Besides, when Hamilton represents Aristotle here as declaring: “That the data of Intellect are to be reverenced as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid from man� — how are we to reconcile this with what we read two pages before (p. 771, a.) as the view of Aristotle about these same data of Intellect, that “they are themselves pre-eminently certain; and, if denied in words, they are still always mentally admitted�? Is it reasonable to say that the Maxim of Contradiction, and the proposition, That if equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders will be equal — are data “to be reverenced as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid from man�? At any rate, I protest against the supposition that Aristotle has ever declared this.
The next two passages cited from Aristotle have really no bearing upon the authority of Common Sense in its metaphysical meaning: they are (i) from Physic. VIII. iii. and (k) from De Gen. Animal. III. x. Both passages assert the authority of sensible perception against general reasoning, where the two are conflicting. They assert, in other words, that general reasoning ought to be tested by experience and observation, and is not to be accepted when disallowed by these tests. (The only condition is, that the observation be exact and complete.) This is just, and is often said, though often disregarded in fact, by Aristotle. But it has no proper connexion with the problem about the trustworthiness of Common Sense.
Next Sir W. Hamilton refers us to (without citing) three other places of Aristotle. Of these, the first (De Cœlo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 4-13, marked l) is one which I am much surprised to find in a modern champion of Common Sense: since it represents Common Sense as giving full certificate to errors now exploded and forgotten. Aristotle had begun by laying down and vindicating his doctrine of the First or Celestial Body, forming the exterior portion of the Kosmos, radically distinct from the four elements; revolving eternally in uniform, perfect, circular motion, eternal, unchangeable, &c. Having stated this, he proceeds to affirm that the results of these reasonings coincide with the common opinions of mankind, that is, with Common Sense; and that they are not contradicted by any known observations of perceptive experience. This illustrates what I have before observed about Aristotle’s position in regard to Common Sense. He does not extol it as an authority, or tell us that “it is to be reverenced as a revelation�; but, when he has proved a conclusion on what he thinks good grounds, he is glad to be able to show that it tallies with common opinions; especially when these opinions have some alliance with the received religion.
The next passage (m) referred to (De CÅ“lo, III. vii. p. 306, a. 13) has nothing to do with Common Sense, but embodies a very just protest by Aristotle against those philosophers who followed out their theories consistently to all possible consequences, without troubling themselves to enquire whether those consequences were in harmony with the results of observation.
There follows one other reference (n) which was hardly worth Sir W. Hamilton’s notice. In Meteorologic. I. xiii. p. 349, a. 25, Aristotle, after reciting a theory of some philosophers (respecting the winds) which he considers very absurd, then proceeds to say:— “The many, without going into any enquiry at all, talk better sense than those who after enquiry bring forward such conclusions as these.� It is not saying much for the authority of Common Sense, to affirm that there have been occasionally philosophical theories so silly as to be worse than Common Sense.
B. — Aristotle’s Doctrine.
In regard to Aristotle, there are two points to be examined —
I. What position does he take up in respect to the authority of Common Sense?
II. What doctrine does he lay down about the first principia or beginnings of scientific reasoning — the ἀρχαὶ συλλογιστικαί?