The major premiss upon which the preceding sophistical refutation must rest, is, That it is impossible both to know and not to know the same thing. This must be put as a direct question by the questioner, and must be conceded by the respondent, before the intended refutation can be made good. Now there are some persons who solve the refutation by answering this question in the negative, and by saying that it is possible both to know and not to know the same thing, only not in the same respect: such is the case when we know Koriskus, but do not know Koriskus approaching from a distance.[116] Aristotle disapproves this mode of solution, as well as another mode which refers the fallacy to equivocation of terms. He points out that there are many other sophistical refutations, coming under the general head of Fallaciæ Accidentis, to which such solution will not apply; and that there ought to be one uniform mode of solution applicable to every fallacy coming under the same general head; though he admits at the same time that particular sophistical refutations may be vicious in more than one way. He says, moreover, that this contradiction or negation of the premiss is no true solution; for a solution ought to bring to view clearly the reason why the fallacious refutation appears to be a real refutation. Thus the Fallacia Accidentis consists in an inference that what is true of an accident is true also of the subject thereof: you explain that such inference, though apparently cogent, has no real cogency, and in that explanation consists the only proper solution of the fallacy.[117]
[116] Ibid. b. 7, 18, 37: λύουσι δέ τινες ἀναιροῦντες τὴν ἐρώτησιν· φασὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ταὐτὸ πρᾶγμα εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ ταὐτό.
Mr. Poste (pp. 152-157) translates ἀναιροῦντες τὴν ἐρώτησιν — “contradicting the thesis,â€� and he expresses his surprise at the assertion, observing (very truly) that contradiction of the thesis is the very opposite of a solution; it helps in the very work which the refutation aims at accomplishing. But I cannot think that ἐρώτησις does mean “the thesis,â€� either here or in the other passage to which Mr. Poste refers (xxii. p. 178, b. 14). I think it means a premiss which the respondent has conceded, or must be presumed to have conceded, essential to the validity of the refutation. The term ἐρώτησις cannot surely, with any propriety, be applied to the thesis. It means either a question, or what is conceded in reply to a question; and the thesis cannot come under either one meaning or the other, being the proposition which the respondent sets out by affirming and undertakes to defend.
[117] Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, b. 23: ἦν γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐμφάνισις ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ, παρ’ ὃ ψευδής.
In like manner, all those Fallacies which come under the general head of A dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter, can only be solved by pointing out, in each particular case, in what terms this confusion is concealed — wherein resides the inference apparently cogent which is mistaken for one really cogent. The respondent is driven to an apparent contradiction, by having granted premisses from which the inference is derivable that both sides of the Antiphasis are true — that the same predicate A may be both affirmed and denied of the same subject B. He solves the contradiction by analysing the Antiphasis, and by showing that affirmation is secundum quid, while denial is simpliciter; and that there is a contradiction not real, but only apparent, between the two.[118]
[118] Ibid. xxv. p. 180, a. 23-31.
In like manner, the Fallacy Ignoratio Elenchi will be solved by analysing the two supposed counter-propositions of the Antiphasis, and by showing that there is no real contradiction or inconsistency between them.[119]
[119] Ibid. xxvi. p. 181, a. 1-14.
In regard to the Fallacies under Petitio Principii, the respondent if he perceives that the premiss asked of him involves such a fallacy, must refuse to grant it, however probable it may be in itself. If he does not perceive this until after he has granted it, he must throw back the charge of mal-procedure upon the questioner; declaring that an Elenchus involving assumption of the matter in question is null, and that the concession was made under the supposition that some separate and independent syllogism was in contemplation.[120]
[120] Ibid. xxvii. p. 181, a. 15-21.