ib. v. 321:
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γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ’
ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ’ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀῒδηλον, στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ. |
Theophrastus, De Sensu, c. 10, p. 650, Schneid.
Aristotle says that Empedokles regarded each of these six as a ψυχὴ (soul, vital principle) by itself. Sextus Empiricus treats Empedokles as considering each of the six to be a κριτήριον ἀληθείας (Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 116).
[130] Emp. Fr. v. 313, Karst. ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. viii. 286; also apud Diogen. L. viii. 77.
| πάντα γὰρ ἴσθ’ φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν. |
Stein gives (Emp. Fr. v. 222-231) several lines immediately preceding this from the treatise of Hippolytus; but they are sadly corrupt.
Parmenides had held the same opinion before — καὶ ὅλως πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν — ap. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 4.
Theophrastus, in commenting upon the doctrine of Empedokles, takes as one of his grounds of objection — That Empedokles, in maintaining sensation and knowledge to be produced by influx of the elements into pores, made no difference between animated and inanimate substances (Theophr. De Sens. s. 12-23). Theophrastus puts this as if it were an inconsistency or oversight of Empedokles: but it cannot be so considered, for Empedokles (as well as Parmenides) appears to have accepted the consequence, and to have denied all such difference, except one of degree, as to perception and knowledge.
[131] Emp. Frag. 316, Karst. αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα. Comp. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 11.