Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen, as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, to the Sikels, and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable, and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian[271] allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two months’ provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of Tarentum, from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic gulf from Korkyra. They would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in coming to blows: the only way of taking down the presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return.[272]
Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela,—then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily,—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even angry debate arose upon his present speech.[273] Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that which he characterized as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans, into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.[274]
“Every one[275] (said he), except only cowards and bad citizens, must wish that the Athenians would be fools enough to come here and put themselves into our power. The tales which you have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you; and I wonder at the folly of these alarmists in fancying that their machinations are not seen through.[276] You will be too wise to take measure of the future from their reports: you will rather judge from what able men, such as the Athenians, are likely to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed, I think they account themselves lucky that we, with our powerful cities, have never come across to attack them. And if they should come, as it is pretended, they will find Sicily a more formidable foe than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, knowing all this well enough, will mind their own business, in spite of all the fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up, and which they have already tried often before, sometimes even worse than on the present occasion, in order to terrify you, and get themselves nominated to the chief posts.[277] One of these days, I fear they may even succeed, from our want of precautions beforehand. Such intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city; they condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort at present; by simple persuasion to you, by chastisement to these conspirators, and by watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you are yet incompetent. Or, do you wish not to be under equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell me[278] that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that the rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm, first, that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy merely a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the aggregate wealth existing in the community,—intelligent men, the best counsellors,—and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content even with an exorbitant share in the public advantages, but grasps and monopolizes the whole for itself.[279] This is just what you young and powerful men are aiming at, though you will never be able to keep it permanently in a city such as Syracuse. Be taught by me, or at least alter your views, and devote yourselves to the public advantage of our common city. Desist from practising, by reports such as these, upon the belief of men who know you too well to be duped. If even there be any truth in what you say, and if the Athenians do come, our city will repel them in a manner worthy of her reputation. She will not take you at your word, and choose you commanders, in order to put the yoke upon her own neck. She will look for herself, construe your communications for what they really mean, and, instead of suffering you to talk her out of her free government, will take effective precautions for maintaining it against you.”
Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of the stratêgi who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting no one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these few words: “We generals deprecate this interchange of personal vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer themselves to be biased by it. Let us rather take care, in reference to the reports just communicated, that we be one and all in a condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. We generals shall take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions to neighboring cities, for procuring information and for other objects. We have, indeed, already busied ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we learn.”
The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon at Athens, the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly to Hermokratês and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. Hermokratês has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming period almost constantly in the same position; while the political rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a leader of opposition, a function of course suspended under pressing danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, the men who got to real power and handled the force and treasures of the state, were chiefly of the rich families, often of oligarchical sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, such as Athenagoras and Kleon, the bad side of whose character is so constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all its forms, whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield personal powers, there are always abundant censors and critics,—some better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candor, wisdom, or rhetoric,—the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable importance, though holding a function essentially inferior to that of the authorized magistrate or general.
We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push the city into war, is averse to it, even beyond reasonable limit; and denounces it as the interested policy of the oligarchical party. This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on the part of the persons called demagogues, to involve their city in unnecessary wars: a charge which has been frequently advanced against them, because it so happens that Kleon, in the first half of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace between Athens and Sparta. We see by the harangue of Athenagoras that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war: a fact which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the ascendency of Hermokratês was much increased by the invasion of the Athenians, while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of Athens, though right in his judgment respecting her true political interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always pursue their true political interest, where present temptations of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this instance a surer guide than speculations à priori founded upon the probable policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not visionary, may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or three years before. The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organize and train the select regiment of one thousand hoplites, chosen from the oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the democratical constitution.[280] Now the persons, respecting whose designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select thousand at Argos.
The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but the separate places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of Aristotle.
Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those of Hermokratês than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the danger, they were apprized by their scouts when the Athenian armament was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, and pushed their preparations with the utmost activity, distributing garrisons and sending envoys among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.[281] The halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.
The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian operations had been mainly grounded, it turned out that no more than thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, visited by severe taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from whence they had calculated on obtaining money,—for it appears that both Alkibiadês and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful,—the generals now discussed their plan of action.
Nikias—availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part of the Egestæan allies, now become palpable—wished to circumscribe his range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote which the Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against Selinus; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide the means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this requisition would not be realized, he would only tarry long enough to obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island for speculative enterprises, all at the cost of Athens.[282]