Some of the Macedonian officers round Philip gave explicit assurance, that the purpose of his march was to conquer Thebes, and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. So far, indeed, was this deception carried, that (according to Æschines) the Theban envoys in Macedonia, and the Thebans themselves, became seriously alarmed.[863] The movements of Philip were now the pivot on which Grecian affairs turned, and Pella the scene wherein the greatest cities in Greece were bidding for his favor. While the Thebans and Thessalians were calling upon him to proclaim himself openly Amphiktyonic champion against the Phokians,—the Phokian envoys,[864] together with those from Sparta and Athens, were endeavoring to enlist him in their cause against Thebes. Wishing to isolate the Phokians from such support, Philip made many tempting promises to the Lacedæmonian envoys; who, on their side, came to open quarrel, and indulged in open menace, against those of Thebes.[865] Such was the disgraceful auction, wherein these once great states, in prosecution of their mutual antipathies, bartered away to a foreign prince the dignity of the Hellenic name and the independence of the Hellenic world;[866] following the example set by Sparta in her applications to the Great King, during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and at the peace of Antalkidas. Amidst such a crowd of humble petitioners and expectants, all trembling to offend him,—with the aid too of Æschines, Philokrates, and the other Athenian envoys who consented to play his game,—Philip had little difficulty in keeping alive the hopes of all, and preventing the formation of any common force or decisive resolution to resist him.[867]
After completing his march southward through Thessaly, he reached Pheræ near the Pagasæan Gulf, at the head of a powerful army of Macedonians and allies. The Phokian envoys accompanied his march, and were treated, if not as friends, at least in such manner as to make it appear doubtful whether Philip was going to attack the Phokians or the Thebans.[868] It was at Pheræ that the Athenian envoys at length administered the oath both to Philip and to his allies.[869] This was done the last thing before they returned to Athens; which city they reached on the 13th of the month Skirrophorion;[870] after an absence of seventy days, comprising all the intervening month Thargelion, and the remnant (from the third day) of the month Munychion. They accepted, as representatives of the allied cities, all whom Philip sent to them; though Demosthenes remarks that their instructions directed them to administer the oath to the chief magistrate in each city respectively.[871] And among the cities whom they admitted to take the oath as Philip’s allies, was comprised Kardia, on the borders of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered Kardia as within the limits of the Chersonese, and therefore as belonging to them.[872]
It was thus that the envoys postponed both the execution of their special mission, and their return, until the last moment, when Philip was within three days’ march of Thermopylæ. That they so postponed it, in corrupt connivance with him, is the allegation of Demosthenes, sustained by all the probabilities of the case. Philip was anxious to come upon Thermopylæ by surprise,[873] and to leave as little time as possible either to the Phokians or to Athens for organizing defence. The oath, which ought to have been administered in Thrace,—but at any rate at Pella—was not taken until Philip had got as near as possible to the important pass; nor had the envoys visited one single city among his allies in execution of their mandate. And as Æschines was well aware that this would provoke inquiry, he took the precaution of bringing with him a letter from Philip to the Athenian people, couched in the most friendly terms; wherein Philip took upon himself any blame which might fall upon the envoys, affirming that they themselves had been anxious to go and visit the allied cities, but that he had detained them in order that they might assist him in accommodating the difference between the cities of Halus and Pharsalus. This letter, affording farther presumption of the connivance between the envoys and Philip, was besides founded on a false pretence; for Halus was (either at that very time or shortly afterwards) conquered by his arms, given up to the Pharsalians, and its population sold or expelled.[874]
In administering the oaths at Pheræ to Philip and his allies, Æschines and the majority of the Athenian envoys had formally and publicly pronounced the Phokians to be excluded and out of the treaty, and had said nothing about Kersobleptes. This was, if not a departure from their mandate, at least a step beyond it; for the Athenian people had expressly rejected the same exclusion when proposed by Philokrates at Athens; though when the Macedonian envoy declared that he could not admit the Phokians, the Athenians had consented to swear the treaty without them. Probably Philip and his allies would not consent to take the oath, to Athens and her allies, without an express declaration that the Phokians were out of the pale.[875] But though Philokrates and Æschines thus openly repudiated the Phokians, they still persisted in affirming that the intentions of Philip towards that people were highly favorable. They affirmed this probably to the Phokians themselves, as an excuse for having pronounced the special exclusion; they repeated it loudly and emphatically at Athens, immediately on their return. It was then that Demosthenes also, after having been outvoted and silenced during the mission, obtained an opportunity for making his own protest public. Being among the senators of that year, he made his report to the Senate forthwith, seemingly on the day, or the day next but one, after his arrival, before a large audience of private citizens standing by to witness so important a proceeding. He recounted all the proceedings of the embassy,—recalling the hopes and promises under which Æschines and others had persuaded the Athenians to agree to the peace,—arraigning these envoys as fabricators, in collusion with Philip, of falsehoods and delusive assurances,—and accusing them of having already by their unwarrantable delays betrayed Kersobleptes to ruin. Demosthenes at the same time made known to the Senate the near approach and rapid march of Philip; entreating them to interpose even now at the eleventh hour, for the purpose of preventing what yet remained, the Phokians and Thermopylæ, from being given up under the like treacherous fallacies.[876] A fleet of fifty triremes had been voted, and were ready at a moment’s notice to be employed on sudden occasion.[877] The majority of the Senate went decidedly along with Demosthenes, and passed a resolution[878] in that sense to be submitted to the public assembly. So adverse was this resolution to the envoys, that it neither commended them nor invited them to dinner in the prytaneium; an insult (according to Demosthenes) without any former precedent.
