Both these authors maintain the proposition stated by Plutarch (Agis c. 5, in his reference to the ephor Epitadeus, and the new law carried by that ephor), that the number of Spartan lots, nearly equal and rigorously indivisible, remained with little or no change from the time of the original division, down to the return of Lysander, after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war. Both acknowledge that they cannot understand by what regulations this long unalterability, so improbable in itself, was maintained: but both affirm the fact positively. The period will be more than four hundred years if the original division be referred to Lykurgus: more than three hundred years, if the nine thousand lots are understood to date from the Messenian war.
If this alleged fact be really a fact, it is something almost without a parallel in the history of mankind: and before we consent to believe it, we ought at least to be satisfied that there is considerable show of positive evidence in its favor, and not much against it. But on examining Manso and Müller, it will be seen that not only is there very slender evidence in its favor,—there is a decided balance of evidence against it.
The evidence produced to prove the indivisibility of the Spartan lot, is a passage of Herakleidês Ponticus, c. 2 (ad. calc. Cragii, p. 504), πωλεῖν δὲ γὴν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται,—τῆς ἀρχαίας μοίρας ἀνανέμεσθαι (or νενεμῆσθαι) οὐδὲν ἔξεστι. The first portion of this assertion is confirmed by, and probably borrowed from, Aristotle, who says the same thing, nearly in the same words: the second portion of the sentence ought, according to all reasonable rules of construction, to be understood with reference to the first part; that is, to the sale of the original lot. “To sell land, is held disgraceful among the Lacedæmonians, nor is it permitted to sever off any portion of the original lot,” i. e. for sale. Herakleidês is not here speaking of the law of succession to property at Lacedæmon, nor can we infer from his words that the whole lot was transmitted entire to one son. No evidence except this very irrelevant sentence is produced by Müller and Manso to justify their positive assertion, that the Spartan lot of land was indivisible in respect to inheritance.
Having thus determined the indivisible transmission of lots to one son of a family, Manso and Müller presume, without any proof, that that son must be the eldest: and Müller proceeds to state something equally unsupported by proof: “The extent of his rights, however, was perhaps no farther than that he was considered master of the house and property; while the other members of the family had an equal right to the enjoyment of it.... The master of the family was, therefore, obliged to contribute for all these to the syssitia, without which contribution no one was admitted.”—pp. 199, 200.
All this is completely gratuitous, and will be found to produce as many difficulties in one way as it removes in another.
The next law as to the transmission of property, which Manso states to have prevailed, is, that all daughters were to marry without receiving any dowry,—the case of a sole daughter is here excepted. For this proposition he cites Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 227; Justin, iii. 3; Ælian. V. H. vi. 6. These authors do certainly affirm, that there was such a regulation, and both Plutarch and Justin assign reasons for it, real or supposed. “Lykurgus, being asked why he directed that maidens should be married without dowry, answered,—In order that maidens of poor families might not remain unmarried, and that character and virtue might be exclusively attended to in the choice of a wife.” The same general reason is given by Justin. Now the reason here given for the prohibition of dowry, goes, indirectly, to prove that there existed no such law of general succession, as that which had been before stated, namely, the sacred indivisibility of the primitive lot. For had this latter been recognized, the reason would have been obvious why daughters could receive no dowry; the father’s whole landed property (and a Spartan could have little of any other property, since he never acquired anything by industry) was under the strictest entail to his eldest son. Plutarch and Justin, therefore, while in their statement as to the matter of fact, they warrant Manso in affirming the prohibition of dowry (about this matter of fact, more presently), do, by the reason which they give, discountenance his former supposition as to the indivisibility of the primitive family lots.
Thirdly, Manso understands Aristotle (Polit. ii. 6, 11), by the use of the adverb νῦν, to affirm something respecting his own time specially, and to imply at the same time that the ancient custom had been the reverse. I cannot think that the adverb, as Aristotle uses it in that passage, bears out such a construction: νῦν δὲ, there, does not signify present time as opposed to past, but the antithesis between the actual custom and that which Aristotle pronounces to be expedient. Aristotle gives no indication of being aware that any material change had taken place in the laws of succession at Sparta: this is one circumstance, for which both Manso and Müller, who both believe in the extraordinary revolution caused by the permissive law of the ephor Epitadeus, censure him.
Three other positions are laid down by Manso about the laws of property at Sparta. 1. A man might give away or bequeathe his land to whomsoever he pleased. 2. But none except childless persons could do this. 3. They could only give or bequeathe it to citizens who had no land of their own. Of these three regulations, the first is distinctly affirmed by Aristotle, and may be relied upon: the second is a restriction not noticed by Aristotle, and supported by no proof except that which arises out of the story of the ephor Epitadeus, who is said to have been unable to disinherit his son without causing a new law to be passed: the third is a pure fancy.
So much for the positive evidence, on the faith of which Manso and Müller affirm the startling fact, that the lots of land in Sparta remained distinct, indivisible, and unchanged in number, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. I venture to say that such positive evidence is far too weak to sustain an affirmation in itself so improbable, even if there were no evidence on the other side for contradiction. But in this case there is powerful contradictory evidence.
First, the assertions of these authors are distinctly in the teeth of Aristotle, whose authority they try to invalidate, by saying that he spoke altogether with reference to his own time at Sparta, and that he misconceived the primitive Lykurgean constitution. Now this might form a reasonable ground of presumption against the competency of Aristotle, if the witnesses produced on the other side were older than he. But it so happens, that every one of the witnesses produced by Manso and Müller, are younger than Aristotle: Herakleidês Ponticus, Plutarch, Justin, Ælian, etc. Nor is it shown that these authors copied from any source earlier than Aristotle,—for his testimony cannot be contradicted by any inferences drawn from Herodotus, Thucydidês, Xenophon, Plato, Isokratês, or Ephorus. None of these writers, anterior to, or contemporary with, Aristotle, countenance the fancy of equal, indivisible, perpetual lots, or prohibition of dowry.