But the march necessary for this purpose, first, up the valley of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next, ascending to the Euryalus by a narrow and winding path, was so difficult, that even Demosthenês, naturally sanguine, despaired of being able to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to command within the lines),[449] conducting hoplites and light troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary for establishing a fortified post; lastly, giving orders that every man should carry with him provisions for five days.
Fortune so far favored him, that not only all these preliminary arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable distance, then following various roads to the right, arrived at the Euryalus, or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior of the island about ten months before—had passed, in order to get to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground, assailed it completely by surprise, and captured it after a feeble resistance. Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind the long continuous wall,[450] on the declivity of Epipolæ, as well as to a chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under Hermokratês,[451] who formed a night-watch, or bivouac. This regiment hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenês and the Athenian vanguard charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the fortified positions in their rear. Even Gylippus and the Syracusan troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first carried back by the same retreating movement.
So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been successful beyond all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of their counter-wall which rested upon that fort; the counter-wall was no longer defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan side of it, so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the fort, made no resistance, and fled. Some of the Athenians even began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall, an operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened to Demosthenês a communication with the southern side of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was already carried, if he could only have maintained himself in his actual position, even without advancing farther, and if he could have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we cannot say. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a firm array. Unfortunately, however, their ardor of pursuit—as it constantly happened with Grecian hoplites—disturbed the regularity of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the shock of the Bœotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. The Bœotians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind, still under the impression of success, ignorant of what had passed in front, and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in their rear.
In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamor and confusion wherein there was neither command nor obedience, nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians, thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for enemies, and slain. The Syracusans and Bœotians, shouting aloud and pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost Athenians, and both armies thus grouped into knots which only distinguished each other by mutual demand of the watchword. This test also soon failed, since each party got acquainted with the watchword of the other, especially that of the Athenians, among whom the confusion was the greatest, became well known to the Syracusans, who kept together in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the pæan or war-shout on both sides was remarkable. The Dorians in the Athenian army—from Argos, Korkyra, and other places—raised a pæan not distinguishable from that of the Syracusans; accordingly, their shout struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by the same roads which they had ascended; but these roads were found too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into the plain below, many—especially the new-comers belonging to the armament of Demosthenês—lost their way through ignorance, and were cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter within their own lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than that of men, from the throwing away of shields by those soldiers who leaped the cliff.[452]
The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the Bœotians had first withstood and first repelled the enemy. By this unexpected and overwhelming victory, their feelings were restored to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the arrival of Demosthenês. Again now masters of the field, they again indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with this commission to the various cities of Sicily, while Sikanus with fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood to be wavering, and in a political crisis.[453]
During this absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to mourn the recent reverse, and to discuss the exigencies of their untoward position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement and weariness; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but dishonor. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only made Demosthenês more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to strike one decisive blow; the chances of war had turned out against him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. The season was yet favorable for the voyage (it seems to have been the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was idle, he added, to waste more time and money in staying to carry on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue, especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against the garrison of Dekeleia.[454]
This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that their present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, though he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless to be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become known to the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and secrecy,[455] as such a resolution ought to be. But farthermore, he (Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons who had been at Syracuse and cognizant of the actual facts, but by hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches of criminative orators. Even the citizens actually serving, though now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home, would alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly; and would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to bring away the army. Speaking his own personal feelings, he knew too well the tempers of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger of thus perishing under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful. Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.[456] It must be recollected too, he added, that if their affairs were now bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans a ruinous cost, in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying posts; so that they had already spent two thousand talents, besides heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of the war—to which Demosthenês had alluded as a reason for returning home—could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther pressure would utterly break down the Syracusans. He (Nikias) therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the siege;[457] the more so, as their fleet had now become unquestionably the superior.
Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon protested in the strongest language against the proposition of Nikias. Especially they treated the plan of remaining in the Great Harbor as fraught with ruin, and insisted, at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment’s delay. Even admitting, for argument, the scruples of Nikias against abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great Harbor to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above all, of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which condemned them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At all events to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbor, such was the pressing requisition of Demosthenês and Eurymedon.[458]
But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He insisted on remaining as they were; and it appears that Menander and Euthydemus[459]—colleagues named by the assembly at home, before the departure of the second armament—must have voted under the influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side. Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit, on a point of such transcendent importance.
It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the harbor, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. Throughout the army, hope of success appears to have vanished, while anxiety for return had become general. The opinions of Demosthenês and Eurymedon were doubtless well known, and orders for retreat were expected, but never came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, during the whole of this fatal interval; which plunged the army into the abyss of ruin, instead of mere failure in their aggressive enterprise.