The period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation, and administration.
The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned that even under the democracy of Kleisthenês, and until the time succeeding the battle of Platæa, large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus: which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for life,—though the check exercised by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the ekklesia, and for judging in the heliæa, was at the same time materially increased. We must farther recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, since the political speculations of the last century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings,[659] and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the prætor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious,—decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senate of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenês. The stratêgi, too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double competence—in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs—of issuing orders and of punishing by their own authority, disobedient parties: the imperium of the magistrates, generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from these magisterial judgments; though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleisthenean constitution, to personal responsibility for their general behavior, before the people judicially assembled, at the expiration of their year of office,—and to the farther animadversion of the ekklesia, or public deliberative assembly, meeting periodically during the course of that year: in some of which ekklesiæ, the question might formally be raised for deposing any magistrate, even before his year was expired.[660] Still, in spite of such partial checks, the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal,—must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing: and if this be true of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.[661]
I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristeidês had been impelled, by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen, to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an index of the predominant sentiment: notwithstanding the enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and judicial above described,—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life,—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical interest and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristeidês to that of Periklês: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated by that collective aggrandizement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Platæa, this new fervor of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in Periklês and Ephialtês, rivals of what may be called the conservative party, headed by Kimon.
We have no positive information that it was Periklês who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates, but the change must have been introduced nearly at this time, and with a view of equalizing the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name, and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the dokimasy, or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Periklês and Ephialtês that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular dikasteries, or jury courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates and the senate of Areopagus of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens; six thousand of whom were annually drawn by lot and sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of five hundred each, the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding causes, or inflicting punishment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury,—that is, to submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgment of one or other among these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he should take, was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause: he himself presided over it during the trial, and submitted to it the question at issue, with the results of his own preliminary examination, in addition to the speeches of accuser and accused, with the statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidence of an archon. It is to be remarked, that the system of reference to arbitration for private causes[662] was extensively applied at Athens: a certain number of public arbitrators were annually appointed, to one of whom—or to some other citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties—all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterwards carry the matter before the dikastery: but it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.
I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Periklês and Ephialtês: I doubt not that, before their time, the numerous judicial assembly called Heliæa, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in some cases, separate bodies of them may have been drawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true, that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began: for so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boëckh states,[663] doubtless in very exaggerated language, that “nearly one-third of the citizens sat as judges every day,” cannot be conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time of Periklês, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all causes, civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others: but before his time, the greater number of these causes had been adjudged either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered: the most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, and he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly, by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.[664]
In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life-tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source:[665] especially, the cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in the background for a time, after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new archons under the Kleisthenean constitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of ascendency. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions: it exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides, and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens,—it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline, beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity, and sustained by general awe and reverence: when we read the serious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators,—Demosthenês, Æschinês, or Deinarchus,—we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokratês, in his Discourse usually called Areopagiticus, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetor is inaccurate,—and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own recommendations under the color of past realities,—is sufficiently obvious: but it enables us to presume generally, the extensive regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public and private, at the time which we are now describing.
Such powers were pretty sure to be abused, and when we learn that the Spartan senate[666] was lamentably open to bribery, we can hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens. But even if their powers had been guided by all that beneficence of intention which Isokratês affirms, they were in their nature such as could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people: and the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably as to strengthen its influence, and tighten its supervision during the period immediately following: but that same trial had also called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time.[667] Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances,—the enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical population, the active duties of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, etc. All these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between 480-460 B. C., and by consequence to render the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But at the very time when prudence would have counselled that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have tried to do so: which could not fail to raise against them a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators, but also the representatives of new interests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as an organ of vexatious repression, employed for oligarchical purposes.[668]
From the character of the senate of Areopagus, and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a centre of action to the oligarchical or conservative party,—that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution unaltered, with undiminished authority, administrative as well as judicial, both to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader, and his brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistracies were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high as they could. Moreover, the party was farther strengthened by the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly through Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course, such aid could only have been indirect, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable moment,—for when we consider that Ægina had been in ancient feud with Athens, and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly, the good feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian citizens eminently desirable to preserve: and the philo-Laconian character of the leading men at Athens contributed to disarm the jealousy of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendency was in progress.[669]
The political opposition between Periklês and Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippus, the father of the former, had been the accuser of Miltiadês, the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon, and the great statesmanlike superiority of Periklês, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Periklês must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendency, for the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libellers (about 467-428 B. C.) His public life began about the time when Themistoklês was ostracized, and when Aristeidês was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with the resource and large views of the other; superadding to both a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed,—an excellent musical and lettered education received from Pythokleidês,—an eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived,—and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people,—a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his biographers[670] explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracized, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure, however, that this personal resemblance, like the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother[671] when pregnant of him, was an after-thought of enemies, when his ascendency was already established,—and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of political parties in Athens had greatly changed since the days of Themistoklês and Aristeidês; for the Kleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens, and to the keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Peiræus.
It was to this democratical party,—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology,—that Periklês devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts which it is common to ascribe to one who espouses the political interests of the poor against the rich, he was remarkably exempt: he was indefatigable in his attention to public business, but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity: his eloquence was irresistibly impressive, yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans:[672] moreover, he imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras, a tinge of physical philosophy, which greatly strengthened his mind,[673] and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions,— but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchical Kimon, whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanor of his rival Periklês. Kimon employed the rich plunder, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens,—throwing open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want; while the property of Periklês was administered with a strict, though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evangelus,—the produce of his lands being all sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the market.[674] It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest independence of all pecuniary seduction was sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Perikles,—a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits, but incapable of sustained attention to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendency of Periklês was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities,—probity, firmness, diligence, judgment, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans. As a military commander, though noway deficient in personal courage, he rarely courted distinction, and was principally famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing all rash or distant enterprises: his private habits were sober and recluse,—his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras,[675] Zeno, the musician Damon, and other philosophers,—while the tenderest domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.