out. This is what Aristotle teaches in the Analytica and Topica. It admits of being set out in regular figure and mode — forms of premisses with the conclusion appropriate to each; and the lesson must be learnt before we can know how far the force of deductive reasoning, which begins with the notiora naturâ, is legitimately binding and trustworthy.
[68] Aristot. Topica, I. xii. p. 105, a. 13-19: ἐπαγωγὴ δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος· οἷον εἰ ἔστι κυβερνήτης ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κράτιστος καὶ ἡνίοχος, καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἕκαστον ἄριστος. ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν· ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον. Also the same treatise. VI. iv. p. 141, b. 17.
The inductive interrogations of Sokrates relating to matters of common life, and the way in which they convinced ordinary hearers, are strikingly illustrated in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, especially IV. vi.: πολὺ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχεν (15). The same can hardly be said of the Platonic dialogues.
[69] Bacon, Novum Organ. I. Aphor. 13:— “Syllogismus assensum constringit, non res.�
Both the two main points of Aristotle’s doctrine — the antithesis between Induction and Deduction, and the dependence of the latter process upon premisses furnished by the former, so that the two together form the two halves of complete ratiocination and authoritative proof — both these two are confused and darkened by his attempt to present the Inductive inference and the Analogical or Paradeigmatic inference as two special forms of Syllogistic deduction.[70] But when we put aside this attempt, and adhere to Aristotle’s main doctrine — of Induction as a process antithetical to and separate from Deduction, yet as an essential preliminary thereto, — we see that it forms the basis of that complete and comprehensive System of Logic, recently elaborated in the work of Mr. John Stuart Mill. The inference from Example (i.e. from some particulars to other similar particulars) is distinguished by Aristotle from Induction, and is recognized by him as the primitive intellectual energy, common to all men, through which Induction is reached; its results he calls Experience (ἐμπειρία), and he describes it as the real guide, more essential than philosophical generalities, to exactness of performance in detail.[71] Mr. John Mill has been the first to assign to Experience, thus understood, its full value and true position in the theory of Ratiocination; and to show that the Paradeigmatic process exhibits the prime and ultimate reality of all Inference, the real premisses and the real conclusion which Inference connects together. Between these two is interposed the double process of which Induction forms the first half and Deduction the second; neither the one nor the other being indispensable to Inference, but both of them being required as securities for Scientific inference, if we desire to have its correctness tested and its sufficiency certified; the real evidence, whereby the conclusion of a Syllogism is proved, being the minor premiss, together with (not the major premiss itself, but) the assemblage of particular facts from which by Induction the major premiss is drawn. Now Aristotle had present to his mind the conception of Inference as an entire process, enabling us from some particular truths to discover and prove other particular truths: he considers it as an unscientific process, of which to a limited extent other animals besides man are capable, and which, as operative under the title of Experience in mature practical men, is a safer guide than Science amidst the doubts and difficulties of action. Upon this foundation he erects the superstructure of Science; the universal propositions acquired through Induction, and applied again to particulars or to lower generalities, through the rules of the deductive Syllogism. He signalizes, with just emphasis, the universalizing point of view called Science or Theory; but he regards it as emerging from particular facts, and as travelling again downwards towards particular facts. The misfortune is, that he contents himself with barely recognizing, though he distinctly proclaims the necessity of, the inductive part of this complex operation; while he bestows elaborate care upon the analysis of the deductive part, and of the rules for conducting it. From this disproportionate treatment, one half of Logic is made to look like the whole; Science is disjoined from Experience, and is presented as consisting in Deduction alone; every thing which is not Deduction, is degraded into unscientific Experience; the major premiss of the Syllogism being considered as part of the proof of the conclusion, and the conclusion being necessarily connected therewith, we appear to have acquired a locus standi and a binding cogency such as Experience could never supply; lastly, when Aristotle resolves Induction into a peculiar variety of the Syllogism, he appears finally to abolish all its separate dignity and jurisdiction. This one-sided view of Logic has been embraced and perpetuated by the Aristotelian expositors, who have carefully illustrated, and to a certain extent even amplified, the part which was already in comparative excess, while they have added nothing to the part that was in defect, and have scarcely even preserved Aristotle’s recognition of it as being not merely legitimate but essential. The vast body of Inductive Science, accumulated during the last three centuries, has thus, until recently, been allowed to grow up, as if its proofs and processes had nothing to do with Logic.
