Aristotle blames Demokritus for thus acquiescing in the general course of nature as an ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final causes. M. Lafaist, in a good dissertation, Sur la Philosophie Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p. 78), shows that this is exactly the ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. “Un phénomène se passait-il, si on lui en demandait la raison, il (Demokritus) répondait, ‘La chose se passe ainsi, parcequ’elle s’est toujours passée ainsi.’ C’est, en d’autres termes, la seule réponse que font encore aujourd’hui les naturalistes. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand elle n’est pas soutenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la pesanteur. Qu’est-ce que la loi de la pesanteur? La généralisation de ce fait plusieurs fois observé, qu’une pierre tombe quand elle n’est pas soutenue. Le phénomène dans un cas particulier arrive ainsi, parceque toujours il est arrivé ainsi. Le principe qu’implique l’explication des naturalistes modernes est celle de Démokrite, c’est que la nature demeure constante à elle-même. La proposition de Démokrite — ‘Tel phénomène a lieu de cette façon, parceque toujours il a eu lieu de cette même façon’ — est la première forme qu’ ait revêtue le principe de la stabilité des lois naturelles.”
[214] Aristotle (Physic. ii. 4, p. 196, a. 25) says that Demokritus (he seems to mean Demokritus) described the motion of the atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου. Upon which Mullach (Dem. Frag. p. 382) justly remarks — “Casu (ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου) videntur fieri, quæ naturali quâdam necessitate cujus leges ignoramus evenire dicuntur. Sed quamvis Aristoteles naturalem Abderitani philosophi necessitatem, vitato ἀνάγκης vocabulo, quod alii aliter usurpabant, casum et fortunam vocaret — ipse tamen Democritus, abhorrens ab iis omnibus quæ destinatam causarum seriem tollerent rerumque naturam perturbarent, nihil juris fortunæ et casui in singulis rebus concessit.”
Zeller has a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demokritus (Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 600, 2nd. ed.).
Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dissertations prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, has the like comment respecting the fundamental principle of the Epicurean (identical quoad hoc with the Demokritean) philosophy.
“I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation ascribed by Laplace to Leibnitz — ‘that the blind chance of the Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without a cause’. This is a very incorrect statement of the philosophy taught by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposition. The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the universe does not imply the existence of intelligent causes, but may be accounted for by the active powers belonging to the atoms of matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely long period of time, might have produced, nay must have produced, exactly such a combination of things as that with which we are surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to produce every effect, but, on the contrary, virtually assumes the truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute of intelligence. In the same way, when I apply the words blind chance to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am ultimately the cause of the particular event that is to take place: but only to intimate that I do not here act as a designing cause, in consequence of my ignorance of the various accidents to which the die is subjected while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this Epicurean theory approaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the main object of the Essay on Probabilities (by Laplace) to inculcate.” (Stewart — First Dissertation, part ii. p. 139, note.)
[215] Demokrit. Frag. p. 167, ed. Mullach; Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 27. ἄνθρωποι τύχης εἴδωλον ἐπλάσαντο πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀβουλίης.
[216] Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 604 seq.; Demokrit. Fragm. p. 207, Mull.; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. vii. 117.
[217] Demokrit. Fragm. p. 208, Mullach. Δημόκριτος ἐν οἷς φησι δίνη ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποκρίνεσθαι παντοίων εἰδέων, &c.
Diog. Laert. ix. 31-44.
[218] Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 612, ed. 2nd.