The passages out of the Rhetorica and the Metaphysica (cited on p. 772, b., and marked d and e) are hardly worth notice. But that which immediately follows (marked f), out of the Nikomachean Ethica, is the most pertinent of all that are produced. Hamilton writes:— “Arguing against a paradox of certain Platonists in regard to the Pleasurable, Aristotle says — ‘But they who oppose themselves to Eudoxus, as if what all nature desiderates were not a good, talk idly. For what appears to all, that we affirm to be; and he who would subvert this belief, will himself assuredly advance nothing more deserving of credit.’[5] Compare also L. vii. c. 13 (14). In his paraphrase of the above passage, the Pseudo-Andronicus in one place uses the expression common opinion, and in another all but uses (what indeed he could hardly do in this meaning as an Aristotelian, if indeed in Greek at all) the expression common sense, which D. Heinsius in his Latin version actually employs.� Thus far Hamilton; but the words of Aristotle which immediately follow are even stronger:— “For, in so far as foolish creatures desire pleasure, the objection taken would be worth something; but, when intelligent creatures desire it also, how can the objectors make out their case? Even in mean and foolish creatures, moreover, there is perhaps a certain good natural appetite, superior to themselves, which aims at their own good.�[6] Or as Aristotle (according to some critics, the Aristotelian Eudemus) states it in the Seventh Book of the Nikomachean Ethica, referred to by Sir W. Hamilton without citing it:— “Perhaps all creatures (brutes as well as men) pursue, not that pleasure which they think they are pursuing, nor what they would declare themselves to be pursuing, but all of them the same pleasure; for all creatures have by nature something divine.�[7]
[5] Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. ii. p. 1172, b. 36: ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ’ εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ δ’ ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν, οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ.
[6] Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. ii. p. 1173, a. 2: ᾗ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἦν ἄν τι τὸ λεγόμεν· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς ἂν λέγοιέν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστί τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ’ αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. (I adopt here the text as given by Michelet, ᾗ μὲν in place of εἰ μὲν, but not in leaving out τὸ before λεγόμενον.) I think the sentence would stand better if ἀγαθὸν were omitted after φυσικόν.
[7] Eth. Nikom. VII. xiv. p. 1153, b. 31: ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἢν οἴονται (ἡδονήν) οὐδ’ ἢν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. The sentiment is here declared even more strongly respecting the appetency of all animals — brutes as well as men.
In this passage, Aristotle does really appear as the champion of authoritative Common Sense. He enunciates the general principle: That which appears to all, that we affirm to be. And he proceeds to claim (with the qualification of perhaps) for this universal belief a divine or quasi-divine authority; like Hesiod in the verses cited by Sir W. Hamilton, p. 770, b., and like Dr. Reid in the motto prefixed to his ‘Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.’ If Aristotle had often spoken in this way, he would have been pre-eminently suitable to figure in Sir W. Hamilton’s list of authorities. But the reverse is the fact. In the Analytica and Topica, Aristotle is so far from accepting the opinion and belief of all as a certificate of truth and reality, that he expressly ranks the matters so certified as belonging to the merely probable, and includes them in his definition thereof. Universal belief counts for more or less, as a certificate of the truth of what is believed, according to the matter to which it refers; and there are few matters on which it is of greater value than pleasure and pain. Yet even upon this point Aristotle rejects the authority of the many, and calls upon us to repose implicit confidence in the verdict of the just and intelligent individual, whom he enthrones as the measure. “Those alone are pleasures� (says Aristotle) “which appear pleasures to this man; those alone are pleasant things in which he takes delight. If things which are revolting to him appear pleasurable to others, we ought not to wonder, since there are many corruptions and degenerations of mankind; yet these things are not really pleasurable, except to these men and to men of like disposition.�[8] This declaration, repeated more than once in the Nikomachean Ethica, and supported by Analytica and Topica, more than countervails the opposite opinion expressed by Aristotle, in the passage where he defends Eudoxus.
