These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war, though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage; whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join him.[1030]
Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man. And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission, which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the plunder was lucrative.[1031] But though such may have been the case in ordinary times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances, any Carthaginian (person or property) can have been at Syracuse except by accident; for war with Carthage had been long announced, not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand how the prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)[1032] can have been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment, when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which herald was not sent until after the license for private plunder had been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily,[1033] as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second or third years of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort, and heard with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was, however, no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some of their ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their Sicilian possessions.[1034]
The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius had marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign, accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries of Gelon had been struck with awe[1035] at the superiority of his force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius. More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily subject to Carthage;[1036] cities, whose number and importance had since fearfully augmented.
These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage; whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as soon as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border, and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most intense anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and the other conquered cities.[1037] The Hellenic war-practice, in itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These “Sicilian vespers,” which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured. Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear however, from their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart; while it is unhappily certain, that such interchange of cruelties with less humanized neighbors, contributed to lower in the Sicilian Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterized the Hellenic race in its own home.
Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately north of Cape Lilybæum.[1038]
Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily,—Motyê, Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at once the nearest to the mother-city,[1039] the most important, and the most devoted. It was situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet, separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole, so as to form a regular, though narrow, footpath. It was populous, wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful a force,—the Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of defence. They broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in conjunction with his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein we read of a professed engineer as being directly and deliberately called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.[1040]
Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a portion of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on or allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness, without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.[1041] Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth) which divided Motyê from the main island;[1042]—or at least as much of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however, was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor, yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious impression, or creating the diversion intended.[1043] Imilkon next made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius, as they lay hauled ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from Carthage by night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine coast, he sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off Motyê. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared for attack while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been got afloat. As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been saved by his numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers of missiles, from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta, of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was especially effective; projecting large masses to a great distance, it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress was thus arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor, but landward, across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in breadth, which separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea. Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes, the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but returned at once back to Africa.[1044]
Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory, and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his assault. While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts above the walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork, and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines took fire in the woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already put the houses behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first, remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near, but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes, resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole companies to the ground, by severing or oversetting the platform. For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to their night’s repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be undisturbed, he on one fatal night took them by surprise, sending the Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost defences. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a position within the town before resistance could be organized. In vain did the Motyenes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought up across the artificial earth-way to confirm their success, and the town was thus carried, in spite of the most gallant resistance, which continued even after it had become hopeless.[1045]
The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not merely by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by antecedent Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They butchered indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the slain, in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step, which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments, and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;[1046] a specimen of the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic neighbors and enemies.
The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the command of his brother Leptines; who was instructed to watch for the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in besieging the neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful, through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy’s camp, with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighboring territory dependent upon Carthage.[1047]