On the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, three days after the return of the envoys, the first public assembly was held: where, according to usual form, the resolution just passed by the Senate ought to have been discussed. But it was not even read to the assembly; for immediately on the opening of business (so Demosthenes tells us), Æschines rose and proceeded to address the people, who were naturally impatient to hear him before any one else, speaking as he did in the name of his colleagues generally.[879] He said nothing either about the recent statements of Demosthenes before the Senate, or the senatorial resolution following, or even the past history of the embassy—but passed at once to the actual state of affairs, and the coming future. He acquainted the people that Philip, having sworn the oaths at Pheræ, had by this time reached Thermopylæ with his army. “But he comes there (said Æschines) as the friend and ally of Athens, the protector of the Phokians, the restorer of the enslaved Bœotian cities, and the enemy of Thebes alone. We your envoys have satisfied him that the Thebans are the real wrong-doers, not only in their oppression towards the Bœotian cities, but also in regard to the spoliation of the temple, which they had conspired to perpetrate earlier than the Phokians. I (Æschines) exposed in an emphatic speech before Philip the iniquities of the Thebans, for which proceeding they have set a price on my life. You Athenians will hear, in two or three days, without any trouble of your own, that Philip is vigorously prosecuting the siege of Thebes. You will find that he will capture and break up that city—that he will exact from the Thebans compensation for the treasure ravished from Delphi—and that he will restore the subjugated communities of Platæa and Thespiæ. Nay more—you will hear of benefits still more direct, which we have determined Philip to confer upon you, but which it would not be prudent as yet to particularize. Eubœa will be restored to you as a compensation for Amphipolis: the Eubœans have already expressed the greatest alarm at the confidential relations between Athens and Philip, and the probability of his ceding to you their island. There are other matters too, on which I do not wish to speak out fully, because I have false friends even among my own colleagues.” These last ambiguous allusions were generally understood, and proclaimed by the persons round the orator, to refer to Oropus, the ancient possession of Athens, now in the hands of Thebes.[880] Such glowing promises, of benefits to come, were probably crowned by the announcement, more worthy of credit, that Philip had engaged to send back all the Athenian prisoners by the coming Panathenaic festival,[881] which fell during the next month Hekatombæon.
The first impression of the Athenians, on hearing Æschines, was that of surprise, alarm, and displeasure, at the unforeseen vicinity of Philip;[882] which left no time for deliberation, and scarcely the minimum of time for instant precautionary occupation of Thermopylæ, if such a step were deemed necessary. But the sequel of the speech—proclaiming to them the speedy accomplishment of such favorable results, together with the gratification of their antipathy against Thebes—effaced this sentiment, and filled them with agreeable prospects. It was in vain that Demosthenes rose to reply, arraigned the assurances as fallacious, and tried to bring forward the same statement as had already prevailed with the Senate. The people refused to hear him; Philokrates with the other friends of Æschines hooted him off; and the majority were so full of the satisfactory prospect opened to them, that all mistrust or impeachment of its truth appeared spiteful and vexatious.[883] It is to be remembered that these were the same promises previously made to them by Philokrates and others, nearly three months before, when the peace with Philip was first voted. The immediate accomplishment of them was now again promised on the same authority—by envoys who had communicated a second time with Philip, and thus had farther means of information—so that the comfortable anticipation previously raised was confirmed and strengthened. No one thought of the danger of admitting Philip within Thermopylæ, when the purpose of his coming was understood to be, the protection of the Phokians, and the punishment of the hated Thebans. Demosthenes was scarcely allowed even to make a protest, or to disclaim responsibility as to the result. Æschines triumphantly assumed the responsibility to himself; while Philokrates amused the people by saying: “No wonder, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I should not think alike; he is an ungenial water-drinker; I am fond of wine.”[884]
It was during this temper of the assembly that the letter of Philip, brought by the envoys, was produced and read. His abundant expressions of regard, and promises of future benefit, to Athens, were warmly applauded; while, prepossessed as the hearers were, none of them discerned, nor was any speaker permitted to point out, that these expressions were thoroughly vague and general, and that not a word was said about the Thebans or the Phokians.[885] Philokrates next proposed a decree, extolling Philip for his just and beneficent promises—providing that the peace and alliance with him should be extended, not merely to the existing Athenians, but also to their posterity—and enacting that if the Phokians should still refuse to yield possession of the Delphian temple to the Amphiktyons, the people of Athens would compel them to do so by armed intervention.[886]
