To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of the situation gradually became more and more predominant in the assembly. Kallistratus[514] the orator spoke eloquently in support of the Lacedæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened to, as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen[515] at Athens, since the peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled from Korkyra.
As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside the gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the next morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many citizens went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates himself; and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve thousand men,—not named under conscription by the general, but volunteers.[516] He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that he had formidable enemies to deal with. After having established his position at Corinth, and obtained information regarding the enemy, he marched into Arcadia, and there made war without any important result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted Laconia, while many of the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the plunder acquired; so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled in part by the recent manifestation of Athens,[517] the Theban general himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which it was necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground, and afforded good means of resistance to the passage of an army; nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its two extremities, did not attempt directly to bar the passage of the Thebans. He contented himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But Epaminondas beat them back with some loss, and pursued them to the gates of Corinth. Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body within the town were eager to march out and engage in general battle. Their ardor was however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth, suffered the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.[518]
On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already retained it for four months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although, by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent. Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies, likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition just finished; the invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto unvisited by any enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their walls,—the liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment of Messênê as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city, forming, with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line of defence on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent depression of the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece generally, from Spartan ascendency, now consummated.
Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant. He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without even going through the formality of collecting the votes.[519] And it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.[520]
CHAPTER LXXIX.
FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.
Prodigious was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by Epaminondas.
How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta; and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians and Thebans against her.
Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable; partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the position and policy of Athens.
At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, and whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbors like the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and of Athens,[521] especially the former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power (382-379 B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies. But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens (from 378 B.C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land; while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374 B.C.) from assisting her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.[522] To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He adopted the former as his son;[523] at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have already stated that Iphikrates had married the daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys, on the Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find Timotheus also in great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.[524] Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was treated with considerable favor.[525]