It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis, wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, which he stripped of their rich treasures.[1064] But if such was his plan, he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ; so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification, which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle, yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly raised their spirits.
One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to Imilkon’s fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with numbers decidedly superior, and completely defeated them. They captured the admiral’s ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded, challenging the enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted, they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.
This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still farther accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public with unbounded exultation. “Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies; under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any longer?” Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to extort freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously taken from them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence, promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.
It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was ever tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly, when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, which so many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately and were well known to feel.[1065]
Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by Theodôrus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review, and an emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius, concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves from his dominion. “Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is a worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice. He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”[1066]
“If the conduct of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous, it has been no better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally. He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the Carthaginians. He suffered Messênê to fall into their hands without the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our Grecian brethren and neighbors of Naxus and Katana; transferring the latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former. He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that town; so as to ensure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might have attacked them, if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage. He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence; not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but preserving the terrors of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him, we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.
“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus), in place of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens,—or from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the presidents of all Greece.”
Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodôrus; the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his dominion over them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which coincide in the main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no ground for contesting.
Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words, Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta, against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas. That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus. Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier period of her history.[1067] Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus, and stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in Sicily.[1068] Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. Dionysius had established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis.[1069] Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself emphatically in favor of the despot; intimating that he had been sent to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians,—not to put down the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence, not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius, thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a free spokesman was heard.[1070] And he was thus enabled to dismiss an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.
During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander, with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within. Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril. The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued throughout the Grecian world.