[46] Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 275 D — 278 D. Aristotle also adverts to this fallacy, but without naming the Euthydêmus. See Soph. El. 4, 165, b. 30.
[47] Plato, Euthydêm. p. 300 D. Οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα
[48] Plato, Euthydêm. p. 284 E. τοὺς γοῦν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς λέγουσί τε καὶ φασὶ διαλέγεσθαι. The metaphorical sense of ψυχρὸς is pointless, stupid, out of taste, out of place, &c.
Fallacies — à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter — in the Euthydêmus.
Again, the two Sophists undertake to prove that Sokrates, as well as the youth Kleinias and indeed every one else, knows everything. “Can any existing thing be that which it is, and at the same time not be that which it is? — No. — You know some things? — Yes. — Then if you know, you are knowing? — Certainly. I am knowing of those particular things. — That makes no difference: if you are knowing, you necessarily know everything. — Oh! no: for there are many things which I do not know. — Then if there be anything which you do not know, you are not knowing? — Yes, doubtless — of that particular thing. — Still you are not knowing: and just now you said that you were knowing: and thus, at one and the same time, you are what you are, and you are not what you are.[49]
[49] Plato, Euthydêm. p. 293 C. Aristotle considers know to be an equivocal word; he admits that in certain senses you may both know and not know the same thing. Anal. Prior. ii. 67, b. 8. Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 25.
“But you also” (retorts Sokrates upon the couple), “do not you also know some things, not know others? — By no means. — What! do you know nothing? — Far from it. — Then you know all things? — Certainly we do, — and you too: if you know one thing, you know all things. — What! do you know the art of the carpenter, the currier, the cobbler — the number of stars in the heaven, and of grains of sand in the desert, &c.? — Yes: we know all these things.”
Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their replies — determination not to contradict themselves.
The two Sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the affirmative to each of these successive questions: though Ktesippus pushes them hard by enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse specialties.[50] This is one of the purposes of the dialogue: to represent the two Sophists as willing to answer any thing, however obviously wrong and false, for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the dispute — as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the position of questioners, and to evade the position of respondents — and as exacting a categorical answer — Yes or No — to every question which they put without any qualifying words, and without any assurance that the meaning of the question was understood.[51]
[50] Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 293-294.