Aristotle

by George Grote

Book Θ.

In discriminating the meanings of Ens, we noticed one κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν (apart from Ens according to the Categories). We shall now proceed to discuss these two terms δύναμις and ἑντελέχεια = ἐνέργεια (p. 1045, b. 35).

It is elsewhere mentioned (Δ. p. 1019) that δύναμις has many senses, of which some (like the geometrical, &c.) are equivocal or metaphorical, so that we shall pass them over here (p. 1046, a. 6). But there is one first and proper sense of δύναμις, from which many others diverge in different directions of relationship or analogy (a. 10). That first and proper sense is — a principle of change in alio vel quatenus aliud, or a principle of change ab alio vel quatenus aliud (ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο — ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο — a. 11, 14. The same definition is given in terms somewhat different at p. 1048, a. 28: τοῦτο λέγομεν δυνατὸν ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖν ἄλλο ἢ κινεῖσθαι ὑπ’ ἄλλου, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τρόπον τινά. This Aristotle calls ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν δύναμις — expressed by Bonitz, Comm., p. 379: “agendi patiendive nisum quendam.â€�). The notion of δύναμις however extends more widely than this first sense of δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν. It includes other cases, as where we say that Hermes is δυνάμει in the wood, and that the half foot is δυνάμει in the whole foot (p. 1048, a. 33; Bonitz distinguishes this last sense as Möglichkeit, from the first sense as Vermögen, p. 379).

We begin by speaking about the first and proper sense — δύναμις ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν. One variety thereof is, when a thing has power of being passively affected so and so — when there resides in the thing a principle of passive change (ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς — p. 1046, a. 13) by something else or by itself quatenus something else. (These last words are added because a sick man has the δύναμις of being cured either by a physician, or by himself if he be a physician; but then in this last case he is to be looked upon in two different characters, as physician and as patient: he cures himself as physician, he is cured as patient.) Another variety of δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν is, when a thing has power of resisting change for the worse or destruction by any exterior principle of change (a. 14); as hardness in iron. Sometimes this δύναμις is restricted to the cases in which a person can do the thing in question well: no man is said to have the power of speaking or singing unless he can perform these functions pretty well (a. 18).

In all these varieties, the general notion of δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν is included (p. 1046, a. 16). The active and passive δύναμις are, in one sense, one and the same; in another sense, distinct and different. For one of them resides in the patient, the other in the agent (a. 27): sometimes the two come by nature together in the same thing; yet the patient does not suffer from itself as patient, but from itself as agent. Impotence (ἀδυναμία) is the privation contrary to this δύναμις. Privation has many different meanings (a. 32).

Among these principles of change, some reside in the inanimate substances, others in the animated; not only in the soul generally, but also in the rational branch of the soul (p. 1046, a. 38). Accordingly some δυνάμεις are Rational, others Irrational. All arts and constructive sciences are δυνάμεις (or ἀρχαὶ μεταβλητικαὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο — b. 3). In the rational capacities, the same capacity covers both contraries; in the irrational, each bears upon one of the two contraries exclusively; thus, fire will only heat but not chill, while the medical art will produce either sickness or health. The reason is, that Science is based upon rational explanations or definitions; and the same rational explanation declares both the thing itself and the privation thereof; though not indeed in the same manner: it declares, in a certain way, both together, and, in a certain way, chiefly the positive side (b. 10). Accordingly these sciences are sciences of both the contraries at once: namely, per se, of one side of the Antiphasis; not per se, of the other side; since the rational explanation also declares, directly and per se, only one side, while it declares the other side in a certain way indirectly, mediately, per accidens — i.e., by negation and exclusion (ἀποφάσει καὶ ἀποφορᾷ. — b. 14). For the Contrary is the highest grade of privation; and this is the exclusion of one side of the alternative (ἡ γὰρ στέρησις ἡ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δ’ ἀποφορὰ θατέρου — p. 1046 b. 15; Bonitz says that τὸ ἐναντίον is the subject of this proposition, and ἡ στέρησις the predicate). Both of two contraries cannot reside, indeed, in the same subject; but Science is a δύναμις through rational explanation or reason in the soul which has within it a principle of motion; accordingly the soul can bring to pass either of the two contraries, through reference to the same rational notion or explanation which comprises both (b. 22).

