[24] Ibid. a. 10: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα πεπέρανται καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ πράγματα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἄπειρά ἐστιν. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν πλείω τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοὔνομα τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν.
In dialectical procedure, the Sophist and the litigious debater aim at the accomplishment of five distinguishable ends:— (1) To refute, or obtain the false appearance of refuting, the thesis; (2) To catch, or appear to catch, the opponent in affirming something false or contradictory; (3) Or in affirming something paradoxical; (4) Or in uttering incorrect and ungrammatical speech; (5) Or in tautological repetition. The first of these five ends is what the Sophist most desires; where that cannot be had, then, as secondary purposes, the succeeding four, in the order in which they are enumerated.[25]
[25] Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 12-22.
The syllogism whereby the Sophist appears to refute without really refuting, is either faulty in form, or untrue in matter, or irrelevant to the purpose. The Fallacies that he employs to bring about this deceitful appearance of refutation are various, and may be distributed first under two great divisions:—
I. Fallaciæ Dictionis.
II. Fallaciæ Extra Dictionem.
I. The first division — Fallaciæ Dictionis — includes all those cases wherein, under the same terms or propositions, more than one meaning is expressed. Six heads may be distinguished:—
1. Homonymy (Equivocation): where the double meaning resides in one single term — noun or verb.
2. Amphiboly: where the double meaning resides, not in a single word but, in a combination of words — proposition, phrase, or sentence.
3. Conjunction (hardly distinguishable from that immediately preceding — Amphiboly).