[577] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 13; compare iv, 2, 18,—where he says of the Thebans—ἀμελήσαντες τοῦ ἐς ἑκκαίδεκα, βαθεῖαν παντελῶς ἐποιήσαντο τὴν φάλαγγα, etc., which implies and alludes to the resolution previously taken.
[578] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 11, 12.
[579] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 14, 15.
In the passage,—καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι μέντοι ἐλθόντες κατεστρατοπεδεύσαντο, ἔμπροσθεν ποιησάμενοι τὴν χαράδραν,—I apprehend that ἀπελθόντες (which is sanctioned by four MSS., and preferred by Leunclavius) is the proper reading, in place of ἐλθόντες. For it seems certain that the march of the confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops sought shelter within the town, and the Lacedæmonian pursuers were so close upon them, that the Corinthians within were afraid to keep open the gates. Hence we must reject the statement of Diodorus,—that the battle was fought on the banks of the river Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous.
There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description which Xenophon gives of the Lacedæmonian march. His words run—ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ δὴ Τεγεάτας παρειληφότες καὶ Μαντινέας, ἐξῄεσαν τὴν ἀμφίαλον. These last three words are not satisfactorily explained. Weiske and Schneider construe τὴν ἀμφίαλον (very justly) as indicating the region lying immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of Corinth and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would not be correct to say, that “the Lacedæmonians had gone out by the bimarine way.” On the contrary, the truth is, that “they had gone out into the bimarine road or region,—which meaning however would require a preposition—ἐξῄεσαν εἰς τὴν ἀμφίαλον. Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ἐξιέναι) renders τὴν ἀμφίαλον—viam ad mare—which seems an extraordinary sense of the word, unless instances were produced to support it; and even if instances were produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon should be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos.
Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or district called τὴν Ἐπιεικίαν (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But it is certain from the map, that when the confederates were at Nemea, and the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon,—the former must have been exactly placed so as to intercept the junction of the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Hermionê, with the Lacedæmonian army. To secure this junction, the Lacedæmonians were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region which lies near Kleônæ and Nemea, and to march in a line pointing from Sikyon down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached the other side of these mountains near the sea, they would be in communication with Epidaurus and the other towns of the Argolic peninsula.
The line of march which the Lacedæmonians would naturally take from Sparta to Sikyon and Lechæum, by Tegea, Mantineia, Orchomenus, etc., is described two years afterwards in the case of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19).
[580] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 18. The coloring which Xenophon puts upon this step is hardly fair to the Thebans, as is so constantly the case throughout his history. He says that “they were in no hurry to fight” (οὐδέν τι κατήπειγον τὴν μάχην ξυνάπτειν) so long as they were on the left, opposed to the Lacedæmonians on the opposite right; but that as soon as they were on the right (opposed to the Achæans on the opposite left), they forthwith gave the word. Now it does not appear that the Thebans had any greater privilege on the day when they were on the right, than the Argeians or Athenians had when each were on the right respectively. The command had been determined to reside in the right division, which post alternated from one to the other; why the Athenians or Argeians did not make use of this post to order the attack, we cannot explain.
So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by the Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more,—the Thebans made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his own account, that no mischievous consequences turned upon this greater depth.
[581] See the instructive description of the battle of Mantineia—in Thucyd. v, 71.