METAPHYSICA.
[The following Abstract — when not translation — of six books (Γ, E, Z, Η, Θ, Λ) out of the fourteen included under the title ‘Metaphysica,’ may be said to cover the whole of Aristotle’s dogmatic exposition of First Philosophy. According to the view of Brandis, now in its main features generally accepted, the exposition continued through Books Γ, E, Z, Η, reaches back to Books A and B, and comes to an end with Book Θ. Still it is only with Book Γ that the properly didactic treatment begins, Book A being a historical review of previous opinion, and Book B a mere collection of ἀπορίαι subjected to a preliminary dialectical handling; while, at the other end, Book Λ, though it has no direct connection with Book Θ, is, especially in its latter part, of undeniable importance for Aristotle's metaphysical doctrine.
The remaining books are known as α, Δ, I, K, M, N. The short Book α is entirely unconnected with any of the others, and most probably is not the work of Aristotle. Book Δ (περὶ τῶν ποσαχῶς λεγομένων) — a vocabulary of philosophical terms — is Aristotelian beyond question, being referred to occasionally in the chief books; but it lies quite apart from the exposition proper. Book I — dealing with Unity and Opposites — though it also has no place in the actual line of treatment, is truly ontological in character, and probably was intended to fall within some larger scheme of metaphysical doctrine; the like, as far as can be judged, being true of Books M and N, containing together a criticism of Pythagorean and Platonic theories. Finally, Book K, consisting in part of an epitomized excerpt from the Physica — hardly from the hand of Aristotle, gives otherwise only a sketch in outline of the argument of Books B, Γ, E, and thus, although Aristotelian, is to be discounted.
The author nowhere states the principle upon which he selected the six books for a preliminary Abstract; but the actual selection, joined to various indications in the Abstract and marginal notes in his copies of the Metaphysica, leaves no doubt that he accepted the view of Brandis, more especially as set forth by Bonitz. On the whole question of the Canon of the Metaphysica, Bonitz’s Introduction to his Commentary may with advantage be consulted.]
Book Γ.
In this First Philosophy, Aristotle analyses and illustrates the meaning of the generalissima of language — the most general and abstract words which language includes. All these are words in common and frequent use; in the process of framing or putting together language, they have become permanently stamped and circulated as the result of many previous comparisons, gone through but afterwards forgotten, or perhaps gone through at first without any distinct consciousness. Men employ these words familiarly in ordinary speech, and are understood by others when they do so. For the most part, they employ the words correctly and consistently, in the affirmation of particular propositions relating to topics of daily life and experience. But this is not always or uniformly the case. Sometimes, more or less often, men fall into error and inconsistency in the employment of these familiar general terms. The First Philosophy takes up the generalities and established phrases in this condition; following back analytically the synthetical process which the framers of language have pursued without knowing or at least without recording it, and bringing under conscious attention the different meanings, more or fewer, in which these general words are used.
Philosophia Prima devotes itself, specially and in the first instance, to Ens quatenus Ens in all its bearings; being thus distinguished from mathematics and other particular sciences, each of which devotes itself to a separate branch of Ens (p. 1003, a. 25). It searches into the First Causes or Elements of Ens per se, not per accidens (a. 31). But Ens is a commune, not generically, but analogically; constituted by common relationship to one and the same terminus, as everything healthy is related to health. The Principle (ἀρχή) of all Entia is Essence (οὐσία); but some Entia are so called as being affections of Essence; others, as being a transition to Essence, or as destruction, privation, quality, efficient or generative cause, of Essence or its analoga; others, again, as being negations (ἀποφάσεις) thereof, whence, for example, we say that Non-Ens is Non-Ens (b. 6-10). There is one science of all these primary, secondary, tertiary, &c., Entia; just as there is one science of all things healthy, of the primary, the secondary, the tertiary, &c., quatenus healthy. But, in all such matters, that science bears in the first instance and specially (κυρίως) on the Primum Aliquid, from which all the secondary and other derivatives take their departure, and upon which they depend (b. 16). Accordingly, in the present case, since Essence is the Primum Aliquid, the province of First Philosophy is to investigate the causes and principles of Essences in all their varieties (b. 18-22). Now whatever varieties there are of Ens, the like varieties there are of Unum; for the two are always implicated together, though the words are not absolutely the same in meaning (b. 24-35). Accordingly both Ens and Unum with all the varieties of each belong to Philosophia Prima; likewise Idem, Simile, &c., and the opposites thereof. All opposites may be traced in the last analysis to this foundation — the antithesis of Unum and Multa (p. 1004, a. 1). We must set forth and discriminate the different varieties — primary, secondary, tertiary, &c. — of Idem and Simile, and also of their opposites, Diversum and Dissimile; and we must show how they are derived from or related to Primum Idem, &c., just as we must do in the case of Ens and Unum. All this task belongs to First Philosophy (a. 20-30). Aristotle speaks of ὁ φιλόσοφος, as meaning the master of Philosophia Prima (b. 1; B. p. 997, a. 14).
If these investigations do not belong to the First Philosopher, to which among the other investigators can they belong? Who is to enquire whether Sokrates, and Sokrates sitting, is the same person? Whether Unum is opposite to Unum? In how many senses Opposite can be said? (p. 1004, b. 3). All these are affections per se of Unum quatenus Unum, and of Ens quatenus Ens, not quatenus numbers, or lines, or fire; that is, they are propria (sensu logico) of Ens and Unum (not included in the notion or definition, but deducible therefrom — “notæ consecutione notionisâ€�), just as odd and even, proportionality, equality, excess and defect, are propria of numbers; and there are other propria of solids, whether moved or unmoved, heavy or light. It is these propria of Ens and Unum that Philosophia Prima undertakes to explain (b. 7-16), and which others fail to explain, because they take no account of οὐσία (b. 10), or of the fundamental Ens or Essentia to which these belong as propria.
These Propria of Ens are the οἰκεῖα — the special and peculiar matter or principles — of Philosophia Prima. That all of them belong in this special way to the First Philosopher, we may farther see by the fact that all of them are handled by the Dialectician and the Sophist, who assume an attitude counterfeiting the Philosopher. All three travel over the same ground, and deal with Ens, as a matter common to all (p. 1004, b. 20). But the Sophist differs from the Philosopher in his purpose, inasmuch as he aims only at giving the false appearance of wisdom without the reality, while the Dialectician differs from the Philosopher in his manner of handling (τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως — b. 24). The Dialectician discusses the subject in a tentative way, from many different points of view, suggested by current opinions; the Philosopher marches by a straight and assured road from the appropriate principles of his science to certain conclusions and cognitions.
The same view of the scope and extent of Philosophia Prima may be made out in another way. Almost all philosophers affirm that Entia are composed of contraries, and may be traced back to opposite principles — odd and even, hot and cold, limit and the unlimited, friendship and enmity, &c. Now these and all other contraries may be traced back to Unum and Multa: this we may assume (p. 1005, a. 1; according to Alexander Aph., it had been shown in the treatise De Bono — Schol. p. 648, a. 38, Br.).