[2] Physica, I. pp. 190-191; II. p. 194, b. 20, seq.; Metaph. A. p. 983, a. 33; Alexander ad Metaphys. Δ. p. 306, ed. Bonitz; p. 689, b. Schol. Br.
If we include both what is treated in the Analytica Posteriora (the scientific explanation of Essence and Definition) and what is treated in the Physica, we shall find that nearly all the expository processes employed in the Metaphysica are employed also in these two treatises. To look upon the general notion as a cause, and to treat it as a creative force (der schöpferische Wesensbegriff, to use the phrase of Prantl and other German logicians[3]), belongs alike to the Physica and to the Analytica Posteriora. The characteristic distinction of the treatise entitled Metaphysica is, that it is all-comprehensive in respect to the ground covered; that the expository process is applied, not exclusively to any separate branch of Ens, but to Ens as a whole quatenus Ens — to all the varieties of Ens that admit of scientific treatment at all;[4] that the same abstractions and analytical distinctions, which, both in the Analytica and in the Physica, are indicated and made to serve an explanatory purpose, up to a certain point — are in the Metaphysica sometimes assumed as already familiar, sometimes followed out with nicer accuracy and subtlety.[5] Indeed both the Physica and the Metaphysica, as we read them in Aristotle, would be considered in modern times as belonging alike to the department of Metaphysics.
[3] See [ch. viii. pp. 240] seq. of the present work, with the citations in note b, [p. 252], from Prantl and Rassow.
[4] Metaphys. Γ. i. p. 1003, a. 21: ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ’ αὑτό. Αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν οὐδεμίᾳ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή. οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι, &c.
[5] Metaphys. Λ. vii. p. 1073, a. with Bonitz’s Comment. pp. 504-505. Physica, I. ix. p. 192, a. 34: περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀρχῆς, πότερον μία ἢ πολλαὶ καὶ τίς ἢ τίνες εἰσί, δι’ ἀκριβείας τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἐστὶ διορίσαι, ὥστ’ εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ἀποκείσθω. Compare Physic. I. viii. p. 191, b. 29, and Weisse, Aristoteles Physik, p. 285.
About the Metaphysica, as carrying out and completing the exposition of the Analytica Posteriora, see Metaphys. Z. xii. p. 1037, b. 8: νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν πρῶτον, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς περὶ ὁρισμοῦ μὴ εἴρηται (Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 32; see note b, [p. 243]).
The primary distinction and classification recognized by Aristotle among Sciences or Cognitions, is, that of (1) Theoretical, (2) Practical, (3) Artistic or Constructive.[6] Of these three divisions, the second and third alike comprise both intelligence and action, but the two are distinguished from each other by this — that in the Artistic there is always some assignable product which the agency leaves behind independent of itself, whereas in the Practical no such independent result remains,[7] but the agency itself, together with the purpose (or intellectual and volitional condition) of the agent, is every thing. The division named Theoretical comprises intelligence alone — intelligence of principia, causes and constituent elements. Here again we find a tripartite classification. The highest and most universal of all Theoretical Sciences is recognized by Aristotle as Ontology (First Philosophy, sometimes called by him Theology) which deals with all Ens universally quatenus Ens, and with the Prima Moventia, themselves immoveable, of the entire Kosmos. The two other heads of Theoretical Science are Mathematics and Physics; each of them special and limited, as compared with Ontology. In Physics we scientifically study natural bodies with their motions, changes, and phenomena; bodies in which Form always appears implicated with Matter, and in which the principle of motion or change is immanent and indwelling (i.e., dependent only on the universal Prima Moventia, and not impressed from without by a special agency, as in works of human art). In Mathematics, we study immoveable and unchangeable numbers and magnitudes, apart from the bodies to which they belong; not that they can ever be really separated from such bodies, but we intellectually abstract them, or consider them apart.[8]
[6] Metaphys. E. i. p. 1025, b. 25.
[7] Ibid. b. 22.
[8] Metaphys. E. i. p. 1026; K. vii. p. 1064, a. 28-b. 14; M. iii. pp. 1077-1078; Bonitz, Commentar. p. 284.