[124] Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 428, b. 16: καὶ πολλὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν (i.e. κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν) καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον. — Ibid. p. 429, a. 4: καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι (τὰς φαντασίας) ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ’ αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, &c.
In the chapter now before us, Aristotle is careful to discriminate phantasy from several other psychological phenomena wherewith it is liable to be confounded. But we remark with some surprise, that neither here, nor in any other part of his general Psychology, does he offer any exposition of Memory, the phenomenon more nearly approaching than any other to phantasy. He supplied the deficiency afterwards by a short but valuable tract on Memory and Reminiscence; wherein he recognizes, and refers to, the more general work on Psychology. Memory bears on the past, as distinguished both from the present and future. Memory and phantasy are in some cases so alike, that we cannot distinguish clearly whether what is in our minds is a remembrance or a phantasm.[125] Both of them belong to the same psychological department — to the central sentient principle, and not to the cogitant or intelligent Noûs. Memory as well as phantasy are continuations, remnants, or secondary consequences, of the primary movements of sense; what in itself is a phantasm, may become an object of remembrance directly and per se; matters of cogitation, being included or implicated in phantasms, may also become objects of remembrance, indirectly and by way of accompaniment.[126] We can remember our prior acts of cogitation and demonstration; we can remember that, a month ago, we demonstrated the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles; but, as the original demonstration could not be carried on without our having before our mental vision the phantasm of some particular triangle, so neither can the remembrance of the demonstration be made present to us without a similar phantasm.[127] In acts of remembrance we have a conception of past time, and we recognize what is now present to our minds as a copy of what has been formerly present to us, either as perception of sense or as actual cognition;[128] while in phantasms there is no conception of past time, nor any similar recognition, nor any necessary reference to our own past mental states; the phantasm is looked at by itself, and not as a copy. This is the main point of distinction between phantasm and remembrance:[129] what is remembered is a present phantasm assimilated to an impression of the past. Some of the superior animals possess both memory and phantasy. But other animals have neither; their sensations disappear, they have no endurance; while endurance is the basis both of phantasy and memory.[130]
[125] Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 451, a. 5; p. 449, a. 10.
[126] Ibid. p. 450, a. 22: τίνος μὲν οὖν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἡ μνήμη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φαντασία· καὶ ἔστι μνημονευτὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ μὲν ὅσα ἐστὶ φανταστά, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ’ ὅσα μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας.
[127] Aristot. De Memor. et. Rem. i. p. 449, b. 18.
[128] Ibid. b. 22: ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν. — Ibid. p. 452, b. 28.
[129] Ibid. p. 450, a. 30; p. 451, a. 15: τὸ μνημονεύειν, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, ἕξις. Themistius ad Aristot. De Memoriâ, p. 240, ed. Spengel.
[130] Aristot. Analyt. Poster. ii. p. 99, b. 36: μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος. It may be remarked that in the Topica Aristotle urges a dialectical objection against this or a similar doctrine (Topic. IV. iv. v. p. 125, b. 6-19), and against his own definition cited in the preceding note, where he calls μνήμη an ἕξις. Compare the first chapter of the Metaphysica.
But though some animals have memory, no animal except man has Reminiscence. Herein man surpasses them all.[131] Aristotle draws a marked distinction between the two; between the (memorial) retentive and reviving functions, when working unconsciously and instinctively, and the same two functions, when stimulated and guided by a deliberate purpose of our own — which he calls reminiscence. This last is like a syllogism or course of ratiocinative inference, performable only by minds capable of taking counsel and calculating. He considers memory as a movement proceeding from the centre and organs of sense to the soul, and stamping an impression thereupon; while reminiscence is a counter-movement proceeding from the soul to the organs of sense.[132] In the process of reminiscence, movements of the soul and movements of the body are conjoined,[133] more or less perturbing and durable according to the temperament of the individual. The process is intentional and deliberate, instigated by the desire to search for and recover some lost phantasm or cognition; its success depends upon the fact that there exists by nature a regular observable order of sequence among the movements of the system, physical as well as psychical. The consequents follow their antecedents either universally, or at least according to customary rules, in the majority of cases.[134]
[131] Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453, a. 8. He draws the same distinction in Hist. Animal. I. i. p. 488, b. 26.