[23] Plato, Menon, p. 94 E.
Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown.
The state of the discussion as it stands now, is represented by two hypothetical syllogisms, as follows:
1. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:
But virtue is knowledge:
Therefore virtue is teachable.2. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:
But virtue is not teachable:
Therefore virtue is not knowledge.
The premisses of each of these two syllogisms contradict the conclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If virtue is not acquired by teaching and does not come by nature, how are there any virtuous men?
Sokrates modifies his premisses — knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results — right opinion will do the same.
Sokrates continues his argument: The second premiss of the first syllogism — that virtue is knowledge — is true, but not the whole truth. In proving it we assumed that there was nothing except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But this assumption will not hold. There is something else besides knowledge, which also guides us to the same useful results. That something is right opinion, which is quite different from knowledge. The man who holds right opinions is just as profitable to us, and guides us quite as well to right actions, as if he knew. Right opinions, so long as they stay in the mind, are as good as knowledge, for the purpose of guidance in practice. But the difference is, that they are evanescent and will not stay in the mind: while knowledge is permanent and ineffaceable. They are exalted into knowledge, when bound in the mind by a chain of causal reasoning:[24] that is, by the process of reminiscence, before described.
[24] Plato, Menon, pp. 97 E — 98 A. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλόν τι χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἂν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται.
Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others — good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods.
Virtue then (continues Sokrates) — that which constitutes the virtuous character and the permanent, trustworthy, useful guide — consists in knowledge. But there is also right opinion, a sort of quasi-knowledge, which produces in practice effects as good as knowledge, only that it is not deeply or permanently fixed in the mind.[25] It is this right opinion, or quasi-knowledge, which esteemed and distinguished citizens possess, and by means of which they render useful service to the city. That they do not possess knowledge, is certain; for if they did, they would be able to teach it to others, and especially to their own sons: and this it has been shown that they cannot do.[26] They deliver true opinions and predictions, and excellent advice, like prophets and oracular ministers, by divine inspiration and possession, without knowledge or wisdom of their own. They are divine and inspired persons, but not wise or knowing.[27]