[602] Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Hipp. Maj. p. 150.
[603] Plato, Hippias Major, p. 286, A, B.
[604] Plato, Menon, p. 95, A.; Foss, De Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 27, seq.
[605] See the observations of Groen van Prinsterer and Stallbaum, Stallbaum ad Platon. Gorg. c. 1.
[606] Plato, Gorgias, c. 17, p. 462, B.
[607] Plato, Gorgias, c. 27, p. 472, A. Καὶ νῦν (say Sokratês) περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι—μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ.... Ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ.
[608] This doctrine asserted by Kalliklês will be found in Plato, Gorgias, c. 39, 40, pp. 483, 484.
[609] See the same matter of fact strongly stated by Sokratês in the Memorab. of Xenophon, ii, 1, 13.
[610] Schleiermacher (in the Prolegomena to his translation of the Theætetus, p. 183) represents that Plato intended to refute Aristippus in the person of Kalliklês; which supposition he sustains, by remarking that Aristippus affirmed that there was no such thing as justice by nature, but only by law and convention. But the affirmation of Kalliklês is the direct contrary of that which Schleiermacher ascribes to Aristippus. Kalliklês not only does not deny justice by nature, but affirms it in the most direct manner,—explains what it is, that it consists in the right of the strongest man to make use of his strength without any regard to others,—and puts it above the justice of law and society, in respect to authority.
Ritter and Brandis are yet more incorrect in their accusations of the sophists, founded upon this same doctrine. The former says (p. 581): “It is affirmed as a common tenet of the sophists, there is no right by nature, but only by convention;” compare Brandis, p. 521. The very passages to which these writers refer, as far as they prove anything, prove the contrary of what they assert; and Preller actually imputes the contrary tenet to the sophists (Histor. Philosoph. c. 4, p. 130, Hamburg, 1838) with just as little authority. Both Ritter and Brandis charge the sophists with wickedness for this alleged tenet; for denying that there was any right by nature, and allowing no right except by convention; a doctrine which had been maintained before them by Archelaus (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 16). Now Plato (Legg. x, p. 889), whom these writers refer to, charges certain wise men—σοφοὺς ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ποιητὰς (he does not mention sophists)—with wickedness, but on the ground directly opposite; because they did acknowledge a right by nature, of greater authority than the right laid down by the legislator; and because they encouraged pupils to follow this supposed right of nature, disobeying the law; interpreting the right of nature as Kalliklês does in the Gorgias!