The relations between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. In Thrace, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding, and with unabated vigor; but everywhere else the truce was observed. The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for discussions preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely frustrated; nor does the decree of the Athenian people, which stands included in their vote sanctioning the truce, for sending and receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, ever seem to have been executed.
Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own request, and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament now under Nikias in Pallênê. But Ischagoras, the commander of the reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all farther progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-comers off; which was far more easily executed, and was gratifying to the feelings of Perdikkas himself, as well as an essential service to the Athenians.[716] Ischagoras, however, with a few companions, but without his army, made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas: this was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom, that none except elderly men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed, Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts, for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of Amphipolis; another, Pasitelidas, of Torônê.[717] It is probable that these inspecting commissioners may have contributed to fetter the activity of Brasidas: and the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas, together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one exploit performed by him at this time, and that too more than six months after the retreat from Macedonia, about January or February 422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the town of Potidæa, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant his scaling ladders, without being discovered. The sentinel carrying and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another throughout the night), when some of the soldiers of Brasidas took advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the assailants were compelled to retreat.[718]
In the absence of actual war between the ascendent powers in and near Peloponnesus, during the course of this summer, Thucydidês mentions to us some incidents which perhaps he would have omitted had there been great warlike operations to describe. The great temple of Hêrê, between Mykenæ and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the latter, Mykenæ itself having been subjected and almost depopulated by the Argeians), enjoyed an ancient Pan-Hellenic reputation; the catalogue of its priestesses, seemingly with a statue or bust of each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate nominees. Chrysis, an old woman, who had been priestess there for fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning lamp near to her head: the fillet encircling her head took fire, and though she herself escaped unhurt, the temple itself, very ancient, and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of the Argeians, Chrysis fled to Phlius, and subsequently thought it necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Athênê Alea, at Tegea: Phaeinis was appointed priestess in her place.[719] The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by Eupolemus, of Argos, continuing as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of the former, but with greater splendor and magnitude: Pausanias, the traveller, who describes this temple as a visitor, near six hundred years afterwards, saw near it the remnant of the old temple which had been burned.
We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantineia and Tegea, each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion, the victory was disputed: each party erected a trophy, each sent spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak farther of these Arcadian dissensions.
The Bœotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March; but they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities de facto: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and sacred envoys through Bœotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Bœotia during this interval, is one which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendency of the Thebans over the inferior Bœotian cities.[720] The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespiæ, and condemned the city to remain unfortified, on the charge of atticizing tendencies. How far this suspicion was well founded we have no means of judging: but the Thespians, far from being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless, having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above mentioned.[721]
But the month of March, or the Attic Elaphebolion, 422 B.C., the time prescribed for expiration of the one year’s truce, had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed: Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from the beginning, and both the contracting powers had tacitly acquiesced in the anomalous condition, of war in Thrace coupled with peace elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. Nor was there anything except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties, always excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover, the Athenians were to a certain degree soothed by their success at Mendê and Skiônê, and by their acquisition of Perdikkas as an ally, during the summer and autumn of 423 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or to conclude any new agreement, though neither were disposed to depart from that which had been already concluded.
The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually did renew them. To the Athenians, there was this additional motive for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the conclusion of the one year’s truce, their pious feelings seem now to have taken a peculiar longing towards the visits, pilgrimages, and festivals connected with it. Though the truce, therefore, had really ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were over.[722]
But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at Athens became very different. Kleon and his supporters renewed their instances to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war, and renewed them with great additional strength of argument; the question being now open to considerations of political prudence, without any binding obligation.
“At this time (observes Thucydidês)[723] the great enemies of peace were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former, because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war; the latter, because he thought that if peace were concluded, he should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily credited in his criminations of others.” As to Brasidas, the remark of the historian is indisputable: it would be wonderful, indeed, if he, in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from Lacedæmon,—it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were not in his view the paramount object. In truth, his position in Thrace constituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon.
But the coloring which Thucydidês gives to Kleon’s support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war,—whether his personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations, which tended infallibly to place ascendency in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendency; while matter of crimination against others, assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood, could hardly be wanting either in war or peace; and if the war brought forward unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals who would certainly outshine him, and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man, we read that one of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens, of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon, expressed his surprise on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: “Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them; though I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you; if there be peace, you will have command over me.”[724] This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than that which Thucydidês pronounces in reference to the interests of Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific, and the aristocrat Hermokratês far more warlike:[725] the former is afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add, that Kleon himself had not been always warlike: he commenced his political career as an opponent of Periklês, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war.[726]