Still Sokrates is represented as adopting the resolution to obey, from his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, but which would not weigh with others.
Still, however, though adopting the democratical vein of sentiment for this purpose, Sokrates is made to adopt it on a ground peculiar to himself. His individuality is thus upheld. He holds the sentence pronounced against him to have been unjust, but he renounces all use of that plea, because the sentence has been legally pronounced by the judicial authority of the city, and because he has entered into a covenant with the city. He entertains the firm conviction that no one ought to act unjustly, or to do evil to others, in any case; not even in the case in which they have done injustice or evil to him. “This (says Sokrates) is my conviction, and the principle of my reasoning. Few persons do accept it, or ever will: yet between those who do accept it, and those who do not — there can be no common counsel: by necessity of the case, each looks upon the other, and upon the reasonings of the other, with contempt.”[15]
[15] Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, [note i].
The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, but represents feelings common among Athenian citizens.
This general doctrine, peculiar to Sokrates, is decisive per se, in its application to the actual case, and might have been made to conclude the dialogue. But Sokrates introduces it as a foundation to the arguments urged by the personified Athenian Nomos:—which, however, are not corollaries from it, nor at all peculiar to Sokrates, but represent sentiments held by the Athenian democrats more cordially than they were by Sokrates. It is thus that the dialogue Kriton embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct elements — constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality.
Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason and conscience, for the individual himself.
Apart from the express purpose of this dialogue, however, the general doctrine here proclaimed by Sokrates deserves attention, in regard to the other Platonic dialogues which we shall soon review. The doctrine involves an emphatic declaration of the paramount authority of individual reason and conscience; for the individual himself — but for him alone. “This (says Sokrates) is, and has long been my conviction. It is the basis of the whole reasoning. Look well whether you agree to it: for few persons do agree to it, or ever will: and between those who do and those who do not, there can be no common deliberation: they must of necessity despise each other.”[16] Here we have the Protagorean dogma, Homo Mensura — which Sokrates will be found combating in the Theætêtus — proclaimed by Sokrates himself. As things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you. My reason and conscience is the measure for me: yours for you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine.
[16] Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, [note i].
I shall revert to this doctrine in handling other Platonic dialogues, particularly the Theætêtus.
The Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference between Rhetoric and Dialectic.