[792] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8.

[793] Diodor. xvi. 58; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385-387; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41.

[794] Diodor. xvi. 56.

[795] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57.

[796] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 62. c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 59. Φάλαικον, πάλιν τῆς στρατηγίας ἠξιωμένον, etc.

[797] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 73. c. 44; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 231. Demosthenes, in his oration De Coronâ, spoken many years after the facts, affirms the contingency of alliance between Athens and Thebes at this juncture, as having been much more probable than he ventures to state it in the earlier speech De Falsâ Legatione.

[798] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

[799] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 41. It is this notice of the μυστηριωτίδες σπονδαὶ which serves as indication of time for the event. The Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated in the month Boëdromion (September). These events took place in September, 347 B. C., Olymp. 108, 2—the archonship of Themistokles at Athens. There is also a farther indication of time given by Æschines: that the event happened before he was nominated envoy,—πρὶν ἐμὲ χειροτονηθῆναι πρεσβευτήν (p. 46. c. 41). This refutes the supposition of Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. de Pace, p. 255), who refers the proceeding to the following month Elaphebolion (March), on the ground of some other words of Æschines, intimating “that the news reached Athens while the Athenians were deliberating about the peace.” Böhnecke, too, supposes that the mysteries here alluded to are the lesser mysteries, celebrated in Anthesterion; not the greater, which belong to Boëdromion. This supposition appears to me improbable and unnecessary. We may reasonably believe that there were many discussions on the peace at Athens, before the envoys were actually nominated. Some of these debates may well have taken place in the month Boëdromion.

[800] It is at this juncture, in trying to make out the diplomatic transactions between Athens and Philip, from the summer of 347 to that of 346 B. C., that we find ourselves plunged amidst the contradictory assertions of the two rival orators,—Demosthenes and Æschines; with very little of genuine historical authority to control them. In 343-342 B. C., Demosthenes impeached Æschines for corrupt betrayal of the interest of Athens in the second of his three embassies to Philip (in 346 B. C.). The long harangue (De Falsâ Legatione), still remaining, wherein his charge stands embodied, enters into copious details respecting the peace with its immediate antecedents and consequents. We possess also the speech delivered by Æschines in his own defence, and in counter-accusation of Demosthenes; a speech going over the same ground, suitably to his own purpose and point of view. Lastly, we have the two speeches, delivered several years later (in 330 B. C.), of Æschines in prosecuting Ktesiphon, and of Demosthenes in defending him; wherein the conduct of Demosthenes as to the peace of 346 B. C. again becomes matter of controversy. All these harangues are interesting, not merely as eloquent compositions, but also from the striking conception which they impart of the living sentiment and controversy of the time. But when we try to extract from them real and authentic matter of history, they become painfully embarrassing; so glaring are the contradictions not only between the two rivals, but also between the earlier and later discourses of the same orator himself, especially Æschines; so evident is the spirit of perversion, so unscrupulous are the manifestations of hostile feeling, on both sides. We can place little faith in the allegations of either orator against the other, except where some collateral grounds of fact or probability can be adduced in confirmation. But the allegations of each as to matters which do not make against the other, are valuable; even the misrepresentations, since we have them on both sides, will sometimes afford mutual correction: and we shall often find it practicable to detect a basis of real matter of fact which one or both may seek to pervert, but which neither can venture to set aside, or can keep wholly out of sight. It is indeed deeply to be lamented that we know little of the history except so much as it suits the one or the other of these rival orators, each animated by purposes totally at variance with that of the historian, to make known either by direct notice or oblique allusion.

[801] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. s. 9. p. 31. c. 10. p. 34. c. 20; Argumentum ii ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.