Menon having been thus made to understand the formal requisites for a definition, gives as his definition of virtue the phrase of some lyric poet — “To delight in, or desire, things beautiful, fine, honourable — and to have the power of getting them“. But Sokrates remarks that honourable things are good things, and that every one without exception desires good. No one desires evil except when he mistakes it for good. On this point all men are alike; the distinctive feature of virtue must then consist in the second half of the definition — in the power of acquiring good things, such as health, wealth, money, power, dignities, &c.[14] But the acquisition of these things is not virtuous, unless it be made consistently with justice and moderation: moreover the man who acts justly is virtuous, even though he does not acquire them. It appears then that every agent who acts with justice and moderation is virtuous. But this is nugatory as a definition of virtue: for justice and moderation are only known as parts of virtue, and require to be themselves defined. No man can know what a part of virtue is, unless he knows what virtue itself is.[15] Menon must look for a better definition, including nothing but what is already known or admitted.
[14] Plato, Menon, p. 77 B. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετὴν ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.
Whoever this lyric poet was, his real meaning is somewhat twisted by Sokrates in order to furnish a basis for ethical criticism, as the song of Simonides is in the Protagoras. A person having power, and taking delight in honourable or beautiful things — is a very intelligible Hellenic idéal, as an object of envy and admiration. Compare Protagoras, p. 351 C: εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς ζῴη ἡδόμενος. A poor man may be φιλόκαλος as well as a rich man: φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ’ εὐτελείας, is the boast of Periklês in the name of the Athenians, Thucyd. ii. 40.
Plato, Menon, p. 78 C. Sokr. Ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχι οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον; καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς; μὴ ἄλλ’ ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα; Menon. Οὐκ· ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.
[15] Plato, Menon, p. 79.
Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an electric shock — Sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of search by both.
Menon. — Your conversation, Sokrates, produces the effect of the shock of the torpedo: you stun and confound me: you throw me into inextricable perplexity, so that I can make no answer. I have often discoursed copiously — and, as I thought, effectively — upon virtue; but now you have shown that I do not even know what virtue is. Sokr. — If I throw you into perplexity, it is only because I am myself in the like perplexity and ignorance. I do not know what virtue is, any more than you: and I shall be glad to continue the search for finding it, if you will assist me.
But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know, it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it.
Menon. — But how are you to search for that of which you are altogether ignorant? Even if you do find it, how can you ever know that you have found it? Sokr. — You are now introducing a troublesome doctrine, laid down by those who are averse to the labour of thought. They tell us that a man cannot search either for what he knows, or for what he does not know. For the former, research is superfluous: for the latter it is unprofitable and purposeless, since the searcher does not know what he is looking for.
Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates — anterior immortality of the soul — what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten.