This distinction compared with modern philosophical views.
To translate the views of Plato into analogous views of a modern philosopher, we may say — That right opinion, as contrasted with knowledge, is a discriminating and acute empirical judgment: inferring only from old particulars to new particulars (without the intermediate help and guarantee of general propositions distinctly enunciated and interpreted), but selecting for every new case the appropriate analogies out of the past, with which it ought to be compared. Many persons judge in this manner fairly well, and some with extreme success. But let them be ever so successful in practice, they proceed without any conscious method; they are unable to communicate the grounds of their inferences to others: and when they are right, it is only by haphazard — that is (to use Plato’s language), through special inspiration vouchsafed to them by the Gods. But when they ascend to knowledge, and come to judge scientifically, they then distribute these particular facts into classes — note the constant sequences as distinguished from the occasional — and draw their inferences in every new case according to such general laws or uniformities of antecedent and consequent. Such uniform and unconditional antecedents are the only causes of which we have cognizance. They admit of being described in the language which Plato here uses (αἰτίας λογισμῷ), and they also serve as reasons for justifying or explaining our inferences to others.[48]
[48] We have seen that in the Menon Plato denies all διδαχή, and recognises nothing but ἀνάμνησις. The doctrine of the Timæus (p. 51 D-E) is very different. He there lays especial stress on the distinction between διδαχὴ and πειθώ — the first belonging to ἐπιστήμη, the second to δόξα. Also in Gorgias, 454, and in Republic, v. pp. 477-479, about δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. In those dialogues the distinction between the two is presented as marked and fundamental, as if δόξα alone was fallible and ἐπιστήμη infallible. In the Menon the distinction appears as important, but not fundamental; the Platonic Ideas or Universals being not recognised as constituting a substantive world by themselves. In this respect the Menon is nearer to the truth in describing the difference between ὀρθὴ δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. Mr. John Stuart Mill (in the chapter of his System of Logic wherein the true theory of the Syllogism is for the first time expounded) has clearly explained what that difference amounts to. All our inferences are from particulars, sometimes to new particulars directly and at once (δόξα), sometimes to generals in the first instance, and through them to new particulars; which latter, or scientific process, is highly valuable as a security for correctness (ἐπιστήμη). “Not only“ (says Mr. Mill) “may we reason from particulars to particulars without passing through generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, but years elapse before we learn the use of general language. We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people, or from one person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our observations into general maxims of human or external nature. If we have an extensive experience and retain its impressions strongly, we may acquire in this manner a very considerable power of accurate judgment, which we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of communicating to others. Among the higher order of practical intellects, there have been many of whom it was remarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends, without being able to give any sufficient account of what they did; and applied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly unable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored with appropriate particulars, and having been accustomed to reason at once from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of stating to one’s self or others the corresponding general propositions. The cases of men of talent performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the rudest and most spontaneous forms of the operations of superior minds. It is a defect in them, and often a source of errors, not to have generalised as they went on; but generalisation, though a help, the most important indeed of all helps, is not an essential” (Mill, Syst. of Logic, Book II. ch. iii.). Compare the first chapter of the Metaphysica of Aristotle, p. 980, a. 15, b. 7.
Manifestation of Anytus — intense antipathy to the Sophists and to philosophy generally.
The manner in which Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates before the Dikastery, is introduced into this dialogue, deserves notice. The questions are put to him by Sokrates — “Is virtue teachable? How is Menon to learn virtue, and from whom? Ought he not to do as he would do if he wished to learn medicine or music: to put himself under some paid professional man as teacher?” Anytus answers these questions in the affirmative: but asks, where such professional teachers of virtue are to be found. “There are the Sophists,” replies Sokrates. Upon this Anytus breaks out into a burst of angry invective against the Sophists; denouncing them as corruptors of youth, whom none but a madman would consult, and who ought to be banished by public authority.
Why are you so bitter against the Sophists? asks Sokrates. Have any of them ever injured you? Anyt. — No; never: I have never been in the company of any one of them, nor would I ever suffer any of my family to be so. Sokr. — Then you have no experience whatever about the Sophists? Anyt. — None: and I hope that I never may have. Sokr. — How then can you know about this matter, how far it is good or bad, if you have no experience whatever about it? Anyt. — Easily. I know what sort of men the Sophists are, whether I have experience of them or not. Sokr. — Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus: for how else you can know about them, I do not understand, even on your own statement.[49]
[49] Plato, Menon, p. 92.
Anytus then declares, that the persons from whom Menon ought to learn virtue are the leading practical politicians; and that any one of them can teach it. But Sokrates puts a series of questions, showing that the leading Athenian politicians, Themistoklês, Periklês, &c., have not been able to teach virtue even to their own sons: à fortiori, therefore, they cannot teach it to any one else. Anytus treats this series of questions as disparaging and calumnious towards the great men of Athens. He breaks off the conversation abruptly, with an angry warning to Sokrates to be cautious about his language, and to take care of his own safety.
The dialogue is then prosecuted and finished between Sokrates and Menon: and at the close of it, Sokrates says — “Talk to Anytus, and communicate to him that persuasion which you have yourself contracted,[50] in order that he may be more mildly disposed: for, if you persuade him, you will do some good to the Athenians as well as to himself.”
[50] Plato, Menon, ad fin. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι, πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πρᾳότερος ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅ, τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις.