Again in regard to Temperance — iii. 11 — he states the σκόπος of the temperate man — “What things have a reference to health or vigour, and are agreeable, these he desires in measure and as he ought; as well as the other agreeable things that are not opposed to these, either as being contrary to what is honourable or as being beyond his fortune. For he that desires things agreeable, which yet are contrary to what is honourable or beyond his fortune, loves these pleasures more than they are worth. But not so with the temperate man who lives according to right reason.â€�
These passages are not very distinct, as an explanation of the proper σκόπος: but I cannot find any passages after the beginning of the Sixth Book which are more distinct than they: or perhaps, equally distinct.
In one passage of the Seventh Book, Aristotle refers, though somewhat obscurely, to the average degree of virtue exhibited by the mass of mankind as the standard to be consulted when we pronounce upon excess or defect (vii. 7).
Aristotle seems in some passages to indicate pleasure and pain as the end with reference to which actions or dispositions are denominated good and evil. He says — vii. 11 — “To theorise respecting pleasure and pain, is the business of the political philosopher: for he is the architect of that end with reference to which we call each matter either absolutely good or absolutely evil. Moreover, it is indispensable to institute an enquiry respecting them: for we have explained ethical virtue and vice as referring to pleasures and pains: and most people affirm happiness to be coupled with pleasure: for which reason they have named τὸ μακάριον ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.â€�
In Book VIII. 9-10, the σκόπος is indeed stated very clearly, but not as such — not as if Aristotle intended to make it serve as such, or thought that it ought to form the basis upon which our estimate of what is the proper middle point should be found. In viii. 9-10, he tells us that all justice and benevolence (τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ φιλία) is a consequence and an incident of established communion among human beings (κοινωνία) — that the grand communion of all, which comprehends all the rest, is the Political Communion — that the end and object of the Political Communion, as well that for which it was originally created as that for which it subsists and continues, is the common and lasting advantage (τὸ κοινῇ σύμφερον) — that all other communions, of relations, friends, fellow-soldiers, neighbours, &c., are portions of the all-comprehensive political communion, and aim at realizing some partial advantage to the constituent members. These chapters are very clear and very important, and they announce plainly enough the common and lasting interest as the foundation and measure of justice as well as of benevolence. But they do not apply the same measure, to the qualities which had been enumerated in the Books prior to the Sixth, as a means of ascertaining where the middle point is to be found which is alleged to constitute virtue. Nevertheless, Aristotle tells us that it is in the highest degree difficult to find the middle point which constitutes virtue (ii. 9).
It might seem at first sight not easy for Aristotle, consistently with the plan of his treatise, to point out any such standard or measure. For none can be mentioned, with any tolerable pretensions to admissibility, except that of tendency to promote happiness — the happiness both of the individual agent and of the society to which he belongs. But as he had begun by introducing the ideas of reason and virtue as media for explaining what happiness was, there would have been at least an apparent incongruity in reverting back to the latter as a means of clearing up what was obscure in the former. I say — at least an apparent incongruity — because after all the incongruity is more apparent than real. If we carefully preserve the distinction between the happiness of the individual agent and the happiness of the Society to which he belongs, it will appear that Aristotle might without any inconsistency have specified the latter as being the object to which reason has regard, in regulating and controlling the various affections of each individual.
Wherein consists the happiness of an individual man? In a course of active exertion of the soul conformably to virtue: virtue being understood to consist in a certain mediocrity of our various affections as determined by right reason.
When we next enquire, to what standard does right reason look in making this determination? it may without inconsistency be answered — Right reason determines the proper point of mediocrity by a reference to happiness generally — that is, to the happiness of society at large, including that of the individual agent in question — in other words, to the common and lasting advantage, which Aristotle describes as the grand object of the statesman. There is no inconsistency in reverting to happiness, thus explained, as the standard by which right reason judges in controlling our different affections.
In all moral enquiries, it is of the greatest importance to keep in view the happiness of the individual, and the happiness of the society at large, as two distinct and separate objects — which coincide indeed ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, in the majority of instances and with regard to the majority of individuals — but which do not coincide necessarily and universally, nor with regard to every individual. A particular man may be placed in such a position, or animated with such feelings, that his happiness may be promoted by doing what is contrary to the happiness of the society. He will under these circumstances do what is good for himself but bad for others: he will do what is morally wrong, and will incur the blame of society. In speaking of good and evil it is always necessary to keep in mind, that what is good for an individual may be bad for the society: I mean, understanding the words good for an individual in the most comprehensive sense, as including all that he has to suffer from the unfavourable sentiments of society. Much confusion has arisen from moralists speaking of good and evil absolutely, without specifying whether they meant good for the individual or for the society: more particularly in the writings of the ancient philosophers.
From the manner in which Aristotle arrives at his definition of what constitutes happiness, we might almost suppose that he would have been led to the indication of the happiness of society at large as the standard for right reason to appeal to. For in examining what is the proper business of man in general, he has recourse to the analogy of the various particular arts and professions — the piper, the statuary, the carpenter, the carrier, &c. Each has his particular business and walk of action, and in the performance of that business consists the good and the well in his case (i. 7). So in like manner there is a special business for man in general, in the performance of which we are to seek human good.