Bacon is quite right in effacing the distinction between the two lists of persons whom he compares; and in saying that the latter were just as much sophists as the former, in the sense which he here gives to the word, as well as in every other legitimate sense. But he is not justified in imputing to either of them this many-sided argumentation as a fault, looking to the subjects upon which they brought it to bear. His remark has application to the simpler physical sciences, but none to the moral. It had great pertinence and value, at the time when he brought it forward, and with reference to the important reforms which he was seeking to accomplish in physical science. In so far as Plato, Aristotle, or the other Greek philosophers, apply their deductive method to physical subjects, they come justly under Bacon’s censure. But here again, the fault consisted less in disputing too much, than in too hastily admitting false or inaccurate axioms without dispute.
[735] Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii, 1, 2-5, p. 995, a.
The indispensable necessity, to a philosopher, of having before him all the difficulties and doubts of the problem which he tries to solve, and of looking at a philosophical question with the same alternate attention to its affirmative and negative side, as is shown by a judge to two litigants, is strikingly set forth in this passage. I transcribes portion of it: Ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν.... Διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον, ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ᾽ εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν, ἢ μὴ, γιγνώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. Ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν, τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων.
A little further on, in the same chapter (iii, 1, 19, p. 996, a), he makes a remarkable observation. Not merely it is difficult, on these philosophical subjects, to get at the truth, but it is not easy to perform well even the preliminary task of discerning and setting forth the ratiocinative difficulties which are to be dealt with: Περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥᾴδιον καλῶς. Διαπορῆσαι means the same as διεξελθεῖν τὰς ἀπορίας (Bonitz. not. ad loc.), “to go through the various points of difficulty.”
This last passage illustrates well the characteristic gift of Sokratês, which was exactly what Aristotle calls τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ καλῶς; to force on the hearer’s mind those ratiocinative difficulties which served both as spur and as guide towards solution and positive truth; towards comprehensive and correct generalization, with clear consciousness of the common attribute binding together the various particulars included.
The same care to admit and even invite the development of the negative side of a question, to accept the obligation of grappling with all the difficulties, to assimilate the process of inquiry to a judicial pleading, is to be seen in other passages of Aristotle; see Ethic. Nikomach. vii, 1, 5; De Animâ, i, 2. p. 403, b; De Cœlo, i, 10, p. 279, b; Topica, i, 2, p. 101, a: (Χρήσιμος δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ) πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι, ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. Compare also Cicero, Tusc. Disput. ii, 3, 9.
[736] Cicero (de Orator. iii, 16, 61; Tuscul. Disput. v, 4, 11): “Cujus (Socratis) multiplex ratio disputandi, rerumque varietas, et ingenii magnitudo, Platonis ingenio et literis consecrata, plura genera effecit dissentientium philosophorum.” Ten distinct varieties of Sokratic philosophers are enumerated; but I lay little stress on the exact number.
[737] In setting forth the ethical end, the language of Sokratês, as far as we can judge from Xenophon and Plato, seems to have been not always consistent with itself. He sometimes stated it as if it included a reference to the happiness, not merely of the agent himself, but of others besides; both as coördinate elements; at other times, he seems to speak as if the end was nothing more than the happiness of the agent himself, though the happiness of others was among the greatest and most essential means. The former view is rather countenanced by Xenophon, the best witness about his master, so that I have given it as belonging to Sokratês, though it is not always adhered to. The latter view appears most in Plato, who assimilates the health of the soul to the health of the body, an end essentially self-regarding.
[738] Cicero, de Orator. i, 47, 204.
[739] Xenoph. Mem. iii, 9, 4; Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. vi, 13, 3-5; Ethic. Eudem. i, 5; Ethic. Magn. i, 35.