Aristotle

by George Grote

When therefore, we enquire, What are the principles or elements of Essences, of Relata, of Qualities &c., and whether they are the same or different? it is plain that, generically speaking (allowing for difference of meaning — πολλαχῶς, p. 1071, a. 31), they are the same in each; but, speaking distributively and with reference to particulars, they are different, and not the same. In the following sense (ὡδί â€” a. 34), they are the same, namely, in the way of Analogy (τῷ ἀνάλογον). They are always Matter, Form, Privation, the Movent; hence the causes of Essences are causes of all other things, since, when Essences disappear, all the rest disappears along with them: besides all these, there is the Primum Movens Actuale, common to all (ἔτι τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχείᾳ — a. 36). In the following sense, again, they are different — when we cease to speak of genera, and pass from equivocal terms to particulars: wherever there are different opposites (as white and black, health and sickness) and wherever there are different Matters (καὶ ἔτι αἱ ὗλαι — p. 1071, b. 1; ὗλαι in the plural, rare).

We have thus declared, respecting the principles of Perceivable Essences, what and how many they are; in what respect the same, and in what respect they are different. Essences are threefold; two Physical and one Immoveable. We shall proceed to speak of this last. There exists, of necessity, some Eternal, Immoveable Essence. For Essences are the first of all existent things; and, if they all be perishable, every thing is perishable. But it is impossible that Motion can ever have been generated or can ever be destroyed; for it always existed: it is eternal. There is the like impossibility about Time: for, if Time did not exist, there could be nothing prius and nothing posterius (p. 1071, b. 8). Both Motion and Time are thus eternal; both are also continuous; for either the two are identical, or Time is an affection (πάθος) of Motion. Now no mode of Motion is continuous except local motion; and that in a circle (for rectilinear motion cannot be continuous and eternal). There must be a Movent or Producent Principle (κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν — b. 12); but, if the Movent existed potentially and not actually, there could not be motion continuous and eternal; for that which has mere power may never come into act. There will be no use therefore in such eternal Essences as Plato assumes in his Ideas, unless there be along with them some principle of potential change (εἰ μή τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ μεταβάλλειν — b. 15). Nor indeed will even that be sufficient (i.e., any principle of merely potential change), nor any other Essence (such as Numbers — Schwegler) besides or along with the Platonic Ideas; for, if this principium shall not come into Actuality (εἰ μὴ ἐνεργήσει — b. 17), the motion which we postulate, continuous and eternal, will not result from it. Nor will it even be sufficient that the Movent Principle should be supposed to be in actuality or operation (οὐδ’ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, p. 1071, b. 18), if its Essence be Potentiality: the motion resulting therefrom cannot be eternal; for that which exists potentially may perhaps not exist at all. The Movent Principles therefore must be something of which the Essence is Actuality (b. 19), and which shall be without Matter, for they must be eternal, otherwise nothing else can be eternal. They must therefore be essential Actualities (b. 22).

Here however, a difficulty suggests itself. It seems that every thing which is in actuality must also be in potentiality, but that every thing which is in potentiality does not in every case come into actuality: so that Potentiality seems the prius of the two (δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργοῦν πᾶν δύνασθαι, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον οὐ πᾶν ἐνεργεῖν — p. 1071, b. 24; Bonitz compares p. 1060, a. 1: ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ συναναιροῦν). But, if this were true, no Entia could exist; for it may be that they exist potentially, but not yet exist actually (b. 26). There is the like impossibility, if we adopt the theory of those theologians (Orpheus, Hesiod, &c.) who take their departure from Night, or of those physical philosophers who begin with a chaotic huddle of all things. In both cases such original condition is one of mere potentiality; and how can it ever be put in motion, if there is to be no cause in actuality (εἰ μηθὲν ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ αἴτιον — b. 29)? Matter will never cause motion in itself, but must wait for the carpenter’s art; nor will the earth, but must wait for seed.

It is for this reason that some philosophers, like Plato and Leukippus, represent Actuality as eternal; for they say that motion has always existed. But they do not say what variety of motion, nor why that variety, to the exclusion of others. For nothing is moved at haphazard; there must always be some reason why it is moved in one way rather than another: for example, by nature in one way; by other causes, such as violence or Noûs, in some other way (p. 1071, b. 36). But it is not competent to Plato to assume what he sometimes does assume as principium (p. 1072, a. 2 — allusion to Plato Phædrus 245, E), viz., a Self-Movent; for Plato affirms (in Timæus 34, B) that the soul is posterius, and coæval with the Kosmos. The doctrine just mentioned — That the Potential is prior to the Actual — is true in one sense, but not true in another; we have already explained how (εἴρηται δὲ πῶς — a. 4. Schwegler thinks, note p. 254, that this εἴρηται refers to what has been said in Book Θ, p. 1049, b. 3, seq.; and this seems probable, though Bonitz in his note contests it, and refers to his own theory, set forth in his ProÅ“mium pp. 24, 25, that Book Λ is a separate treatise of Aristotle, completely distinct from all the rest of the Metaphysica. This theory of Bonitz may be in the main true; but it is still possible that Book Θ may have been written previously, and that Aristotle may here refer to it, as Schwegler supposes.).

