[82] Topic. II. ii. p. 109, a. 34: εἷς μὲν δὴ τόπος τὸ ἐπιβλέπειν εἰ τὸ κατ’ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ὑπάρχον ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἀποδέδωκεν. ἁμαρτάνεται δὲ μάλιστα τοῦτο περὶ τὰ γένη, οἷον εἴ τις τῷ λευκῷ φαίη συμβεβηκέναι χρώματι εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ συμβέβηκε τῷ λευκῷ χρώματι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ γένος αὐτοῦ τὸ χρῶμά ἐστιν.
[83] We may find cases in which Aristotle has not been careful to maintain the strict logical sense of συμβεβηκός or συμβέβηκεν where he applies these terms to Genus or Proprium: e.g. Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 24; Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 1.
2. Suppose the thesis set up by the respondent to be an universal affirmative, or an universal negative. You (the interrogator or assailant) should review the particulars contained under these universals. Review them not at once as separate individuals, but as comprised in subordinate genera and species; beginning from the highest, and descending down to the lowest species which is not farther divisible except into individuals. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The cognition of opposites is one and the same cognition; you will investigate whether this can be truly predicated respecting all the primary species of Opposita: respecting Relata and Correlata, respecting Contraries, respecting Contradictories, respecting Habitus and Privatio. If, by going thus far, you obtain no result favourable to your purpose,[84] you must proceed farther, and subdivide until you come to the lowest species:— Is the cognition of just and unjust one and the same? that of double and half? of sight and blindness? of existence and non-existence? If in all, or in any one, of these cases you can show that the universal thesis does not hold, you will have gained your point of refuting it. On the other hand, if, when you have enumerated many particulars, the thesis is found to hold in all, the respondent is entitled to require you to grant it as an universal proposition, unless you can produce a satisfactory counter-example. If you decline this challenge, you will be considered an unreasonable debater.[85]
[84] Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 20: κἂν ἐπὶ τούτων μήπω φανερὸν ᾖ, πάλιν ταῦτα διαιρετέον μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων, οἷον εἰ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, &c.
[85] Ibid. b. 25-30. ἐὰν γὰρ μηδέτερον τούτων ποιῇ, ἄτοπος φανεῖται μὴ τιθείς.
3. You will find it useful to define both the accident predicated in the thesis, and the subject respecting which it is predicated, or at least one of them: you will see then whether these definitions reveal anything false in the affirmation of the thesis. Thus, if the thesis affirms that it is possible to do injustice to a god, you will define what is meant by doing injustice. The definition is — hurting intentionally: you can thus refute the thesis by showing that no injustice to a god can possibly be done; for a god cannot be hurt.[86] Or let the thesis maintained be, The virtuous man is envious. You define envy, and you find that it is — vexation felt by reason of the manifest success of some meritorious man. Upon this definition it is plain that the virtuous man cannot feel envy: he would be worthless, if he did feel it. Perhaps some of the terms employed in your definition may themselves require definition; if so, you will repeat the process of defining until you come to something plain and clear.[87] Such an analysis will often bring out some error at first unperceived in the thesis.
[86] Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 34: οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται βλάπτεσθαι τὸν θεόν.
[87] Ibid. p. 110, a. 4: λαμβάνειν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὀνομάτων λόγους, καὶ μὴ ἀφίστασθαι ἕως ἂν εἰς γνώριμον ἔλθῃ.
4. It will be advisable, both for assailant and respondent, to discriminate those cases in which the authority of the multitude is conclusive from those in which it is not. Thus, in regard to the meaning of terms and in naming objects, we must speak like the multitude; but, when the question is as to what objects deserve to be denominated so and so, we must not feel bound by the multitude, if there be any special dissentient authority.[88] That which produces good health we must call wholesome, as the multitude do; but, in calling this or that substance wholesome, the physician must be our guide.
[88] Ibid. a. 14-22.