[220] Diog. L. ii. 97. Θεόδωρος — παντάπασιν ἀναιρῶν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας. Diog. L. ii. 86, 97. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 34, 83-84. Ἡγησίας ὁ πεισιθάνατος.
[221] Diog. L. ii. 93, 94.
Hegesias — Low estimation of life — renunciation of pleasure — coincidence with the Cynics.
Such is the summary which we read of the doctrines of Hegesias: who is said to have enforced his views,[222] — of the real character of life, as containing a great preponderance of misfortune and suffering — in a manner so persuasive, that several persons were induced to commit suicide. Hence he was prohibited by the first Ptolemy from lecturing in such a strain. His opinions respecting life coincide in the main with those set forth by Sokrates in the Phædon of Plato: which dialogue also is alleged to have operated so powerfully on the Platonic disciple Kleombrotus, that he was induced to terminate his own existence. Hegesias, agreeing with Aristippus that pleasure would be the Good, if you could get it — maintains that the circumstances of life are such as to render pleasure unattainable: and therefore advises to renounce pleasure at once and systematically, in order that we may turn our attention to the only practicable end — that of lessening pain. Such deliberate renunciation of pleasure brings him into harmony with the doctrine of the Cynics.
[222] Compare the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue entitled Axiochus, pp. 366, 367, and the doctrine of Kleanthes in Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 88-92. Lucretius, v. 196-234.
Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well as by Protagoras.
On another point, however, Hegesias repeats just the same doctrine as Aristippus. Both deny any thing like absolute knowledge: they maintain that all our knowledge is phenomenal, or relative to our own impressions or affections: that we neither do know, nor can know, anything about any real or supposed ultra-phenomenal object, i.e., things in themselves, as distinguished from our own impressions and apart from our senses and other capacities. Having no writings of Aristippus left, we know this doctrine only as it is presented by others, and those too opponents. We cannot tell whether Aristippus or his supporters stated their own doctrine in such a way as to be open to the objections which we read as urged by opponents. But the doctrine itself is not, in my judgment, refuted by any of those objections. “Our affections (πάθη) alone are known to us, but not the supposed objects or causes from which they proceed.” The word rendered by affections must here be taken in its most general and comprehensive sense — as including not merely sensations, but also remembrances, emotions, judgments, beliefs, doubts, volitions, conscious energies, &c. Whatever we know, we can know only as it appears to, or implicates itself somehow with, our own minds. All the knowledge which I possess, is an aggregate of propositions affirming facts, and the order or conjunction of facts, as they are, or have been, or may be, relative to myself. This doctrine of Aristippus is in substance the same as that which Protagoras announced in other words as — “Man is the measure of all things”. I have already explained and illustrated it, at considerable length, in my chapter on the Platonic Theætêtus, where it is announced by Theætetus and controverted by Sokrates.[223]
[223] See below, [vol. iii. ch. xxviii.] Compare Aristokles ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xiv. 18, 19, and Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii. 190-197, vi. 53. Sextus gives a summary of this doctrine of the Kyrenaics, more fair and complete than that given by Aristokles — at least so far as the extract from the latter in Eusebius enables us to judge. Aristokles impugns it vehemently, and tries to fasten upon it many absurd consequences — in my judgment without foundation. It is probable that by the term πάθος the Kyrenaics meant simply sensations internal and external: and that the question, as they handled it, was about the reality of the supposed Substratum or Object of sense, independent of any sentient Subject. It is also probable that, in explaining their views, they did not take account of the memory of past sensations — and the expectation of future sensations, in successions or conjunctions more or less similar — associating in the mind with the sensation present and actual, to form what is called a permanent object of sense. I think it likely that they set forth their own doctrine in a narrow and inadequate manner.
But this defect is noway corrected by Aristokles their opponent. On the contrary, he attacks them on their strong side: he vindicates against them the hypothesis of the ultra phenomenal, absolute, transcendental Object, independent of and apart from any sensation, present, past, or future — and from any sentient Subject. Besides that, he assumes them to deny, or ignore, many points which their theory noway requires them to deny. He urges one argument which, when properly understood, goes not against them, but strongly in their favour. “If these philosophers,” says Aristokles (Eus. xiv. 19, 1), “know that they experience sensation and perceive, they must know something beyond the sensation itself. If I say ἐγὼ καίομαι, ‘I am being burned,’ this is a proposition, not a sensation. These three things are of necessity co-essential — the sensation itself, the Object which causes it, the Subject which feels it (ἀνάγκη γε τρία ταῦτα συνυφίστασθαι — τό τε πάθος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον).” In trying to make good his conclusion — That you cannot know the sensation without the Object of sense — Aristokles at the same time asserts that the Object cannot be known apart from the sensation, nor apart from the knowing Subject. He asserts that the three are by necessity co-essential — i.e. implicated and indivisible in substance and existence: if distinguishable therefore, distinguishable only logically (λόγῳ χωριστὰ), admitting of being looked at in different points of view. But this is exactly the case of his opponents, when properly stated. They do not deny Object: they do not deny Subject: but they deny the independent and separate existence of the one as well as of the other: they admit the two only as relative to each other, or as reciprocally implicated in the indivisible fact of cognition. The reasoning of Aristokles thus goes to prove the opinion which he is trying to refute. Most of the arguments, which Sextus adduces in favour of the Kyrenaic doctrine, show forcibly that the Objective Something, apart from its Subjective correlate, is unknowable and a non-entity; but he does not include in the Subjective as much as ought to be included; he takes note only of the present sensation, and does not include sensations remembered or anticipated. Another very forcible part of Sextus’s reasoning may be found, vii. sect. 269-272, where he shows that a logical Subject per se is undefinable and inconceivable — that those who attempt to define Man (e.g.) do so by specifying more or fewer of the predicates of Man — and that if you suppose all the predicates to vanish, the Subject vanishes along with them.