Now, in regard to the distinction of aim or disposition drawn by Aristotle between the dialectical disputant and the litigious or sophistic disputant, we see at once, as was before suggested, that it lies apart from the critical estimate of art, science, or philosophy; and that it belongs, so far as it is well founded, to the estimate of individuals ethically and politically, as worthy men or patriotic citizens. Whether Euripides or Sophokles composed finer tragedies (as we find argued in the Ranæ of Aristophanes), must be decided by examining the tragedies themselves, not by enquiring whether one of them was vain and greedy of money, the other free from these blemishes. A theorist who is laying down general principles of Rhetoric, and illustrating them by the study of Æschines and Demosthenes, will appreciate the oration against Ktesiphon and the oration De Coronâ in their character of compositions intended for a particular purpose. For Rhetoric it is of no moment whether Æschines was venal or disinterested — a malignant rival or an honest patriot; this is an enquiry important indeed, but belonging to the historian and not to the rhetorical theorist. Whether Aristotle was or was not guided, in his animadversions on Plato, by an unworthy and captious jealousy of his master, is an interesting question in reference to his character; but our appreciation of his philosophy must proceed upon an examination, not of his motives but, of his doctrines and reasonings as we find them. A good argument is not deprived of its force when enunciated by a knave, nor is a bad argument rendered good because it proceeds from a virtuous man. Indeed, so far as the character of the speaker counts at all, in falsifying the fair logical estimate of an argument, it operates in a direction opposite to that here indicated by Aristotle. The same argument in the mouth of one who is esteemed and admired counts for more than its worth; in the mouth of a person of low character it counts for less than it is worth.[55] To distribute arguments into two classes — those employed by persons of dishonourable character and those employed by honourable men — is a departure from the scientific character of Logic.
[55] Eurip. Hecub. 293.
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τὸ δ’ ἀξίωμα, κἂν καῶς λέγῃς, τὸ σὸν πείσει· λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τ’ ἀδοξούντων ἰὼν κἂκ τῶν δοκούντων αὐτὸς οὐ ταὐτὸν σθένει. |
Aristot. Rhetoric. I. ii. p. 1356, a. 5-15.
As to the other part of the case (if it is still necessary to recur to it), touching the peculiarity of the matter of sophistical arguments, the inconsistency of Aristotle is most apparent. In enumerating the Sophistical Refutations he tells us that these fallacies are indeed sometimes palpable and easily detected, but that they are often very difficult to detect and very misleading; that an unprepared hearer will generally be imposed upon by several of them, and even a scientific hearer by some; and that, even where the fallacy does not actually deceive, the proper mode of meeting and exposing it will not occur unless to one previously exercised in Dialectic.[56] That Fallacies In Dictione, taken as a class (though these are what he declares to be the most usual modus operandi of the sham dialecticians called Sophists[57]), often passed unperceived, and were hard to solve and elucidate even when perceived — we know to have been his opinion; for it is not only in the Topica and Sophistici Elenchi, but also in the Metaphysica and other works,[58] that he takes pains to analyse and discriminate the several distinct meanings borne by terms familiar to every one, such as idem, unum, pulchrum, bonum, amare, album, acutum, &c., which terms therefore, when employed in argument, were always liable to introduce a fallacy of Equivocation or Amphiboly. He tells us the like in specifying the seven Fallacies Extra Dictionem: that they also were often unnoticed, and required vigilant practice to see through and solve. The description in detail, therefore, which Aristotle gives (in Sophistici Elenchi) of the working process peculiar to the litigious Sophist, is completely at variance with the definition which he had given of the sophistic syllogism at the commencement of the Topica. That definition is indeed suitable for the type-specimens which he and other logicians give to illustrate this or that class of Fallacies: the type-specimen produced must carry absurdity on the face of it, so that the reader may at first sight recognize it as a fallacy; and he may even find difficulty in believing that any one can really be imposed upon by such trifling. But, though suitable for the type-specimen taken separately, this definition fails in the essential character which Aristotle postulates for a definition, since it is quite untrue and unsuitable for numerous instances of the class intended to be illustrated.[59] Aristotle was the first who attempted to distribute Fallacies into classes, such that, while in each class there were certain specimens palpably stamped with the fallacious character, there were also in each class an indefinite multitude of analogous cases wherein the fallacious character did not reveal itself openly or easily, but required attentive consideration to detect it, often indeed remaining undetected, and producing its natural fruit of error and confusion. This was one of his many great merits in regard to Logic; and the classification of Fallacies (modified as to details) has passed to all subsequent logicians, so that we find difficulty in understanding that the contemporaries of Sokrates and Plato had no idea of it. But the value of his service to Logic would be much lessened, if all fallacies were sophistic syllogisms, intended to deceive but never really deceiving, corresponding to his definition at the beginning of the Topica; if (as he tells us in the Sophistici Elenchi) they were only impudent forgeries put in circulation by a set of professional knaves called Sophists; and if all non-sophistical dialecticians, and all the world without, could be trusted as speaking correctly by nature and as never falling into them.
[56] Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 5-15, b. 5-35. καὶ λανθάνει πολλάκις οὐχ ἧττον αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας τὸ τοιοῦτον. — vii. p. 169, a. 22-30, b. 8-15: ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν. — xv. p. 175, a. 20.
[57] Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 2-20.
[58] Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39; p. 106, b. 3-9; p. 107, a. 12, b. 7: πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς λόγοις λανθάνει παρακολουθοῦν τὸ ὁμώνυμον. Cf. Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 33; V. ii. p. 129, b. 30, seq.; VI. x. p. 148, a. 23, seq. Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 17.
Compare also Book Δ. of the Metaphysica, and the frequent recognition and analysis τῶν πολλάκῶς λεγομένων throughout the other Books of the Metaphysica.
[59] Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 26: δεῖ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμὸν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀληθεύεσθαι. — VI. x. p. 148, x. p. 148, b. 2: δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ συνώνυμον ἐφαρμόττειν.