[81] See infra, [chap. 49].
[82] Xenophon, Rep. Athen, i, 18. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐπὶ δίκας ᾔεσαν οἱ σύμμαχοι, τοὺς ἐκπλέοντας Ἀθηναίων ἐτίμων ἂν μόνους, τούς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν δ᾽ ἠνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον κολακεύειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν συμμάχων, γιγνώσκων ὅτι δεῖ μὲν ἀφικόμενον Ἀθήναζε δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις τισὶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅς ἐστι δὴ νόμος Ἀθήνῃσι. Καὶ ἀντιβολῆσαι ἀναγκάζεται ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, καὶ εἰσιόντος του, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς χειρός. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οἱ σύμμαχοι δοῦλοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθεστᾶσι μᾶλλον.
[83] Thucyd. i, 76, 77. Ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν· ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη. Καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις, καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις, φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν, etc.
I construe ξυμβολαίαις δίκαις as connected in meaning with ξυμβόλαια and not with ξύμβολα—following Duker and Bloomfield in preference to Poppo and Göller: see the elaborate notes of the two latter editors. Δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων indicated the arrangements concluded by special convention between two different cities, by consent of both, for the purpose of determining controversies between their respective citizens: they were something essentially apart from the ordinary judicial arrangements of either state. Now what the Athenian orator here insists upon is exactly the contrary of this idea: he says, that the allies were admitted to the benefit of Athenian trial and Athenian laws, in like manner with the citizens themselves. The judicial arrangements by which the Athenian allies were brought before the Athenian dikasteries cannot, with propriety, be said to be δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων; unless the act of original incorporation into the confederacy of Delos is to be regarded as a ξύμβολον, or agreement,—which in a large sense it might be, though not in the proper sense in which δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων are commonly mentioned. Moreover. I think that the passage of Antipho (De Cæde Herôdis, p. 745) proves that it was the citizens of places not in alliance with Athens, who litigated with Athenians according to δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων,—not the allies of Athens while they resided in their own native cities; for I agree with the interpretation which Boeckh puts upon this passage, in opposition to Platner and Schömann (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, book iii, ch. xvi, p. 403, Eng. transl.; Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 778; Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, ch. iv, 2, pp. 110-112, where the latter discusses both the passages of Antipho and Thucydidês).
The passages in Demosthenês Orat. de Halones. c. 3, pp. 98, 99; and Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter oration, though it is undoubtedly spurious, because we may well suppose the author of it to be conversant with the nature and contents of ξύμβολα), give us a sufficient idea of these judicial conventions, or ξύμβολα,—special and liable to differ in each particular case. They seem to me essentially distinct from that systematic scheme of proceeding whereby the dikasteries of Athens were made cognizant of all, or most, important controversies among or between the allied cities, as well as of political accusations.
M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the autonomous allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the Peloponnesian war) and the subject-allies: “the former class (he says) retained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the courts of Athens.” Doubtless this distinction would prevail to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one of the subject islands, or between an individual Chian and an individual Thasian; would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the Chian defendant be sued, before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios, must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos. We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies,—the liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of prosecuting for injuries received.
There is one remark, however, which appears to me of importance for understanding the testimonies on this subject. The Athenian empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year 377 B.C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests, to acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to resume her footing of something like an imperial city. But her power over her allies, during this second period of empire, was nothing like so great as it had been during the first, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: nor can we be at all sure that what is true of the second is also true of the first. Now I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians, which represent the allies as carrying on δίκας ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων in ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about the second empire or alliance. Bekker Anecdota, p. 436. Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων ἐδίκαζον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pollux, viii. 63. Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἦν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐδικάζοντο. Also Hesychius, i, 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians may really have had σύμβολα, or special conventions for judicial business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as they did during the first. It is to be remarked, however, that Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of σύμβολα treats them in a perfectly general way, as contentions for settlement of judicial controversy between city and city, without any particular allusion to Athens and her allies. Compare Heffter, Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, iii, 1, 3, p. 91.
[84] Thucyd. i. 77. Οἱ δὲ (the allies) εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν, etc.
[85] Compare Isokratês, Or. iv, Panegyric. pp. 62-66, sects. 116-138; and Or. xii, Panathenaic. pp. 247-254, sects. 72-111; Or. viii, De Pace, p. 178, sect. 119, seqq.; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 2, 3.
[86] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 17.