The Scholia of Alexander on the beginning of the Topica (pp. 251, 252, Brandis) are instructive; also his Scholia on p. 105, b. 30, p. 260, a. 24. διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ (i.e. the Topica) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις πλεῖστα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐνδόξως λέγεται.
We see here that Alexander understands by the exoteric the dialectic handling of opinions on physics and ethics.
In the Eudemian Ethica also (i. 8, p. 1217, b. 16) we find ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, where we have the same antithesis in other words — Exoteric or Dialectic versus Philosophical or Didactic. Compare a clear statement in Simplikius (Schol. ad Physic. p. 364, b. 19). Πρῶτον μὲν λογικῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ, τούτεστι πιθανῶς καὶ ἐνδόξως, καὶ ἔτι κοινότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον. Ἡ γὰρ διαλεκτικὴ ἡ Ἀριστοτέλους κοινή ἐστι μέθοδος περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζομένη — τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν ὡς κοινὸν εἴωθεν ἀντιδιαστέλλειν τᾳ οἰκείῳ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἀποδεικτικῷ.
We thus learn, from the example furnished by Aristotle himself, what he means by “exoteric discourses.� The epithet means literally, extraneous to, lying on the outside of; in the present case, on the outside of philosophy, considered in its special didactic and demonstrative march.[41] Yet what thus lies outside philosophy, is nevertheless useful as an accompaniment and preparation for philosophy. We shall find Aristotle insisting upon this in his Topica and Analytica; and we shall also find him introducing the exoteric treatment into his most abstruse philosophical treatises (the Physica is one of the most abstruse) as an accompaniment and auxiliary — a dialectic survey of opinions, puzzles, and controverted points, before he begins to lay down and follow out affirmative principles of his own. He does this not only throughout the Physica (in several other passages besides that which I have just cited),[42] but also in the Metaphysica, the treatises De Animâ, De Generatione et Corruptione, &c.
[41] We find the epithet ἐξωτερικὸς used once by Aristotle, not in conjunction with λόγοι, but with πράξεις, designating those acts which are performed with a view to some ulterior and extraneous end (τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν, as contrasted with πράξεις αὐτοτελεῖς — οἰκεῖαι): Polit. vii. p. 1325, b. 22-29. σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. In the Eudemian Ethics the phrase τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις λόγοις σοφίζονται is used much in the same sense as τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: i.e. opposed to τοῖς οἰκείοις — to that which belongs specially to the scientific determination of the problem (Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1218, b. 18).
The phrase διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων, in Aristot. Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 31, and the different phrase ἐκ τῶν εἰωθότων λόγων λέγεσθαι, in Phys. vi. 2, p. 233, a. 13, appear to have the same meaning and reference. Compare Prantl not. ad Arist. Phys. p. 501.
[42] If we turn to the beginning of book iv. of the Physica, where Aristotle undertakes to examine Τόπος, Place, we shall see that he begins by a dialectic handling of ἀπορίαι, exactly analogous to that which he himself calls ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, when he proceeds to examine Χρόνος, Time: see Physica, iv. pp. 208, a. 32-35, 209, a. 30; 210, a. 12, b. 31. He does the like also about Κενόν, Vacuum, p. 213, a. 20, b. 28, and about Ἄπειρον, Infinitum, iii. p. 204, b. 4 (with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 364, b. 20, Br.).
Compare the Scholion of Simplikius ad Physica (i. p. 329, b. 1, Br.) — ἴσως δὲ (Simplikius uses this indecisive word ἴσως) ὅτι ἡ ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα ἀπορία τοῦ λόγου ἐξωτερική τις ἦν, ὡς Εὔδημός φησι, διαλεκτικὴ μᾶλλον οὖσα, with this last Scholion, on p. 364, b. 20, which describes the same dialectic handling, though without directly calling it exoteric.
Having thus learnt to understand, from one distinct passage of Aristotle himself, what he means by “exoteric discourses,� we must interpret by the light of this analogy the other indistinct passages in which the phrase occurs. We see clearly that in using the phrase, he does not of necessity intend to refer to any other writings of his own — nor even to any other writings at all. He may possibly mean this; but we cannot be sure of it. He means by the phrase, a dialectic process of turning over and criticizing diverse opinions and probabilities: whether in his own writings, or in those of others, or in no writings at all, but simply in those oral debates which his treatise called Topica presupposes — this is a point which the phrase itself does not determine. He may mean to allude, in some cases where he uses the phrase, to his own lost dialogues; but he may also allude to Platonic and other dialogues, or to colloquies carried on orally by himself with his pupils, or to oral debates on intellectual topics between other active-minded men. When Bernays refers “exoteric discourse� to the lost Aristotelian Dialogues; when Madvig, Zeller, Torstrick, Forchhammer, and others, refer it to the contemporary oral dialectic[43] — I think that neither of these explanations is in itself inadmissible. The context of each particular passage must decide which of the two is the more probable. We cannot go farther, in explaining the seven doubtful passages where Aristotle alludes to the “exoteric discourses,� than to understand the general character and scope of the reasonings which he thus designates. Extra-philosophical, double-sided, dialectic, is in general (he holds) insufficient by itself, and valuable only as a preparation and auxiliary to the didactic process. But there are some particular points on which such dialectic leaves a result sufficient and satisfactory, which can be safely accepted as the basis of future deduction. These points he indicates in the passages above cited; without informing us more particularly whether the dialectic was written or spoken, and whether by himself or by others.[44]
[43] Ueberweg (Geschichte der Philos. des Alterthums, vol. i. § 46, p. 127, 2nd ed.) gives a just and accurate view of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, as conceived by Aristotle. See also the dissertation of Buhle, prefixed to his unfinished edition of Aristotle, De Aristotelis Libris Exotericis et Acroamaticis, pp. 107-152 — which discusses this subject copiously, and gives a collection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it. It is instructive, though his opinion leans too much towards the supposition of a double doctrine. Bernays, in his dissertation, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, maintains that by exoteric books are always meant the lost dialogues of Aristotle; and he employs much reasoning to refute the supposition of Madvig (Excurs. VII. ad Cicero, de Fin. p. 861), of Torstrick (ad Aristotel. de Animâ, p. 123), and also of Zeller, that by exoteric discourses are not meant any writings at all, but simply the colloquies and debates of cultivated men, apart from the philosophical schools. On the other hand, Forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion, and has defended it against the objections of Bernays (Forchhammer, Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden, p. 16, seq.). The question is thus fully argued on both sides. To me it seems that each of these two opinions is partially right, and neither of them exclusively right. “Exoteric discourse,â€� as I understand it, might be found both in the Aristotelian dialogues, and in the debates of cultivated men out of the schools, and also in parts of the Aristotelian akroamatic works. The argument of Bernays (p. 36, seq.), that the points which Aristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric discourses, were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by cultivated men out of the schools, or (as he expresses it) in the salons or coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) at Athens — this argument seems to me untenable. We know well, from the Topica of Aristotle, that the most abstruse subjects were handled dialectically, in a manner which he called extra-philosophical; and that this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at Athens. To discuss these matters in the way which he calls πρὸς δόξαν, was more frequent than to discuss them πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.