So again Plato (Legg. iii, p. 692), after remarking that the legislator of Sparta first provided the senate, next the ephors, as a bridle upon the kings, says of the ephors that they were “something nearly approaching to an authority emanating from the lot,”—οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως.
Upon which passage there are some good remarks in Schömann’s edition of Plutarch’s Lives of Agis and Kleomenês (Comment. ad Ag. c. 8, p. 119). It is to be recollected that the actual mode in which the Spartan ephors were chosen, as I have already stated in my first volume, cannot be clearly made out, and has been much debated by critics:—
“Mihi hæc verba, quum illud quidem manifestum faciant, quod etiam aliunde constat, sorte captos ephoros non esse, tum hoc alterum, quod Hermannus statuit, creationem sortitioni non absimilem fuisse, nequaquam demonstrare videntur. Nimirum nihil aliud nisi prope accedere ephororum magistratus ad cos dicitur, qui sortito capiantur. Sortitis autem magistratibus hoc maxime proprium est, ut promiscue—non ex genere, censu, dignitate—a quolibet capi possint: quamobrem quum ephori quoque fere promiscue fierent ex omni multitudine civium, poterat haud dubie magistratus eorum ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως esse dici, etiamsi αἱρετοὶ essent—h. e. suffragiis creati. Et video Lachmannum quoque, p. 165, not. 1, de Platonis loco similiter judicare.”
The employment of the lot, as Schömann remarks, implies universal admissibility of all citizens to office: though the converse does not hold good,—the latter does not of necessity imply the former. Now, as we know that universal admissibility did not become the law of Athens until after the battle of Platæa, so we may conclude that the employment of the lot had no place before that epoch,—i. e. had no place under the constitution of Kleisthenês.
[261] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 9-16.
[262] See a passage about such characters in Plato, Republic, v, p. 475 B.
[263] Plutarch, Arist. 22.
[264] So at least the supporters of the constitution of Kleisthenês were called by the contemporaries of Periklês.
[265] Plutarch, Arist. ut sup. γράφει ψήφισμα, κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἱρεῖσθαι.
[266] So in the Italian republics of the twelfth and thirteenth century, the nobles long continued to possess the exclusive right of being elected to the consulate and the great offices of state, even after those offices had come to be elected by the people: the habitual misrule and oppression of the nobles gradually put an end to this right, and even created in many towns a resolution positively to exclude them. At Milan, towards the end of the twelfth century, the twelve consuls, with the Podestat, possessed all the powers of government: these consuls were nominated by one hundred electors chosen by and among the people. Sismondi observes: “Cependant le peuple imposa lui-même a ces électeurs, la règle fondamentale de choisir tous les magistrats dans le corps de la noblesse. Ce n’étoit point encore la possession des magistratures que l’on contestoit aux gentilshommes: on demandoit seulement qu’ils fussent les mandataires immédiats de la nation. Mais plus d’une fois, en dépit du droit incontestable des citoyens, les consuls regnant s’attribuèrent l’élection de leurs successeurs.” (Sismondi, Histoire des Républiques Italiennes, chap. xii, vol. ii, p. 240.)