[133] Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 37-p. 183, a. 4: ἔστι δὲ συλλογιστικὸς μὲν λόγος δριμύτατος, ἂν ἐξ ὅτι μάλιστα δοκούντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔνδοξον ἀναιρῇ· εἷς γὰρ ὢν ὁ λόγος, μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, ἅπαντας ὁμοίους ἕξει τοὺς συλλογισμούς· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ὁμοίως ἔνδοξον ἀναιρήσει [ἢ κατασκευάσει]· διόπερ ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαῖον. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος δριμύς, ὁ ἐξ ἴσου τὸ συμπέρασμα ποιῶν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι. I transcribe this text as it is given by Bekker, Waitz, Bussemaker, and Mr. Poste. The editions anterior to Bekker had the additional words ἢ κατασκευάζῃ after ἀναιρῇ in the fourth line; and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his translation defends and retains them. Bekker and the subsequent editors have omitted them, but have retained the last words ἢ κατασκευάσει in the seventh line. To me this seems inconsistent: the words ought either to be retained in both places or omitted in both. I think they ought to be omitted in both. I have enclosed them in brackets in the fifth line.
This difficult passage (not well explained by Alexander, Schol. p. 320, b. 9) requires the explanations of Waitz and Mr. Poste. The note of Mr. Poste is particularly instructive, because he expands in full (p. 164) the three “similar syllogismsâ€� to which Aristotle here briefly alludes. The phrase μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως is determined by a passage in Analyt. Priora, II. viii. p. 59, b. 1: it means “employment of the contradictory of the conclusion, in combination with either one of the premisses, to upset the other.â€� The original syllogism is assumed to have two premisses, each highly probable, while the conclusion is highly improbable, being the negation of a highly probable proposition. The original syllogism will stand thus: All M is P; All S is M; Ergo, All S is P: the two premisses being supposed highly probable, and the conclusion highly improbable. Of course, therefore, the contradictory of the conclusion will be highly probable — Some S is not P. We take this contradictory and employ it to construct two new syllogisms as follows:— “All M is P; Some S is not P; Ergo Some S is not M. And again, Some S is not P: All S is M; Ergo, Some M is not P. All these three syllogisms are similar in this respect: that each has two highly probable premisses, while the conclusion is highly improbable.
But in eristic or sophistic debate our greatest embarrassment as respondents will arise when we do not at once see whether the refutative syllogism brought against us is conclusive or not, and whether it is to be solved by negation or by distinction.[134] Next in order as to embarrassment stands the case, where we see in which of the two processes (negation or distinction) we are to find our solution, yet without seeing on which of the premisses we are to bring the process to bear; or whether, if distinction be the process required, we are to apply it to the conclusion, or to one of the premisses.[135] A defective syllogistic argument is silly, when the deficient points are of capital importance — relating to the minor or to the middle term, or when the assumptions are false and strange; but it will sometimes be worthy of attention, if the points deficient are outlying and easily supplied; in which cases it is the carelessness of the questioner that is to blame, rather than the argument itself.[136] Both the line of argument taken by the questioner, and the mode of solution adopted by the respondent, may be directed towards any one of three distinct purposes: either to the thesis and main subject discussed; or to the adversary personally (i.e., to the particular way in which he has been arguing); or to neither of these, but simply to prolong the discussion (i.e., against time). The solution may thus be sometimes such that it would take more time to argue upon it than the patience of the auditors will allow.[137]
[134] Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 7.
[135] Ibid. a. 9: δεύτερος δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ δῆλος μὲν ὅτι παρὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσίν ἐστι, μὴ φανερὸς δ’ ὢν διὰ τίνος τῶν ἠρωτημένων ἀναίρεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πότερον αὕτη παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ παρά τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἐστίν.
Mr. Poste translates these last words very correctly:— “Whether it is one of the premisses or the conclusion that requires distinction.â€� Here Aristotle again speaks of a mode of solution furnished by applying distinction (διαίρεσις) to the conclusion as well as to the premisses, though he does not say that solution can be furnished by applying disproof (ἀναίρεσις) to the conclusion. See my remarks, a few pages above, on Mr. Poste’s note respecting ch. xviii. ([supra, p. 406]).
[136] Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 14-20.
[137] Ibid. a. 21.
The last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi is employed by Aristotle in recapitulating the scope and procedure of the nine Books of Topica (reckoning the Sophistici Elenchi as the Ninth, as we ought in propriety to do); and in appreciating the general bearing and value of that treatise, having regard to the practice and theory of the day.
The business of Dialectic and Peirastic is to find and apply the syllogizing process to any given thesis, with premisses the most probable that can be obtained bearing on the thesis. This Aristotle treats as the proper function of Dialectic per se and of Peirastic; considering both — the last, of course — as referring wholly to the questioner. His purpose is to investigate and impart this syllogizing power — the power of questioning and cross-examining a respondent who sets up a given thesis, so as to drive him into inconsistent answers. It appears that Aristotle would not have cared to teach the respondent how he might defend himself against this procedure, if there had not happened to be another art — Sophistic, closely bordering on Dialectic and Peirastic. He considers it indispensable to furnish the respondent with defensive armour against sophistical cross-examination; and this could not be done without teaching him at the same time modes of defence against the cross-examination of Dialectic and Peirastic. For this reason it is (Aristotle tells us[138] that he has included in the Topica precepts on the best mode of defending the thesis by the most probable arguments, as well as of impugning it. The respondent professes to know (while the questioner does not), and must be taught how to maintain his thesis like a man of knowledge. Sokrates, the prince of dialecticians, did nothing but question and cross-examine: he would never be respondent at all; for he explicitly disclaimed knowledge. And if it were not for the neighbourhood of Sophistic, Aristotle would have thought it sufficient to teach a procedure like that of Sokrates. It was the danger from sophistical cross-examination that led him to enlarge his scheme — to unmask the Sophists by enumerating the paralogisms peculiar to them, and to indicate the proper scheme of the responses and solutions whereby the respondent might defend himself against them. We remember that Aristotle treats all paralogisms and fallacies as if they belonged to a peculiar art or profession called Sophistic, and as if they were employed by Sophists exclusively; as if the Dialecticians and the Peirasts, including among them Sokrates and Plato, put all their questions without ever resorting to or falling into paralogisms.