Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal of that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.
CHAPTER LXXIV.
FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.
Having in my last chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down to the battle of Knidus, in the beginning of August, B.C. 394, at which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean, in Greece Proper,—I now take up the thread of events from a period somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly called the Corinthian war, began.
At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 B.C., the power of Sparta throughout all Greece from Laconia to Thessaly, was greater than it had ever been, and greater than any Grecian state had ever enjoyed before. The burden of the long war against Athens she had borne in far less proportion than her allies; its fruits she had reaped exclusively for herself. There prevailed consequently among her allies a general discontent, which Thebes as well as Corinth manifested by refusing to take part in the recent expeditions; either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus,—or of Agis against the Eleians,—or of Agesilaus against the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were completely humbled by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities in Peloponnesus, from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from being governed by oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, were obedient to her authority,—with the single exception of Argos, which remained, as before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment unfriendly. Athens was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan allies, furnishing her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by the xenâgus,—or officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of commanding such foreign contingents.
In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power is yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 B.C. (about two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so unable to protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac Gulf, near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the Bœotians were obliged to send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the Lacedæmonian harmost.[530] In the winter of 409-408 B.C., another disaster had happened at Herakleia, in which the Lacedæmonian harmost was slain.[531] But about 399 B.C., we find Sparta exercising an energetic ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a central post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount Œta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was sent thither to repress some factious movements, with a force sufficient to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize the obnoxious party in the place, and to put them to death, five hundred in number, outside of the gates.[532] Carrying his arms farther against the Œtæans and Trachinians in the neighborhood, who had been long at variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia, he expelled them from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with their wives and children into Thessaly.[533] Hence, the Lacedæmonians were enabled to extend their influence into parts of Thessaly, and to place a harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, resting upon Herakleia as a basis,—which thus became a position of extraordinary importance for their dominion over the northern regions.
With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, in addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx of tribute,—and among cities who had not merely long recognized her as leader, but had never recognized any one else,—it required an unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination against her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and antipathy. The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the means had been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing Athens. The news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia, which had prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of 396 B.C., was doubtless circulated and heard with satisfaction among the Grecian cities unfriendly to Sparta; and the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and Athens, to take service under that prince,—aggravated in the case of the Thebans by a positive offence given to him on the occasion of his sacrifice at Aulis,—was enough to warn Sparta of the dangerous sentiments and tendencies by which she was surrounded near home.
It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation and promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of the following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary supplies, with news of revived naval warfare threatening the insular dominion of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had put to death and succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded the armistice mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to remove his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed active measures for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in order to create a necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of Asia. He sent a Rhodian named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to the cities most unfriendly to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of fifty talents;[534] directing him to employ this money in gaining over the leading men in these cities, and to exchange solemn oaths of alliance and aid with Persia, for common hostility against Sparta. The island of Rhodes having just revolted from the Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon with the Persian fleet (as I have mentioned in the last chapter), so that probably the Rhodian envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes on behalf of his countrymen. He was an appropriate envoy on this occasion, as having an animated interest in raising up new enemies to Sparta, and as being hearty in stirring up among the Thebans and Corinthians the same spirit which had led to the revolt of Rhodes. The effect which that revolt produced in alarming and exasperating the Spartans, has been already noticed; and we may fairly presume that its effect on the other side, in encouraging their Grecian enemies, was considerable. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, distributing his funds. He concluded engagements on behalf of the satrap, with various leading men in each, putting them into communication with each other; Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in Thebes,—Timolaus and Polyanthes at Corinth,—Kylon and others at Argos. It appears that he did not visit Athens; at least, Xenophon expressly says that none of his money went there. The working of this mission,—coupled, we must recollect, with the renewed naval warfare on the coast of Asia, and the promise of a Persian fleet against that of Sparta,—was soon felt in the more pronounced manifestation of anti-Laconian sentiments in these various cities, and in the commencement of attempts to establish alliance between them.[535]
With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when such temptation was resisted,—and a morality considerably higher than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is, given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us) Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present for the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution to the wants of the army),[536] or to that which the satrap Tiribazus gave to Antalkidas afterwards,[537] also for public objects. Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest, having received these presents from Timokrates, accused the Lacedæmonians and rendered them odious,—each in his respective city.[538] But it is certain, from his own showing, that the hatred towards them existed in these cities, before the arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was of old standing; in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the close of the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none of the money,[539] were quite as ready for war as the other cities. If we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that Timokrates gave private presents to various leading politicians, which is by no means improbable,—we must dissent from the explanatory use which he makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the cause of the war. What these leading men would find it difficult to raise was, not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to brave the power of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of Timokrates would be a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of Persian coöperation and support against Sparta. He must have been produced publicly either before the people, the senate, or at least the great body of the anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money which he brought with him, though a portion of it may have gone in private presents, would serve to this party as the best warrant for the sincerity of the satrap.