Dialogues of Investigation or Search.Dialogues of Exposition.
Ζητητικοί.Ὑφηγητικοί.
1. Theætêtus.1. Timæus.
2. Parmenidês.2. Leges.
3. Alkibiadês I.3. Epinomis.
4. Alkibiadês II.4. Kritias.
5. Theagês.5. Republic.
6. Lachês.6. Sophistês.
7. Lysis.7. Politikus.
8. Charmidês.8. Phædon.
9. Menon.9. Philêbus.
10. Ion. 10. Protagoras.
11. Euthyphron.11. Phædrus.
12. Euthydêmus.12. Symposion.
13. Gorgias.13. Kratylus.
14. Hippias I.14. Kriton.
15. Hippias II.
16. Kleitophon.
17. Hipparchus.The Apology, Menexenus, Epistolæ, do not properly belong to either head.
18. Erastæ.
19. Minos.

Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over the expository and dogmatical.

It will thus appear, from a fair estimate and comparison of lists, that the relation which Plato bears to philosophy is more that of a searcher, tester, and impugner, than that of an expositor and dogmatist — though he undertakes both the two functions: more negative than affirmative — more ingenious in pointing out difficulties, than successful in solving them. I must again repeat that though this classification is just, as far as it goes, and the best which can be applied to the dialogues, taken as a whole — yet the dialogues have much which will not enter into the classification, and each has its own peculiarities.

Dialogues of Search — sub-classes among them recognised by Thrasyllus — Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c.

The Dialogues of Search, thus comprising more than half the Platonic compositions, are again distributed by Thrasyllus into two sub-classes — Gymnastic and Agonistic: the Gymnastic, again, into Obstetric and Peirastic; the Agonistic, into Probative and Refutative. Here, again, there is a pretence of symmetrical arrangement, which will not hold good if we examine it closely. Nevertheless, the epithets point to real attributes of various dialogues, and deserve the more attention, inasmuch as they imply a view of philosophy foreign to the prevalent way of looking at it. Obstetric and Tentative or Testing (Peirastic) are epithets which a reader may understand; but he will not easily see how they bear upon the process of philosophy.

Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative teaching, positive results, direct proofs.

The term philosopher is generally understood to mean something else. In appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, What authoritative creed has he proclaimed, for disciples to swear allegiance to? What positive system, or positive truths previously unknown or unproved, has he established? Next, by what arguments has he enforced or made them good? This is the ordinary proceeding of an historian of philosophy, as he calls up the roll of successive names. The philosopher is assumed to speak as one having authority; to have already made up his mind; and to be prepared to explain what his mind is. Readers require positive results announced, and positive evidence set before them, in a clear and straightforward manner. They are intolerant of all that is prolix, circuitous, not essential to the proof of the thesis in hand. Above all, an affirmative result is indispensable.

When I come to the Timæus, and Republic, &c., I shall consider what reply Plato could make to these questions. In the meantime, I may observe that if philosophers are to be estimated by such a scale, he will not stand high on the list. Even in his expository dialogues, he cares little about clear proclamation of results, and still less about the shortest, straightest, and most certain road for attaining them.

The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and teaching — assume truth to be unknown to all alike — follow a process devious as well as fruitless.

But as to those numerous dialogues which are not expository, Plato could make no reply to the questions at all. There are no affirmative results:—and there is a process of enquiry, not only fruitless, but devious, circuitous, and intentionally protracted. The authoritative character of a philosopher is disclaimed. Not only Plato never delivers sentence in his own name, but his principal spokesman, far from speaking with authority, declares that he has not made up his own mind, and that he is only a searcher along with others, more eager in the chase than they are.[50] Philosophy is conceived as the search for truth still unknown; not as an explanation of truth by one who knows it, to others who do not know it. The process of search is considered as being in itself profitable and invigorating, even though what is sought be not found. The ingenuity of Sokrates is shown, not by what he himself produces, for he avows himself altogether barren — but by his obstetric aid: that is, by his being able to evolve, from a youthful mind, answers of which it is pregnant, and to test the soundness and trustworthiness of those answers when delivered: by his power, besides, of exposing or refuting unsound answers, and of convincing others of the fallacy of that which they confidently believed themselves to know.