The idea of the ξεῖνος and the ἱκέτης run very much together. I can hardly persuade myself that the reading ἱκέτευσε (Odyss. xi. 520) is truly Homeric: implying as it does the idea of a pitiable sufferer, it is altogether out of place when predicated of the proud and impetuous Neoptolemus: we should rather have expected ἐκέλευσε. (See Odyss. x. 15.)
The constraining efficacy of special formalities of supplication, among the Scythians, is powerfully set forth in the Toxaris of Lucian: the suppliant sits upon an ox-hide, with his hands confined behind him (Lucian, Toxaris c. 48, vol. iii. p. 69, Tauchn.)—the μεγίστη ἱκετηρία among that people.
[130] Iliad, xxiii. 142.
[131] Odyss. xiv. 389.—
Οὐ γὰρ τοὔνεκ᾽ ἐγώ σ᾽ αἰδέσσομαι, οὐδὲ φιλήσω,
Ἀλλὰ Δία ξένιον δείσας, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐλεαίρων.
[132] Nägelsbach (Homerische Theologie, Abschn. v. s. 23) gives a just and well-sustained view of the Homeric ethics: “Es ist der charakteristische Standpunkt der Homerischen Ethik, dass die Sphären des Rechts, der Sittlichkeit, und Religiosität, bey dem Dichter, durchaus noch nicht auseinander fallen, so dass der Mensch z. B. δίκαιος seyn konnte ohne θεουδὴς zu seyn—sondern in unentwickelter Einheit beysammen sind.”
[133] Νόμοι, laws, is not an Homeric word; νόμος, law, in the singular, occurs twice in the Hesiodic Works and Days (276, 388).
The employment of the words δίκη, δίκαι, θέμις, θέμιστες, in Homer, is curious as illustrating the early moral associations, but would require far more space than can be given to it in a note; we see that the sense of each of these words was essentially fluctuating. Themis, in Homer, is sometimes decidedly a person, who exercises the important function of opening and closing the agora, both of gods and men (Iliad, xx. 4: Odyss. ii. 68), and who, besides that, acts and speaks (Iliad, xiv. 87-93): always the associate and companion of Zeus, the highest god. In Hesiod, (Theog. 901,) she is the wife of Zeus: in Æschylus, (Prometh. 209,) she is the same as Γαῖα: even in Plato, (Legg. xi. p. 936,) witnesses swear (to want of knowledge of matters under inquest) by Zeus, Apollo, and Themis. Themis as a person is probably the oldest sense of the word: then we have the plural θέμιστες (connected with the verb τίθεμι, like θεσμὸς and τεθμὸς), which are (not persons, but) special appurtenances or emanations of the supreme god, or of a king acting under him, analogous to and joined with the sceptre. The sceptre, and the θέμιστες or the δίκαι constantly go together (Iliad, ii. 209; ix. 99): Zeus or the king is a judge, not a lawmaker; he issues decrees or special orders to settle particular disputes, or to restrain particular men; and, agreeable to the concrete forms of ancient language, the decrees are treated as if they were a collection of ready-made substantive things, actually in his possession, like the sceptre, and prepared for being delivered out when the proper occasion arose: δικασπόλοι, οἵτε θέμιστας Πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται (Il. i. 238), compared with the two passages last cited: Ἄφρονα τοῦτον ἀνέντας, ὃς οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα (Il. v. 761), Ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας (Odyss. ix. 215). The plural number δίκαι is more commonly used in Homer than the singular: δίκη is rarely used to denote Justice, an an abstract conception; it more often denotes a special claim of right on the part of some given man (Il. xviii. 508). It sometimes also denotes, simply, established custom, or the known lot,—δμώων δίκη, γερόντων, θείων βασιλήων, θεῶν (see Damm’s Lexicon, ad voc.) θέμις is used in the same manner.
See, upon this matter, Platner, De Notione Juris ap. Homerum, p. 81, and O. Müller, Prolegg. Mythol. p. 121.