[654] Thucyd. i, 113; Diodor. xii, 6. Platæa appears to have been considered as quite dissevered from Bœotia: it remained in connection with Athens as intimately as before.
[655] Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 5, 4.
[656] Thucyd. i, 114; v, 16, Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.
[657] Thucyd. i, 114; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Diodor. xii, 7.
[658] Thucyd. i, 114, 115; ii, 21; Diodor. xii, 5. I do not at all doubt that the word Achaia here used, means the country in the north part of Peloponnesus, usually known by that name. The suspicions of Göller and others, that it means, not this territory, but some unknown town, appear to me quite unfounded. Thucydidês had never noticed the exact time when the Athenians acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, though he notices the Achæans (i, 111) in that capacity. This is one argument, among many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from the silence of Thucydidês against the reality of an event,—in reference to this period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, where his whole summary is so brief.
In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton remarks: “The disasters in Bœotia produced the revolt of Eubœa and Megara about eighteen months after, in Anthestêrion 445 B. C.: and the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration of the five years’ truce,” (ad ann. 447 B. C.)
Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is probable: I incline to think that the revolt of Eubœa and Megara followed more closely upon the disasters in Bœotia, in spite of the statement of archons given by Diodorus: οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, the expression of Thucydidês means probably no more than three or four months; and the whole series of events were evidently the product of one impulse. The truce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B. C., it seems reasonable to place the revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 446 B. C.—and the disasters in Bœotia, either in the beginning of 446 B. C., or the close of 447 B. C.
It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does, ad ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii, p. 478), that the five years’ truce must have been actually expired before Pleistoanax and the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica: the thirty years’ truce, afterwards concluded, did not run out its full time.
[659] See K. F. Hermann, Griechische Staatsalterthümer, sects. 53-107, and his treatise De Jure et Auctoritate Magistratuum ap. Athen. p. 53 (Heidelb. 1829); also Rein, Römisches Privatrecht, pp. 26, 408, Leips. 1836. M. Laboulaye also insists particularly upon the confusion of administrative and judiciary functions among the Romans (Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains, pp. 23, 79, 107, etc.): and compare Mr. G. C. Lewis, Essay on the Government of Dependencies, p. 42, with his citation from Hugo, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, p. 42. Mr. Lewis has given just and valuable remarks upon the goodness of the received classification of powers as a theory, and upon the extent to which the separation of them either has been, or can be, carried in practice: see also Note E, in the same work, p. 347.
The separation of administrative from judicial functions appears unknown in early societies. M. Meyer observes, respecting the judicial institutions of modern Europe: “Anciennement les fonctions administratives et judiciaires n’étoient pas distinctes. Du temps de la liberté des Germains et même long temps après, les plaids de la nation ou ceux du comté rendoient la justice et administroient les intérêts nationaux ou locaux dans une seule et même assemblée: sous le régime féodal, le roi ou l’empereur dans son conseil, sa cour, son parlement composé des hauts barons ecclésiastiques et laïes, exerçait tous les droits de souveraineté comme de justice: dans la commune, le bailli, mayeur, ou autre fonctionnaire nommé par le prince, administraient les intérêts communaux et jugeoient les bourgeois de l’avis de la communauté entière, des corporations qui la composoient, ou des autorités et conseils qui la réprésentoient: on n’avoit pas encore soupçonné que le jugement d’une cause entre particuliers pût être étranger à la cause commune.”—Meyer, Esprit des Institutions Judiciaires, book v, chap. 11, vol. iii, p. 239; also chap. 18, p. 383.