During the few days immediately succeeding the return of the envoys to Athens (on the 13th of Skirrophorion), Philip wrote two successive letters, inviting the Athenian troops to join him forthwith at Thermopylæ.[887] Probably these were sent at the moment when Phalækus, the Phokian leader at that pass, answered his first summons by a negative reply.[888] The two letters must have been despatched one immediately after the other, betraying considerable anxiety on the part of Philip; which it is not difficult to understand. He could not be at first certain what effect would be produced by his unforeseen arrival at Thermopylæ on the public mind at Athens. In spite of all the persuasions of Æschines and Philokrates, the Athenians might conceive so much alarm as to obstruct his admission within that important barrier; while Phalækus and the Phokians—having a powerful mercenary force, competent, even unaided, to a resistance of some length—were sure to attempt resistance, if any hope of aid were held out to them from Athens. Moreover it would be difficult for Philip to carry on prolonged military operations in the neighborhood, from the want of provisions; the lands having been unsown through the continued antecedent war, and the Athenian triremes being at hand to intercept his supplies by sea.[889] Hence it was important to him to keep the Athenians in illusion and quiescence for the moment; to which purpose his letters were well adapted, in whichever way they were taken. If the Athenians came to Thermopylæ, they would come as his allies—not as allies of the Phokians. Not only would they be in the midst of his superior force and therefore as it were hostages;[890] but they would be removed from contact with the Phokians, and would bring to bear upon the latter an additional force of intimidation. If, on the contrary, the Athenians determined not to come, they would at any rate interpret his desire for their presence as a proof that he contemplated no purposes at variance with their wishes and interests; and would trust the assurances, given by Æschines and his other partisans at Athens, that he secretly meant well towards the Phokians. This last alternative was what Philip both desired and anticipated. He wished only to deprive the Phokians of all chance of aid from Athens, and to be left to deal with them himself. His letters served to blind the Athenian public, but his partisans took care not to move the assembly[891] to a direct compliance with their invitation. Indeed the proposal of such an expedition (besides the standing dislike of the citizens towards military service) would have been singularly repulsive, seeing that the Athenians would have had to appear, ostensibly at least, in arms against their Phokian allies. The conditional menace of the Athenian assembly against the Phokians (in case of refusal to surrender the temple to the Amphiktyons), decreed on the motion of Philokrates, was in itself sufficiently harsh, against allies of ten years’ standing; and was tantamount at least to a declaration that Athens would not interfere on their behalf—which was all that Philip wanted.
Among the hearers of these debates at Athens, were deputies from these very Phokians, whose fate now hung in suspense. It has already been stated that during the preceding September, while the Phokians were torn by intestine dissensions, Phalækus, the chief of the mercenaries, had repudiated aid (invited by his Phokian opponents), both from Athens and Sparta;[892] feeling strong enough to hold Thermopylæ by his own force. During the intervening months, however, both his strength and his pride had declined. Though he still occupied Thermopylæ with eight thousand or ten thousand mercenaries, and still retained superiority over Thebes, with possession of Orchomenus, Koroneia, and other places taken from the Thebans,[893]—yet his financial resources had become so insufficient for a numerous force, and the soldiers had grown so disorderly from want of regular pay,[894] that he thought it prudent to invite aid from Sparta during the spring,—while Athens was deserting the Phokians to make terms with Philip. Archidamus accordingly came to Thermopylæ with one thousand Lacedæmonian auxiliaries.[895] The defensive force thus assembled was amply sufficient against Philip by land; but that important pass could not be held without the coöperation of a superior fleet at sea.[896] Now the Phokians had powerful enemies even within the pass—the Thebans; and there was no obstacle, except the Athenian fleet under Proxenus at Oreus,[897] to prevent Philip from landing troops in the rear of Thermopylæ, joining the Thebans, and making himself master of Phokis from the side towards Bœotia.
To the safety of the Phokians, therefore, the continued maritime protection of Athens was indispensable; and they doubtless watched with trembling anxiety the deceitful phases of Athenian diplomacy during the winter and spring of 347-346 B. C. Their deputies must have been present at Athens when the treaty was concluded and sworn in March 346 B. C. Though compelled to endure not only the refusal of Antipater excluding them from the oath, but also the consent of their Athenian allies, tacitly acted upon without being formally announced, to take the oath without them,—they nevertheless heard the assurances, confidently addressed by Philokrates and Æschines to the people, that this refusal was a mere feint to deceive the Thessalians and Thebans,—that Philip would stand forward as the protector of the Phokians, and that all his real hostile purposes were directed against Thebes. How the Phokians interpreted such tortuous and contradictory policy, we are not told. But their fate hung upon the determination of Athens; and during the time when the Ten Athenian envoys were negotiating or intriguing with Philip at Pella, Phokian envoys were there also, trying to establish some understanding with Philip, through Lacedæmonian and Athenian support. Both Philip and Æschines probably amused them with favorable promises. And though, when the oaths were at last administered to Philip at Pheræ, the Phokians were formally pronounced to be excluded,—still the fair words of Æschines, and his assurances of Philip’s good intentions towards them, were not discontinued.