That Actuality is prior to Potentiality, is conformable to the doctrine of Anaxagoras, Noûs in his doctrine existing in Actuality; also to that of Empedokles, who introduces Friendship and Enmity; and again, to that of Leukippus, who affirms Motion to be eternal. So that Chaos or Night (i.e., mere Potentiality) did not prevail for an infinite anterior time, but the same things came round in perpetual vicissitude or rotation; which consists with the doctrine that Actuality is prior to Potentiality. If the same condition comes round periodically, we must necessarily assume something Actual, which perpetually actualizes in the same manner (δεῖ τι ἀεὶ μένειν ὡσαύτως ἐνεργοῦν — p. 1072, a. 10). Again, if generation and destruction are to take place, we must assume something else Actual, which actualizes in a manner perpetually changing (ἄλλο δεῖ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως — a. 12). This last must actualize sometimes per se, sometimes in a different way; that is, according to some other influence, or according to the First (or Uniform) Actual. But it will necessarily actualize according to the First Actual; which will thus be a cause both to itself, and to the variable Actual. Now the First Actual is the best; for it is the cause of perpetual sameness, while the other is cause of variety; both together are the cause of unceasing variety. But this is how the motions really stand. Why then, should we look out for other principles (a. 18)?

Now, since the preceding views are consistent with the facts and may be true (ἐπεὶ δ’ οὕτω τ’ ἐνδέχεται — p. 1072, a. 18) — and, if they be not true, we shall be compelled to admit that every thing proceeds either from Night, or from confused Chaos or Non-Ens — we may consider the problem as solved. There exists something always in unceasing circular motion: this is evident not merely from reason, but from fact. The First Heaven (Aplanês or Fixed Star sphere) will therefore be eternal. There must therefore exist something which causes this unceasing motion, or some Prime Movent. But, since Movens Immobile, Movens Motum, Motum non Movens, form a series of three terms, and since the two last of these certainly exist, we may infer that the first exists also; and that the Prime Movent, which causes the motion of the Aplanês, is immoveable (a. 20-25. — This passage perplexes all the commentators — Schwegler, Bonitz, Alexander, &c. It can hardly be construed without more or less change of the text. I do not see to what real things Aristotle can allude under the description of Mota which are not Moventia. There is much to be said for Pierron and Zévort’s translation, p. 220: “Comme il n'y a que trois sortes d’êtres — ce qui est mu, ce qui meut, et le moyen terme entre ce qui est mu et ce qui meut: c’est un être (i.e., this middle term is an être) qui meut sans être mu.â€� — Bonitz disapproves this interpretation of the word μέσον, and it is certainly singular to say that between Movens and Motum, the term Movens sed non Motum forms a medium: Motum sed non Movens would form just as good a medium.). This Prime Movent, which causes motion without being itself moved, must be eternal, must be Essentia, and must be an Actuality.

Now both the Appetibile (τὸ ὀρεκτόν) and the Cogitabile (τὸ νοητόν) cause motion in this way, i.e., without being moved themselves; moreover the Primum Appetibile and the Primum Cogitabile are coincident or identical (p. 1072, a. 27). For that which appears beautiful, is the object of desire; but that which is beautiful, is the first object of will (a. 28). Cogitation is the principium of the two (the primary fact or fundamental element): we will so and so, because we think it good; it is not true that we think it good because we will it (ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ, μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα — a. 29). Now the Cogitant Mind (νοῦς) is moved by the Cogitabile, and, in the series of fundamental Contraries, the members of one side of the series are Cogitabilia per se (while those of the other side are only Cogitabilia per aliud — νοητὴ δ’ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ’ αὑτήν — a. 31; see Alex., p. 668, 16, Bon.). These Cogitabilia per se are first as to Essentia (i.e., compared with the Cogitabilia per aliud, they are logically priora): and again, among Essentiæ, that variety which is simple and actual comes first (i.e., it is logically prius, as compared with the compound and the potential). Now Unum is not identical with Simplex: Unum signifies that which is a measure of something else, while Simplex denotes a peculiar attribute of the subject in itself (a. 34). But the Pulchrum and the Eligibile per se belongs to the same side of the series of Contraries, as the Cogitabilia per se: and the Primum Pulchrum or Eligibile is the Best or akin thereunto, in its own particular ascending scale (b. 1).

That τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα is among the Immoveables, may be seen by our Treatise De Bono, where we give a string of generic and specific distributions (ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ — p. 1072, b. 2; see the interpretation of Alexander, adopted both by Schwegler and by Bonitz). For τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα is used in a double sense: in one of the two senses it ranks among the Immoveables: in another it does not (ἔστι γὰρ διττὸν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, b. 3 — διττόν is Schwegler’s correction, adopted by Bonitz). It causes motion, in the manner of a beloved object; and that which it causes to move, causes motion in the other things (κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον· τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τἄλλα κινεῖ — b. 3; τὸ δὲ κινούμενον is the conjecture of Schwegler and Bonitz).

Now, if any thing be moved, there is a possibility that it may be in a condition different from that in which it actually is. If the first actuality of the Moveable be translation or motion in space, there is a possibility that it may be otherwise than it is as to place, even though it cannot be otherwise than it is as to Essentia (p. 1072, b. 7).

But, as to the Prime Movent, which is itself immoveable, and which exists in actuality, it is impossible that that can be other than what it is, in any respect whatever (p. 1072, b. 8). For the first of all changes is local motion, or rotation in a circle, and this is exactly what the Prime Movent imparts (but does not itself possess). It exists by necessity, and by that species of necessity which implies the perfect and beautiful: and in this character it is the originating principle. For there are three varieties of necessity: (1) That of violence, in contradiction to the natural impulse; (2) That without which good or perfection cannot be had; (3) That which is what it is absolutely, without possibility of being otherwise. From a principle of this nature (i.e., necessary in the two last senses) depend the Heaven and all Nature (b. 14).