[8] Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. v. p. 1176, a. 15: δοκεῖ δ’ ἐν ἅπασι τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ᾗ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι, καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει &c. Ib. vi. p. 1176, b. 24: καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα.
The next passage (g) produced by Sir W. Hamilton is out of the Eudemian Ethica. But this passage, when translated more fully and exactly than we read it in his words, will be found to prove nothing to the point which he aims at. He gives it as follows, p. 773, a.:— “But of all these we must endeavour to seek out rational grounds of belief, by adducing manifest testimonies and authorities. For it is the strongest evidence of a doctrine, if all men can be adduced as the manifest confessors of its positions; because every individual has in him a kind of private organ of the truth. Hence we ought not always to look to the conclusions of reasoning, but frequently rather to what appears [and is believed] to be.� The original is given below.[9]
[9] Aristot. Eth. Eud. I. vi. p. 1218, b. 26: πειρατέον δὲ περὶ τούτων πάντων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς πάντως, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων, οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως. Then after an interval of fifteen lines: καλῶς δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς κρίνειν τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διά τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως, ὅτι προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις (νῦν δ’ ὅποτ’ ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν, ἀναγκάζονται πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεδεῖχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν δι’ ἥν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν.
The following is a literal translation, restoring what Sir W. Hamilton omits:— “But, respecting all these matters, we must endeavour to seek belief through general reasoning, employing the appearances before us (i.e. the current dicta and facta of society) as testimonies and examples. For it is best that all mankind should be manifestly in agreement with what we are about to say; but, if that cannot be, that at all events they should be in some sort of agreement with us; which they will come to be when brought round (by being addressed in the proper style). For every man has in him some tendencies favourable to the truth, and it is out of these that we must somehow or other prove our conclusions. By taking our departure from what is said around us truly but not clearly, we shall by gradual advance introduce clearness, taking along with us such portion of the confused common talk as is most congruous to Science.… It is well also to consider apart the causal reasoning (syllogistic, deductive premisses), and the conclusion shown: first, upon the ground just stated, that we must not pay exclusive attention to the results of deductive reasoning, but often rather to apparent facts, whereas it often happens now that, when men cannot refute the reasoning, they feel constrained to believe in the conclusion; next, because the conclusion, shown by the reasoning, may often be true in itself, but not from the cause assigned in the reasoning. For a true conclusion may be shown by false premisses; as we have seen in the Analytica.�
Whoever reads the original words of Aristotle (or Eudemus) will see how much Sir W. Hamilton’s translation strains their true meaning. Κράτιστον does not correspond to the phrase — “it is the strongest evidence of a doctrine.â€� Κράτιστον is the equivalent of ἄριστον, as we find in chap. iii. of this Book of the Eudemian Ethica (p. 1215, a. 3): ἐπεὶ δ’ εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἑκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ βίου τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσίν. Nor ought the words οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν to be translated — “a kind of private organ of the truth:â€� they mean simply — “something in him favourable or tending towards the truth,â€� as we read in chap. ii. of this same Book — οἰκεῖον πρὸς εὐεξίαν (p. 1214, b. 22). Moreover, Hamilton has omitted to translate both the words preceding and the words following; accordingly he has missed the real sense of the passage. Aristotle inculcates upon the philosopher never to neglect the common and prevalent opinions, but to acquaint himself with them carefully; because, though these opinions are generally full of confusion and error (εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ ἁπάντων (οἱ πολλοί) — Ethic. Eudem. I. iii. p. 1215, a. 1), he will find in them partial correspondences with the truth, of which he may avail himself to bring the common minds round to better views; but, unless he knows pretty well what the opinions of these common minds are, he will not be able to address them persuasively. This is the same reasonable view which Aristotle expresses at the beginning of the Topica (in a passage already cited, above), respecting the manner of dealing proper for a philosopher towards current opinion. But it does not at all coincide with the representation given by Hamilton.