Certain passages from the Scholiast, stating that the pay of the dikasts fluctuated (οὐκ ἕστηκεν—ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐδίδοτο) do not so naturally indicate a rise from one obolus to three, as a change backwards and forwards according to circumstances. Now it seems that there were some occasions when the treasury was so very poor that it was doubtful whether the dikasts could be paid: see Lysias, cont. Epikrat. c. 1; cont. Nikomach. c. 22; and Aristophan. Equit. 1370. The amount of pay may, therefore, have been sometimes affected by this cause.
[693] There is a remarkable passage on this point in the treatise of Xenophon, De Republic. Athen. iii, 6. He says:—
Φέρε δὴ, ἀλλὰ φησί τις χρῆναι δικάζειν μὲν, ἐλάττους δὲ δικάζειν. Ἀνάγκῃ τοίνυν, ἐὰν μὲν πολλὰ (both Weiske and Schneider substitute πολλὰ here in place of ὀλίγα, which latter makes no sense) ποιῶνται δικαστήρια, ὀλίγοι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσονται τῷ δικαστηρίῳ· ὥστε καὶ διασκευάσασθαι ῥᾴδιον ἔσται πρὸς ὀλίγους δικαστὰς, καὶ συνδεκάσαι (so Schneider and Matthiæ, in place of συνδικάσαι) πολὺ ἧττον δικαίως δικάζειν.
That there was a good deal of bribery at Athens, where individuals could be approached and dealt with, is very probable (see Xenoph. de Repub. Ath. iii. 3): and we may well believe that there were also particular occasions on which money was given to the dikasts, some of whom were punished with death for such corrupt receipt (Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 17-22, pp. 12-15). But the passage above quoted from Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, shows that the precautions taken to prevent corruption of the dikasteries were well-devised and successful, though these precautions might sometimes be eluded.
[694] Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. c. 8, 2. Τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οἱ δυνατώτεροι οὔτε βούλονται δοκεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς φοβεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ νομίζουσι τοῦτο ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ ὑπέρχονται μάλιστα τὰς ἀρχάς, etc.
Respecting the violent proceedings committed by powerful men at Thebes, whereby it became almost impossible to procure justice against them for fear of being put to death, see Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. Fragm. ed. Fabr. p. 143, and Polybius, xx, 4, 6; xxiii, 2.
[695] Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 18. Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Περίκλεις, οὕτως ἥγου ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους· Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς εὔτακτοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάκτως δ’ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδένων δὲ καταδεέστερον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις; Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστι· τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὁπλίτας, καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς, οἳ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθίᾳ προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων.
[696] See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-25; Thucyd. vi, 15, and the speech which he gives as spoken by Alkibiadês in the assembly, vi, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7-8-16, and the Oration of Demosthenês against Meidias throughout: also Fragm. v. of the Πέλαργοι of Aristophanês, Meineke, ii, p. 1128.
[697] Sir Thomas Smith, in his Treatise on the Commonwealth of England, explains the Court of Star-chamber as originally constituted in order “to deal with offenders too stout for the ordinary course of justice.” The abundant compounds of the Greek language furnish a single word exactly describing this same class of offenders,—Ὑβριστόδικαι—the title of one of the lost comedies of Eupolis: see Meineke, Historia Critica Comicorum Græcorum, vol. i, p. 145.
Dean Tucker observes, in his Treatise on Civil Government: “There was hardly a session of parliament, from the time of Henry the Third to Henry the Eighth, but laws were enacted for restraining the feuds, robberies, and oppressions of the barons and their dependents on the one side,—and to moderate and check the excesses and extortions of the royal purveyors on the other; these being the two capital evils then felt. Respecting the tyranny of the ancient baronage, even squires as well as others were not ashamed to wear the liveries of their leaders, and to glory in every badge of distinction, whereby they might be known to be retained as the bullies of such or such great men, and to engage in their quarrels, just or unjust, right or wrong. The histories of those times, together with the statutes of the realm, inform us that they associated (or, as they called it, confederated together) in great bodies, parading on horseback in fairs and markets, and clad in armor, to the great terror of peaceable subjects; nay, that they attended their lords to parliament, equipped in the same military dress, and even dared sometimes to present themselves before the judge of assize, and to enter the courts of justice, in a hostile manner,—while their principals sat with the judges on the bench, intimidating the witnesses, and influencing the juries by looks, nods, signs and signals.” (Treatise concerning Civil Government, p. 337, by Josiah Tucker, D. D. London, 1781.)