[43] Ibid. a. 18-22: φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἂν οὕτω βαδίζων ἔλθῃ εἰς ταῦτα ὧν μηκέτι ἐστὶ διαφορά, ἕξει τὸν λόγον τῆς οὐσίας.

To obtain or put together a definition through logical Division, three points are to be attended to.[44] Collect the predicates in Quid; range them in the proper order; make sure that there are no more, or that you have collected all. The essential predicates are genera, to be obtained not otherwise than by the method (dialectical) used in concluding accidents. As regards order, you begin with the highest genus, that which is predicable of all the others, while none of these is predicable of it, determining in like fashion the succession of the rest respectively. The collection will be complete, if you divide the highest genus by an exhaustive specific difference, such that every thing must be included in one or other of the two proximate and opposed portions; and then taking the species thus found as your dividendum, subdivide it until no lower specific difference can be found, or you obtain from the elements an exact equivalent to the subject.[45]

[44] Ibid. a. 23: εἰς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν ὅρον διὰ διαιρέσεων. The Scholiast, p. 248, a. 41, explains κατασκευάζειν by εὑρεῖν, συνθεῖναι, ἀποδοῦναι. He distinguishes it from ἀποδεικνύναι; demonstration of the definition being impracticable.

[45] Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, a. 23 seq. See Waitz, Comm. p. 418.

When the investigation must proceed by getting together a group of similar particulars, you compare them, and note what is the same in all; then turn to another group which are the same in genere yet differ in specie from the first group, and have a different point of community among themselves. You next compare the point of community among the members of the first group, and that among the members of the second group. If the two points of community can be brought under one rational formula, that will be the definition of the subject; but if at the end of the process, the distinct points of community are not found resolvable into any final one, this proves that the supposed definiendum is not one but two or more.[46] For example, suppose you are investigating, What is the essence or definition of magnanimity? You must study various magnanimous individuals, and note what they have in common quâ magnanimous.[47] Thus, Achilles, Ajax, Alkibiades were all magnanimous. Now, that which the three had in common was, that they could not endure to be insulted; on that account Alkibiades went to war with his countrymen, Achilles was angry and stood aloof from the Greeks, Ajax slew himself. But, again, you find two other magnanimous men, Sokrates and Lysander. These two had in common the quality, that they maintained an equal and unshaken temper both in prosperity and adversity. Now when you have got thus far, the question to be examined is, What is the point of identity between the temper that will not endure insult, and the temper that remains undisturbed under all diversities of fortune? If an identity can be found, this will be the essence or definition of magnanimity; to which will belong equanimity as one variety, and intolerance of insult as another. If, on the contrary, no identity can be found, you will then have two distinct mental dispositions, without any common definition.[48]

[46] Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 7-15. πάλιν σκοπεῖν εἰ ταὐτὸν ἕως ἂν εἰς ἕνα ἔλθῃ λόγον· οὗτος γὰρ ἔσται τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμός. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βαδίζῃ εἰς ἕνα ἀλλ’ εἰς δύο ἢ πλείω, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἕν τι εἶναι τὸ ζητούμενον, ἀλλὰ πλείω.

[47] Ibid. b. 16: σκεπτέον ἐπί τινων μεγαλοψύχων, οὓς ἴσμεν, τί ἔχουσιν ἓν πάντες ᾗ τοιοῦτοι.

[48] Ibid. b. 17-25. ταῦτα δύο λαβὼν σκοπῶ τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχουσιν ἥ τε ἀπάθεια ἡ περὶ τὰς τύχας καὶ ἡ μὴ ὑπομονὴ ἀτιμαζομένων. εἰ δὲ μηδέν, δύο εἴδη ἂν εἴη τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας.

Æquam memento rebus in arduis
Servare mentem: non secus in bonis
Ab insolenti temperatam
Lætitiâ. — HORACE. Ode, ii. 3.

Aristotle says that there will be two species of magnanimity. But surely if the two so-called species connote nothing in common they are not rightly called species, nor is magnanimity rightly called a genus. Equanimity would be distinct from magnanimity; Sokrates and Lysander would not properly be magnanimous but equanimous.