The Megaric philosophers recognize no δύναμις apart from ἐνέργεια; affirming that no one has any power, except at the moment when he is actually exercising it. These philosophers are wrong (for various reasons indicated: p. 1046, b. 30 — p. 1047, a. 20). Power and Act are distinct. A particular event is possible to happen, yet it does not happen; or possible not to happen, yet it does happen (p, 1047, a. 22). That is possible, to which, if the act supervene whereto such possibility relates, nothing impossible will ensue (a. 25). The name ἐνέργεια, appended to that of ἐντελέχεια (ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη — a. 30), has come to be applied to other things chiefly from reference to motions; for motion is par excellence ἐνέργεια. Hence Non-Entia are never said to be moved, though other predicates may be applied to them: we may call them διανοητά and ἐπιθυμητά, but never κινούμενα; for, if we did, we should be guilty of contradiction, saying that things which are not ἐνεργείᾳ are ἐνεργείᾳ. Among the Non-Entia there are some which are Entia δυνάμει: we call them Non-Entia, because they are not ἐντελεχείᾳ (b. 2).

If the definition above given of τὸ δυνατόν be admitted, we see plainly that no one can say truly: This is possible, yet it will never happen (p. 1047, b. 3, seq.).

Among all the various δυνάμεις, some are congenital, such as the perceptive powers (αἰσθήσεων — p. 1047, b. 31); others are acquired by practice, such as playing the flute; others by learning, like the arts: these two last varieties we cannot possess without having previously exercised ourselves in them actively (b. 34), but the others, which are more of a passive character, we may possess without such condition. This distinction coincides with that which was drawn previously between the rational and the irrational δυνάμεις or capacities: the rational capacities belonging only to a soul, and to the rational branch thereof. Now every δυνατόν has its own specialities and conditions: it is itself a given something, and it is surrounded with concomitants of special time, place, neighbourhood, &c. (p. 1048, a. 1). The irrational capacities must necessarily pass into reality, whenever the active and the passive conditions come together, because there is but one reality to arise; but the rational capacities not necessarily, because they tend to either one of two contrary realities, both of which cannot be produced. Which of the two contraries shall be brought to reality, will depend upon another authority — the appetency or deliberate resolution of the soul: to whichsoever of the two, each possible, such sovereign appetency tends, that one will be brought to pass, when agent and patient come together and both are in suitable condition (a. 11); and under those circumstances, it will necessarily (ἀνάγκη — a. 14) be brought to pass. We need not formally enunciate the clause — “if nothing extrinsic occurs to prevent itâ€�: for this is already implied in the definition of δύναμις which is never affirmed as absolute and unconditional, but always under certain given conditions (a. 18: ἔστι δ’ οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ’ ἐχόντων πῶς). Accordingly the agent will not be able to bring about both sides of the alternative at once, even though appetite or deliberate resolution may prompt him to do it (a. 21).

Having thus gone through the variety of δύναμις called ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν, we shall now give some explanations of ἐνέργεια; in the course of which we shall be able to illustrate by contrast, the other variety of δύναμις, which was indicated above (p. 1048, a. 30). Ἐνέργεια is used when the thing exists, not δυνάμει: meaning by δυνάμει such as Hermes in the wood or the half-yard in the whole yard. We shall explain our meaning, by giving an induction of particulars; for definition cannot be given of every thing. We must group into one view the analogies following (οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν — a. 37): As the person now actually building is to the professional builder not so engaged; as the animal awake is to the animal asleep; as the animal seeing is to the animal possessed of good eyes but having them closed; as that which is severed from matter is to matter (τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον — b. 3); as the work completed is to the material yet unworked; — so is ἐνέργεια to δύναμις. The antithesis is not similar in all these pairs of instances, but there is a relationship or analogy pervading all (ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε — b. 8). In some of the pairs, the antithesis is the same as that of κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν; in others, it is the same as that of οὐσία πρός τινα ὕλην (b. 9). In one member of each pair, we have ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη; in the other τὸ δυνατόν (b. 5 — ἐνέργεια here is reality severed and determinate, as contrasted with δύναμις potentiality huddled together and indeterminate. — See Schwegler’s note: “Potenzialität und Aktualität sind reine Verhältnissbegriffeâ€� — p. 172, seq.). But in all the above-named examples, that which is now δυνάμει may come actually to be ἐνεργείᾳ: the person now sleeping may awake; the person whose eyes are now closed may open them and see; the Hermes now in the wood may be brought out of the wood and exist as a real statue. It is otherwise with The Infinite, Vacuum, &c. These exist δυνάμει only, and can never come to exist ἐνεργείᾳ, or independently. The Infinite can exist ἐνεργείᾳ only for our cognition. The fact that the bisection thereof is never exhausted — that we may go on dividing as long as we choose — gives to the potential Infinite a certain actuality, though it cannot be truly separated (b. 16).