Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, A. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων περιέρχομαι, ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους, μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται· λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.
Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii, pp. 61-64) admits as a fact this reference of the Sokratic ethics to human security and happiness as their end; while Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosoph. ii, p. 40, seq.) resorts to inadmissible suppositions, in order to avoid admitting it, and to explain away the direct testimony of Xenophon. Both of these authors consider this doctrine as a great taint in the philosophical character of Sokratês. Zeller even says, what he intends for strong censure, that “the eudæmonistic basis of the Sokratic ethics differs from the sophistical moral philosophy, not in principle, but only in result” (p. 61).
I protest against this allusion to a sophistical moral philosophy, and have shown my grounds for the protest in the preceding chapter. There was no such thing as sophistical moral philosophy. Not only the sophists were no sect or school, but farther, not one of them ever aimed, so far as we know, at establishing any ethical theory: this was the great innovation of Sokratês. But it is perfectly true that, between the preceptorial exhortation of Sokratês, and that of Protagoras or Prodikus, there was no great or material difference; and this Zeller seems to admit.
[711] The existence of cases forming exceptions to each separate moral precept, is brought to view by Sokratês in Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 15-19; Plato, Republic, i, 6, p. 331, C, D, E; ii, p. 382, C.
[712] Plato, Phædon, c. 88, p. 89, E. ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρητο, ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, etc. ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη, Protagor. c. 27, p. 319, A; Gorgias, c. 163, p. 521, D.
Compare Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A, B; Euthydêmus, c. 50, p. 292, E: τίς ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη, ἣ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσειεν;...
The marked distinction between τέχνη, as distinguished from ἄτεχνος τριβὴ—ἄλογος τριβὴ or ἐμπειρία, is noted in the Phædrus, c. 95, p. 260, E, and in Gorgias, c. 42, p. 463, B; c. 45, p. 465, A; c. 121, p. 501, A, a remarkable passage. That there is in every art some assignable end, to which its precepts and conditions have reference, is again laid down in the Sophistês, c. 37, p. 232, A.
[713] This fundamental analogy, which governed the reasoning of Sokratês, between the special professions and social living generally,—transferring to the latter the idea of a preconceived end, a theory, and a regulated practice, or art, which are observed in the former,—is strikingly stated in one of the aphorisms of the emperor Marcus Antoninus, vi, 35: Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς οἱ βάναυσοι τεχνῖται ἁρμόζονται μὲν ἄχρι τινὸς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας, οὐδὲν ἧσσον μέντοι ἀντέχονται τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τούτου ἀποστῆναι οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν; Οὐ δεινὸν, εἰ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς μᾶλλον αἰδέσονται τὸν τῆς ἰδίας τέχνης λόγον, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὃς αὐτῷ κοινός ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς;
[714] Plato (Phædr. c. 8, p. 229, E; Charmidês, c. 26, p. 164, E; Alkibiad. i, p. 124, A; 129, A; 131, A).
Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 24-26. οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν, ἔγνωκε τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Cicero (de Legib. i, 22, 59) gives a paraphrase of this well-known text, far more vague and tumid than the conception of Sokratês.