[71] Topic. I. v. p. 102, a. 13; I. xiii. p. 105, a. 22; VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 31-b. 2.
[72] Aristotle himself observes this, Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 14.
A third manœuvre treated as peculiar to the Sophist is — that he takes account of the particular philosophical sect to which the respondent belongs, and endeavours to bring out by interrogations whatever there may be paradoxical in the tenets of that sect.[73] But would not any expert Dialectician do just the same? What else would be done by Sokrates, if cross-examining an Anaxagorean or a Herakleitean? or by Aristotle himself, if interrogating a Platonist?
[73] Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 29.
Another proceeding treated as peculiar to the Sophist is — that he seeks to drive the respondent into a paradox, by bringing out in cross-examination certain well-known antitheses or contradictions which subsist together in the opinions of mankind. Thus, men profess in their public talk high principles of virtue; but secretly and at the bottom of their hearts they desire to get wealth or power per fas et nefas. Again, there are two kinds of justice: one, that which is just by nature and in truth, such as wise men or philosophers approve; the other, that which is just according to law or custom, such as the multitude in this or in in some other society approve. There is, also, conflict between the authority of a father, and that of the wise; between justice and expediency; and as to whether it is more eligible to suffer wrong or to do wrong.[74] All these antitheses are presented to us in the Platonic Gorgias, to which (i.e., to the speech of Kallikles therein) Aristotle here makes reference; and he numbers it among the vices distinguishing the Sophist from the genuine Dialectician — to dwell upon such antitheses for the purpose of forcing the respondent into paradoxical answers. But, surely, the antitheses here fastened upon that obnoxious name are of a class utterly opposed to the class of pseudo-probabilia, which he tells us are the peculiar game of the litigious Sophist, though every man of ordinary intelligence detects them at first sight as fallacies. They are all real and serious issues,[75] having plausible arguments pro and con, debateable without end, and settled by every man for himself according to his own sentiment and predisposition. They are exactly the subject-matter best fitted for the acute Dialectician. No man would be allowed by Aristotle to deserve that title, if he omitted to raise and argue them, the thesis being supposed suitable.[76] Aristotle himself speaks often of the equivocal sense of the term justice — of the distinction between what is just by nature and what is just according to some local or peculiar sentiment.[77] The manœuvre which Aristotle imputes to the Sophist being exactly the same as that which Kallikles imputes to Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias,[78] it is Sokrates, and not Kallikles, who serves here as illustrating what Aristotle calls a Sophist. Indeed, if we read the Gorgias, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates there represented as neglecting the difference between what is probable (conformable to received opinion) and what is paradoxical. He admits that he stands alone in his opinion, against all the world, and his opponents even imagine that he is bantering them; but he confides in his own individual reason and consistency, so as to be able to reduce all opponents dialectically to proved contradiction with themselves.[79] Himself maintaining a paradox, he constrains his respondent by acute dialectic to assent to it; which is exactly what Aristotle imputes to the Sophists of his day as a reproach.
[74] Ibid. b. 36-p. 173, a. 30.
[75] Rhetoric. II. xxv. p. 1402, a. 33: οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν.
A disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses, must be allowed κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα θεωρεῖν τὰ κοινά, which is the characteristic feature assigned by Aristotle to the Dialectician, as contrasted with the Sophist (Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 5), in so far us I can understand the words κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. See [note b p. 394 supra].
[76] Topic. I. iii. p. 101, a. 5-10. ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν ἃ προαιρούμεθα.
[77] Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 25. Ethic. Nikom. V. x. p. 1134, b. 18; I. i. p. 1094, b. 15. Rhetoric. I. xiii. p. 1373, b. 5.