It was in the summer of 405 B.C., that this treaty was concluded, which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens, and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way, to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of Greece.[976]
The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress, depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence. No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.
Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian army would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for Dionysius.[977] It had been brought about under him, though not as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him as the savior of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity, before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favorable opportunity, to resist.
His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall, provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of every kind, immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough to shelter a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort, destined for a public magazine of corn.[978] It suited his purpose that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also erected a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius. Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor, closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time, though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but enabling him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master, at the same time, of the grand means of war and defence against foreign enemies.
To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step towards perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents, was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept Syracuse in subjection.[979] Having provided houses for his soldiers, by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as the former; so far at least, as any man could be properly called a citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.[980]
Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands, Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. It would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion not very long afterwards, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as amounting to about ten thousand.[981] To ensure landed properties to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice. How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from Dionysius into a traditional observance for future anti-popular governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued the city near two centuries afterwards, prescribed the rule of admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native Syracusan residents.[982]
Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know. Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from the Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five years, the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is, twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.[983] To what years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen were actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came back from Gela.[984]
Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries, Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, partly of armed Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus. While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most mutinous speakers;[985] upon which the soldiers rushed forward in a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves again, with loud shouts, free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every effort to recover their liberty.
So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan enemies could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found themselves speedily reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to Corinth, for aid; while they at the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy of the population, to possess themselves farther of the outer city Achradina, and with its appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now exclusively occupied by his chosen partisans and mercenaries. If he even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as the Lesser Harbor.[986] A considerable naval force was sent to their aid from Messênê and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him up on the seaside; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no farther assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as adviser.[987] The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert him.
Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade, brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack. And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion; discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged away by the leg.[988] Accordingly, Dionysius determined to hold out, without quitting Ortygia; sending private envoys to the Campanians, with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty the possession of Syracuse.