[88] Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 6: τὸ δὲ καθόλου τίμιον, ὅτι δηλοῖ τὸ αἴτιον· ὥστε περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ καθόλου τιμιωτέρα τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς νοήσεως, ὅσων ἕτερον τὸ αἴτιον· περὶ δὲ τῶν πρώτων ἄλλος λόγος.
By τὰ πρῶτα, he means the ἀρχαὶ of Demonstration, which are treated especially in II. xix. See Biese, Die Philos. des Aristoteles, p. 277.
[89] Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 9-17. ἔστι μέντοι ἔνια ἀναγόμενα εἰς αἰσθήσεως ἔκλειψιν ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν· ἔνια γὰρ εἰ ἑώρωμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐζητοῦμεν, οὐχ ὡς εἰδότες τῷ ὁρᾷν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔχοντες τὸ καθόλου ἐκ τοῦ ὁρᾷν.
The text of this and the succeeding words seems open to doubt, as well as that of Themistius (p. 63). Waitz in his note (p. 374) explains the meaning clearly:— “non ita quidem ut ipsa sensuum perceptio scientiam afferat; sed ita ut quod in singulis accidere videamus, idem etiam in omnibus accidere coniicientes universe intelligamus.�
Aristotle next proceeds to refute, at some length, the supposition, that the principia of all syllogisms are the same. We see at once that this cannot be so, because some syllogisms are true, others false. But, besides, though there are indeed a few Axioms essential to the process of demonstration, and the same in all syllogisms, yet these are not sufficient of themselves for demonstration. There must farther be other premisses or matters of evidence — propositions immediately true (or established by prior demonstrations) belonging to each branch of Science specially, as distinguished from the others. Our demonstration relates to these special matters or premisses, though it is accomplished out of or by means of the common Axioms.[90]
[90] Analyt. Post. I. xxxii. p. 88, a. 18-b. 29. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ διτταί, ἐξ ὧν τε καὶ περὶ ὃ· αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ὧν κοιναί, αἱ δὲ περὶ ὅ ἴδιαι, οἷον ἀριθμός, μέγεθος. Compare xi. p. 77, a. 27. See Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Plan Général des Derniers Analytiques, p. lxxxi.
Science or scientific Cognition differs from true Opinion, and the cognitum from the opinatum, herein, that Science is of the Universal, and through necessary premisses which cannot be otherwise; while Opinion relates to matters true, yet which at the same time may possibly be false. The belief in a proposition which is immediate (i. e., undemonstrable) yet not necessary, is Opinion; it is not Science, nor is it Noûs or Intellect — the principium of Science or scientific Cognition. Such beliefs are fluctuating, as we see every day; we all distinguish them from other beliefs, which we cannot conceive not to be true and which we call cognitions.[91] But may there not be Opinion and Cognition respecting the same matters? There may be (says Aristotle) in different men, or in the same man at different times; but not in the same man at the same time. There may also be, respecting the same matter, true opinion in one man’s mind, and false opinion in the mind of another.[92]
[91] Analyt. Post. I. xxxiii. p. 88, b. 30-p. 89, a. 10.
[92] Ibid. p. 89, a. 11-b. 6. That eclipse of the sun is caused by the interposition of the moon was to the astronomer Hipparchos scientific Cognition; for he saw that it could not be otherwise. To the philosopher Epikurus it was Opinion; for he thought that it might be otherwise (Themistius, p. 66, Spengel).
With some remarks upon Sagacity, or the power of divining a middle term in a time too short for reflection (as when the friendship of two men is on the instant referred to the fact of their having a common enemy), the present book is brought to a close.[93]