[70] Heyder (in his learned treatise, Darstellung der Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik, p. 226), after having considered the unsatisfactory process whereby Aristotle attempts to resolve Induction into a variety of Syllogism, concludes by a remark which I think just:— “Aus alle dem erhellt zur Genüge, dass sich Aristoteles bei dem Versuch die Induction auf eine Schlussform zurückzuführen, selbst sich nicht recht befriedigt fühlte, und derselbe wohl nur aus seinem durchgängigen Bestreben zu erklären ist, alles wissenschaftliche Verfahren in die Form des Schlusses zu bringen; dass dagegen, seiner eigentlichen Meinung und der strengen Consequenz seiner Lehre zu Folge, die Induction zum syllogistischen und beweisenden Verfahren einen in dem Begriff der beiden Verfahrungsweisen liegenden Gegensatz bildete, was sich ihm dann auch auf das Verhältniss der Induction zur Begriffsbestimmung ausdehnen musste.�
[71] Aristot. Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 12; xxvi. p. 69, a. 17. Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30, seq.; xiii. p. 97, b. 7. Topica, VIII. i. p. 155, b. 35; p. 156, b. 10; p. 157, a. 14-23; p. 160, a. 36. Metaphys. A. i. p. 980, b. 25-p. 981, a. 30. This first chapter of the Metaphysica is one of the most remarkable passages of Aristotle, respecting the analytical philosophy of mind.
But though this restricted conception of Logic or the theory of Reasoning has arisen naturally from Aristotle’s treatment, I maintain that it does not adequately represent his view of that theory. In his numerous treatises on other subjects, scarcely any allusion is made to the Syllogism; nor is appeal made to the rules for it laid down in the Analytica. His conviction that the formalities of Deduction were only one part of the process of general reasoning, and that the value of the final conclusion depended not merely upon their being correctly performed, but also upon the correctness of that initial part whereby they are supplied with matter for premisses — is manifested as well by his industry (unrivalled among his contemporaries) in collecting multifarious facts, as by his specific declarations respecting Induction. Indeed, a recent most erudite logician, Sir William Hamilton, who insists upon the construction of Logic in its strictest sense as purely formal, blames Aristotle[72] for having transgressed this boundary, and for introducing other considerations bearing on diversities of matter and of material evidence. The charge so made, to whatever extent it is well-founded, does rather partake of the nature of praise; inasmuch as it evinces Aristotle’s larger views of the theory of Inference, and confirms his own statement that the Deductive process was only the last half of it, presupposing a prior Induction. It is only this last half that Aristotle has here analysed, setting forth its formal conditions with precepts founded thereupon; while he claims to have accomplished the work by long and patient investigation, having found not the smallest foundation laid by others, and bespeaks indulgence[73] as for a first attempt requiring to be brought to completion by others. He made this first step for himself; and if any one would make a second step, so as to apply the same analysis to the other half, and to bring out in like manner the formal conditions and principles of Induction, we may fairly believe that Aristotle would have welcomed the act, as filling up what he himself recognized to be a gap in the entire compass of Reasoning. As to his own achievement, it is certain that he could not have composed the Analytica and Topica, if he had not had before him many specimens of the deductive process to study and compare. Neither could the inductive process have been analysed, until after the examples of successful advance in inductive science which recent years have furnished. Upon these examples, mainly, has been based the profound System of Mr. John Stuart Mill, analysing and discriminating the formalities of Induction in the same way as those of Deduction had before been handled by Aristotle; also fusing the two together as co-operative towards one comprehensive scheme of Logic — the Logic of Evidence generally, or of Truth as discoverable and proveable. In this scheme the Syllogistic Theory, or Logic of Consistency between one proposition and others, is recognized as an essential part, but is no longer tolerated as an independent whole.[74]
[72] See his Discussions on Philosophy, p. 139, seq.; Lectures on Logic, vol. i. p. 27.